Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSOP Digest, Vol 139, Issue 7

From: Viktor Dukhovni <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 12:02:35 -0400

> On Jun 7, 2018, at 11:46 AM, [email-masked] wrote:
> 
> This particular author believes that the DNSSEC should move to ECC,
> so there’s a high cost associated with KSK algorithm rollover. So, if people
> are going to change to “stronger” (whatever this means in DNSSEC context)
> algorithm they should be strongly encouraged to change the algorithm
> to ECDSA256 (for now).

Just wanted to add, that I don't think of 10 as stronger than 8,
there's no evidence of weakness in SHA2-256 any time soon.  I
rather view 8/10 as being two sides of the same coin, RSA with
the two un-truncated SHA2 algorithms, with which to use a "toss-up".
So there's no real advantage to moving to 10, modulo a small
performance improvement in verifying the signatures of "large"
RRsets.  And the fact that RSA-SHA512 is can't be used with
512-bit keys is perhaps a feature.

-- 
	Viktor.