Subject: [Asrg] Volunteering to work on the evaluation critera

From: Russell Brand <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2003 12:21:30 -0800

I'd like to volunteer to gather, collate, and organize the proposed
evaluation criteria.  It seems that I can best do this by

    (1) to the extent practical, gather up the proposed criteria that
        have been discussed already

    (2) put those into a document and distribute that to the list.

    (3) request that people on the list send to me a list of criteria
        that I have left out

    (4) that I publish and updated list

    (5) request that people send to me any thoughts, arguments,
        explanation as to why any of the various proposed criteria
        might be MUST vs SHOULD vs NICE TO HAVE vs irrelevant

    (6) that I publish an annotated list which include the
        argumentation on all points where there is discussion and the
        consensus answer where one exists.

My email address is

    [email-masked]

please put

    EVALUATION CRITERIA       

in the header

Here is my first pass at enumeration of criteria.

                               *draft*

         Proposed Evaluation Criteria for Anti Spam Solutions

                           $Revision: 1.3 $
                   $Date: 2003-03-26 12:19:28-08 $

                           Russell L. Brand
                        [email-masked]
                   [email-masked]

                               *draft*

1.0 Introduction
================

This is an unordered simple listing of possible criteria for ASRG to
evaluate anti-spam solutions.

I am actively soliciting both additional criteria and also
argumentation/analysis as to which criteria are appropriate and
important and which are not.

2.0 Current List of Criteria
============================

2.1 Inexpensive
---------------

[2.1.1] not computational/storage expensive for the (legitimate) sender 

[2.1.2] not computational/storage expensive for the recipient 

[2.1.3] not computational/storage expensive for relay

[2.1.4] does not (greatly) increase the communications requirements 

[2.1.5] does not (greatly) increase the message size

[2.1.6] makes the bad guys bare the cost rather than the legitimate
users 

2.2 Unencumbered
----------------

[2.2.1] no undisclosed pending "submarine" patents

[2.2.2] no patents

[2.2.3] no patents that won't be readily licensed to all

[2.2.4] no patents that are so ludicrous as to be readily
ignored. 

2.3 easy to use
---------------

[2.3.1] easy for the sender to use for ongoing communication 

[2.3.2] easy for the sender to use for a first contact situation 

[2.3.3] easy for the recipient to use for ongoing communication 

[2.3.4] easy for the recipient to use for a first contact situation  

[2.3.5] easy to use for mailing lists

[2.3.6] easy to use for carbon copies

[2.3.7] easy to remember email addresses

[2.3.8] not needing to change email addresses to start using the
system 

[2.3.9] ability to have only one email addresses if desired

[2.3.10] ability to have an infinite number of (eg: a pattern of) of
email addresses if desired 

[2.3.11] not making it harder than it is now to change email addresses

[2.3.12] not requiring users and companies to get new domain names

2.4 easy to deploy
------------------

[2.4.1] can be deployed incrementally 

[2.4.2] easy to add on to existing software

[2.4.3] doesn't rely on infrastructure that doesn't exist / won't be
adopted

2.5 interoperable 
-----------------

[2.5.1] will work with webmail 

[2.5.2] will work with offline readers (pop3/imap4)

[2.5.3] will work with direct delivery

[2.5.4] will work with direct relays

[2.5.5] will work with other anti-spam systems

[2.5.6] will exchange mail between people using this system and people
not using this system

[2.5.7] practical to use on all operating systems 

[2.5.8] will work with existing email software packages

2.6 highly effective
--------------------

[2.6.1] blocks all undesired email 

[2.6.1] blocks all undesired commercial email 

2.7 persistantly effective
--------------------------

[2.7.1] isn't just a step in an arms race

[2.7.2] will work for a long time 

[2.7.3] will provably work for forever 

2.8 doesn't interfere with the delivery of legitimate mail
----------------------------------------------------------

[2.8.1] legitimate mail is not delayed

[2.8.2] legitimate mail is not lost

[2.8.3] legitimate bounce messages are not lost

[2.8.4] legitimate individual mail

[2.8.5] legitimate bulk mail

2.9 single solution
-------------------

[2.9.1] one solution that will work for all people

[2.9.1] one solution that will work for all the different types of
problems 

2.10 technical rather than legislative
--------------------------------------

[2.10.1] can be made to work without relying on any legislation 

[2.10.2] can be made to work without relying on any new legislation 

[2.10.3] doesn't interfere with current enforcement actions

[2.10.4] the technical solutions provides additional help to legal
enforcement 

2.11 opt-in
-----------

[2.11.1] supports an opt-in bulk mail system

[2.11.2] supports a way to opt out of an opt-in bulk mail system that
one has opt into 

2.12 explainability
-------------------

[2.12.1] easy to explain what it does

2.13 implementability  
---------------------

[2.13.1] is possible to implement 

[2.13.2] is easy to implement 

[2.13.3] has already been implemented 

[2.13.4] a reference implementation is available

[2.13.5] two distinct implementations have been done

[2.13.6] a GPL version exists

2.14 other platforms
--------------------

[2.14.1] works for instant messengers 

[2.14.2] works for receive-only alphanumeric pagers 

[2.14.3] works for two-way alphanumeric pagers 

[2.14.4] works for SMS / phone text messenging 

2.15 Accountability and Anonymity 
---------------------------------

[2.15.1] trace all mail to sending person 

[2.15.2] trace all mail to sending organization 

[2.15.3] trace all mail to sending organization  but not person 

[2.15.4] prevents forged mail sending organization (but permits
unspecified sending organizations)

[2.15.5] prevents forged mail sending individual (but permits
unspecified sending undividuals)

[2.15.6] allow anonymous remailers to continue working.

## end
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