Subject: CAP issue: JIT signing/encryption

From: [email-masked] (Steve Mansour)
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2001 10:38:06 -0700

- JIT signing/encryption:

  For some cases we may wind up having signing/encryption done by
  'downstream' CS's as the request routes thru.  ie: Paul @ MIT sent a
  REQUEST to his CS w/your CalID as 1 TARGET.  He sends the data
  unsigned/encrypted to his CS.  It sees your TARGET and by some TBD CS
  policy it decides that the data must be signed/encrypted so that it
can go
  over, say, iMIP.  His CS does not have his key so it simply uses its
own.
  (Additionally, if his server fanned it out to outside the firewall
before
  this happens, the signer/encryptor is not even his CS).  So the first
CS
  that can sign it does and then that is trackable all the way to you
[after
  resigning by each subsequent CS in the flow path is done]

I meant to include this in my last message. Again, my recommendation is
that CAP version 1 does not address this problem.

Bruce is probably ready to shoot me at this point.  Just to be clear, I
think these are great scenarios to consider, they are great things to
solve going forward, but I feel like trying to deal with a complex issue
such as this is just too much for CAP 1.

Do others feel this way?  Does anyone feel like this is an issue we MUST
solve in CAP 1?

-Steve