Subject: [Ietf-not43] -02 requirements draft

From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2002 17:57:54 -0500

Howdy,

> Ted Hardie wrote:
>> The requirement provides functionality: "Tell me all the domains administered
>> by Example DNS /Tell me all the domains owned by Joe Example".  There are
>> clear reasons to want this functionality.
> 
> Would you mind describing why one might want this functionality?

The "administered by" example would be useful if you were trying
to find another path to reach someone when their basic network
was down.

As for the "all domains owned by Joe Example", we've heard this 
requirement from both IPR and law enforcement communities.  

For example, in the notes from one of VeriSign's discussion forums
on the topic, with the law enforcement & ipr communities (August, 2001;
see http://uwho.verisignlabs.com for the minutes):

> Steven Metalitz, Smith & Metalitz, DNSO IPC · 
[...]
> From the perspective of IP
> community, he highlighted two important areas: 1) the universal Whois
> should be a one-stop shopping portal for accessing information
> provided by as many Registrars as possible and 2) Whois should be
> robustly searchable along a range of data elements instead of only
> through a look-up info based on a domain name, e.g., Whois should be
> searchable also for all domain names registered by the same
> Registrar. Generally, Whois needs to be public, free to use, without
> substantial restrictions and should provide information in real time.

Leslie.

-- 

-------------------------------------------------------------------
"An essential element of a successful journey
    is recognizing when you have arrived."
       -- ThinkingCat (c.1983 - 2002)

Leslie Daigle
[email-masked]
-------------------------------------------------------------------

---

From: [email-masked] (Ross Wm. Rader)
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 18:33:49 -0500

> requirement from both IPR and law enforcement communities.

Thereby forcing a requirement for allowing registrants to opt-out of certain
types of searches. (I really should do that reading that I mentioned
earlier - I'm sure that this is addressed somewhere in the drafts
already...:)

                       -rwr

"There's a fine line between fishing and standing on the shore like an
idiot."
- Steven Wright

Got Blog? http://www.byte.org/blog
----- Original Message -----
From: "Leslie Daigle" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>
Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 5:57 PM
Subject: [Ietf-not43] -02 requirements draft

> _______________________________________________
> Ietf-not43 mailing list
> [email-masked]
> http://lists.verisignlabs.com/mailman/listinfo/ietf-not43

---

From: [email-masked] (Rick Wesson)
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 16:03:54 -0800 (PST)

Leslie,

> requirement from both IPR and law enforcement communities.

at issue is that this same style of query is exactly what direct marketeers
want too. while i have herd from the IPR community I don't see them
offering to fund the development and deployment of such services.

though we may have some actors that desire these services I see no reason
to offer them for free. This is why I have proposed a requirement for
settlements.

I also can't see how we can tell the diference between an authorized user
that is a Direct Marketer and one that is from law enforcement.

best,

-rick

---

From: [email-masked] (Ted Hardie)
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 16:42:51 -0800 (PST)

Requirement 3.1.4 currently says:

3.1.4 Level of Access

   The service MUST allow the classification of data as being either
   privileged or non-privileged, for the purpose of restricting access
   to privileged data.  Note that this requirement makes no assumption
   or prescription as to what data (social or operational) might be
   considered privileged, but merely provides the ability to make the
   classification as necessary.

   The service MUST be capable of serving both privileged and non-
   privileged data.

    The service MUST be capable of authenticating privileged entities and
   ensuring that only those entities have access to both privileged and
   non-privileged data.

   The service MUST be capable of providing access to non-privileged
   data without requiring authentication of any type (i.e.  anonymous
   access).

I read that as saying that the service must be able to distinguish
between those who have a right to ask for priviledged data and those
who do not, and I'd put "Direct Marketer" and "law enforcment"
in two different places in that dichotomy.  You may decide
that "paid-up Direct Marketer" and "non-paid-up Direct Marketer"
also belong in two different classes, but that is a matter
of policy and contract, not a question of how the service needs
to work.
			regards,
				Ted Hardie

---

From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2002 18:58:54 -0600

> requirement from both IPR and law enforcement communities.  

They're going to be disappointed. This group made a concious decision to
pursue a distributed model some time back.

What is being asked is akin to asking for all of the PTR RRs everywhere in
DNS (including privates) that have host.example.com in the RRdata. You can
either cache everything in a catalog server and hope that the data was
entered willingly, accurately and timely, or you can lookup
host.example.com directly and hope that the returned A RRs are a useful
enough subset for what you want. Neither of those scenarios is liar-proof.

Option 3 is to setup another branch of Internet governance, which we have
specifically walked away from.

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/

---

From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2002 20:18:15 -0600

on 11/6/2002 6:42 PM Ted Hardie wrote:

> in two different places in that dichotomy.

The mere existence of a mechanism does not mean that anybody will provide
or honor it. In particular, the mere existence of a mechanism is unlikely
to give law enforcement personnel greater access via a catalog server
since the cache will likely only contain non-privileged information in the
first place. In the secondary case where a query is sent to the owner's
server directly, there is no way to guarantee that the credentials are
either ignored or purposefully misdirected ("law enforcement gets this set
of lies" in particular).

IOW, "privilege" is always a local consideration, and does not address the
"requirements" of the actors listed in Leslie's message. Even if those
actors do get some kind of privilege at some servers, there is no way to
require that all of the autonomous servers provide the same privilege.

---

From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2002 22:11:55 -0500

Nope -- non-centralization does not prevent global
queries.

See the references in 

http://lists.verisignlabs.com/pipermail/ietf-not43/2002-July/000157.html

Leslie.

-- 

Leslie Daigle
[email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2002 22:22:45 -0500

I will agree there is no *technical* way to ensure
it.  However, I believe our job is to provide the facility
for implementing the requirements (or at least, not
add additional impediments).

Leslie.

---

From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2002 18:28:24 -0600

> add additional impediments).

Well they can certainly the use same hooks as the rest of us, and if they
perform the necessary negotations (or legal actions) with the owners of
the databases they want to access, then they can certainly use those tools
for whatever data-mining purposes they want. They just need to know that
(1) the public partitions and servers will not suit their vertical needs,
and (2) the data they end up getting access to may be wrong or incomplete
(willingly or accidentally), and we have very little real control over
that given the range of players and involved in this effort and the
practical limits of any sufficiently flexible technology.

Combined, this means that public system will essentially be limited to
functioning as a database of the good-guys, albeit a nice one.