Subject: [AAA-DOCTORS] FW: Evaluation: draft-ietf-pkix-rfc4055-update-01.txt to ProposedStandard

From: "Romascanu, Dan (Dan)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2009 15:04:53 +0100

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-rfc4055-update-01.tx
t

Technical Summary

   The subjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate carries
   three data items: an algorithm identifier, optional parameters, and
   a bit string that represents the public key. The parameters are
   specific to the algorithm and this field usually contains simple
   values needed to characterize the public key algorithm, e.g., the
   generator and modulus for Diffie-Hellman. However, X.509 does not
   constrain the scope of this parameters field. The ANSI X9.62
   standards committee elected to use this field to express
   potentially complex limitations on how the public key in the
   certificate can be used, e.g., which key derivation functions can
   be applied to the bit string that results from a Diffie-Hellman key
   exchange.

   After considerable debate, the PKIX WG has decided to not express
   key usage constraints via this field. Instead, the WG decided that
   this sort of information should be expressed via use of distinct
   algorithm identifiers. (This decision is consistent with the
   observation that current products are not deigned to handle such
   key usage restrictions expressed in the subjectPublicKeyInfo
   field.)

   RFC 4055 such allowed restrictions to be placed in this field when
   used with RSA-OAEP.  This document changes RFC 4055 to say that
   restrictions MUST NOT be present in the certificate's
   subjectPublicKeyInfo field when used with RSA-OAEP. It also
   replaces incorrect references to the publicKeyAlgorithm field with
   references to the subjectPublicKeyInfo field. As a result, this
   revised version of RFC 4055 will be consistent with the PKIX WG
   conventions adopted for this field.

Working Group Summary

   This ID was discussed on the mailing list. A poll was taken on the
   PKIX list to determine whether the proposed change was the way
   forward and another poll was taken to determine whether the change
   would adversely affect implementations. The WG was in favor of the
   change and no implementer said it would adversely affect their
   products. Further, vendors that implement RFC 4055 support the
   change.

Document Quality

   This document is a short update of an existing draft and is
   comparable in quality to its predecessor.

Personnel

   Steve Kent is the document Shepherd.  Pasi Eronen is the 
   responsible security area director.

RFC Editor Note

   Abstract:
   OLD: 
      It updates the conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme -
      Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport
      algorithm with the Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1
      version 1.5 signature algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key
      Infrastructure (PKI).
   NEW:
      It updates the conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme -
      Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport
      algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
   
   Section 1:
   OLD:
      RFC 4055 specifies conventions for using the RSA Encryption
      Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key
      transport algorithm with the Public-Key Cryptography Standards
      (PKCS) #1 version 1.5 signature algorithm in the Internet X.509
      Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
   NEW:
      RFC 4055 specifies conventions for using the RSA Encryption
      Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key
      transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key
      Infrastructure (PKI).

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