Subject: Re: [dtn-security] [dtn-interest] Migrating mailing list and wiki
From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
To: DTN <[email-masked]>, DTN Security Discussion <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2011 22:24:01 +0000
List-Id: DTN Security Discussion <dtn-security.maillists.intel-research.net>

Hi again,

Just an FYI, we've now migrated the wiki to its new
home. Please let Alex (cc'd) and I know if you spot
anything odd or broken. All current write access etc
should be just the same (mine worked anyway;-).

More on the mailing list next week, but the current
plan is to move to e.g. [email-masked] so when
we're ready we'll subscribe all the current list members
to the new list(s), send out a last message to each
of the lists being migrated (see the To: line above)
and then shut these lists. List archives (both old
and new) will be hosted at the new list info site.

Again, any issues there please let us know. Sorry
that you'll have to adjust your filters, but there
ya go. I hope that'll all happen next week.

Regards,
Stephen.

On 04/02/11 10:28, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> Due to some machine changes with the current infrastructure
> we're planning to migrate the DTNRG related lists (dtn-interest,
> dtn-security and dtn-users) to the IETF/IRTF infrastructure in
> the next few weeks. That'll mean you'll need to change filters
> etc. but everything else should be the same.
> 
> We're also planning to move the wiki, which, all going well,
> should just result in a little downtime.
> 
> Once we're all set, we'll send another mail with the final
> details.
> 
> If there're any issues with the above please mail Kevin and
> I, and also cc Alex McMahon ([email-masked]) who'll
> be doing most of the real work involved.
> 
> Regards,
> Stephen.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dtn-interest mailing list
> [email-masked]
> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-interest
> 

From: "Scott, Keith L." <[email-masked]>
To: Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2011 08:23:25 -0500
Accept-Language: en-US
acceptlanguage: en-US
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] hop-by-hop authentication

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The hop-by-hop authentication is designed to keep 'bogus' traffic out of the
network by providing a mechanism to prevent un-authenticated sources from
injecting it.  Hop-by-hop security assumes that the appropriate keys and
policy are in the network.  You're right in that *if* a malicious node can
forge a signature for a bundle and inject it into the network, then after
the first hop there's nothing in the BAB machinery to restrict that bundle's
movement (though other security policies that use non-single-hop mechanisms
like the payload security block might be in place).

The notion was that some networks may have very constrained, expensive, or
critical links and that it would be desirable to deter someone who could
connect to the network from being able to inject traffic that would cross
those links, consuming resources.  End-to-end security like IPSec doesn't do
this, e.g., because the traffic isn't thrown away until the destination
(after it's consumed resources on the critical link(s)).

                                --keith

From: [email-masked]
[mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of
Shoaib Malik
Sent: Friday, February 04, 2011 6:27 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] hop-by-hop authentication

Hi All, 

I have a question about the hop-by-hop authentication in BSP.. 

On each hop, the receiving node validates the integrity of bundle and
performs authentication of forwarder (source or intermediate forwarder)...
What benefits we get from this process ? What level of trust we have to
assume ? ... This security feature can only provide integrity of data and
nothing more than that ? 

If a malicious node can sign the bundle and forward it, then the forwarder
can verify the integrity but, still it will forward... 

In short, What are the assumptions on which BSP works ? .. 

many thanks.. 

kind regards,

Shoaib

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style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>The hop-by-hop authentication is designed to keep &#8216;bogus&#8217; =
traffic out of the network by providing a mechanism to prevent =
un-authenticated sources from injecting it.&nbsp; Hop-by-hop security =
assumes that the appropriate keys and policy are in the network.&nbsp; =
You&#8217;re right in that *<b>if</b>* a malicious node can forge a =
signature for a bundle and inject it into the network, then after the =
first hop there&#8217;s nothing in the BAB machinery to restrict that =
bundle&#8217;s movement (though other security policies that use =
non-single-hop mechanisms like the payload security block might be in =
place).<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>The notion was that some networks may have very constrained, =
expensive, or critical links and that it would be desirable to deter =
someone who could connect to the network from being able to inject =
traffic that would cross those links, consuming resources.&nbsp; =
End-to-end security like IPSec doesn&#8217;t do this, e.g., because the =
traffic isn&#8217;t thrown away until the destination (after it&#8217;s =
consumed resources on the critical link(s)).<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
--keith<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
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0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
[email-masked] =
[mailto:[email-masked]] <b>On Behalf =
Of </b>Shoaib Malik<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, February 04, 2011 6:27 =
AM<br><b>To:</b> [email-masked]<br><b>Cc:</b> =
[email-masked]<br><b>Subject:</b> =
[dtn-security] hop-by-hop authentication<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Hi =
All,&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>I have a question about the hop-by-hop =
authentication in BSP..&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>On each hop, the receiving =
node validates the integrity of bundle and performs authentication of =
forwarder (source or intermediate forwarder)... What benefits we get =
from this process ? What level of trust we have to assume ? ... This =
security feature can only provide integrity of data and nothing more =
than that ?&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>If a malicious node can sign the bundle and =
forward it, then the forwarder can verify the integrity but, still it =
will forward...&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>In short, What are the =
assumptions on which BSP works ? ..&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>many =
thanks..&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>kind =
regards,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Shoaib<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></body></html=
>
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Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2011 11:26:30 +0000
From: Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] hop-by-hop authentication

--0016364c43ed5ee7b4049b73276f
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi All,
I have a question about the hop-by-hop authentication in BSP..

On each hop, the receiving node validates the integrity of bundle and
performs authentication of forwarder (source or intermediate forwarder)...
What benefits we get from this process ? What level of trust we have to
assume ? ... This security feature can only provide integrity of data and
nothing more than that ?
If a malicious node can sign the bundle and forward it, then the forwarder
can verify the integrity but, still it will forward...

In short, What are the assumptions on which BSP works ? ..

many thanks..

kind regards,
Shoaib

--0016364c43ed5ee7b4049b73276f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi All,=A0<div>I have a question about the hop-by-hop authentication in BSP=
..=A0</div><div><br></div><div>On each hop, the receiving node validates th=
e integrity of bundle and performs authentication of forwarder (source or i=
ntermediate forwarder)... What benefits we get from this process ? What lev=
el of trust we have to assume ? ... This security feature can only provide =
integrity of data and nothing more than that ?=A0</div>
<div>If a malicious node can sign the bundle and forward it, then the forwa=
rder can verify the integrity but, still it will forward...=A0</div><div><b=
r></div><div>In short, What are the assumptions on which BSP works ? ..=A0<=
/div>
<div><br></div><div>many thanks..=A0</div><div><br></div><div>kind regards,=
</div><div>Shoaib</div>

--0016364c43ed5ee7b4049b73276f--

Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2011 10:28:22 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
To: DTN <[email-masked]>, DTN Security Discussion <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: [dtn-security] Migrating mailing list and wiki

Hi all,

Due to some machine changes with the current infrastructure
we're planning to migrate the DTNRG related lists (dtn-interest,
dtn-security and dtn-users) to the IETF/IRTF infrastructure in
the next few weeks. That'll mean you'll need to change filters
etc. but everything else should be the same.

We're also planning to move the wiki, which, all going well,
should just result in a little downtime.

Once we're all set, we'll send another mail with the final
details.

If there're any issues with the above please mail Kevin and
I, and also cc Alex McMahon ([email-masked]) who'll
be doing most of the real work involved.

Regards,
Stephen.

From: "HUANG, CHIN-TSER" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2011 09:42:14 -0500
Accept-Language: en-US
acceptlanguage: en-US
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Security for DTN

Hi Shoaib,

Your assumptions, from the starting point, are confusing.
First, if you are talking about physical confidentiality, it's always possible that N1, S, and perhaps another node N2, are all within each other's radio range at one moment. In this case, what do you mean by saying "there exists a confidential channel between N1 and S"? The transmission between N1 and S is also open to N2.
Second, if you are talking about communication confidentiality, there cannot be any confidentiality of the message contents unless they have pre-established shared secret for encryption purpose, or they set up a shared secret on demand. But what's your assumption on that?
My suggestion is that you think about these fundamental issues first before you proceed.

Hope it helps and good luck,
Chin-Tser
--
Chin-Tser Huang
Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science
   and Engineering
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
+1-803-777-4635 voice
+1-803-777-3767 fax
________________________________________
From: [email-masked] [[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Shoaib Malik [[email-masked]]
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2011 3:00 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] Security for DTN

hi,
I am working on a secure DTN network.

In the DTN network, Suppose a node, say N1, opportunistically becomes available to any other already existing node S, then at that time can we assume that there exist a confidential channel between N1 and S.
In general, "Can we assume that there exist a confidential channel between each hop nodes, in a multi hop network".

Is taking this assumption good or bad while working on security for DTN.

regards,
Shoaib

From: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" <[email-masked]>
To: Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2011 07:40:00 -0600
Accept-Language: en-US
acceptlanguage: en-US
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Security for DTN

Shoaib,

>From the question, I believe you are new to network security.  It is a painful subject that many do not understand well - at least in practical deployments. 

DTN is a network overlay.  So, you have the security, or lack of security on each of the underlying networks (convergence layers) which may include IPv4, IPv6, CCSDS (google it), bluetooth, thumb drive policy, radio link security etcetera.  In addition, you have DTN security.  You can assume nothing  on any of these links.  DTN bundle authentication(between hop security) requires some type of policy configuration and most often, a shared key.  Key distribution has not yet been addressed, nor has there been much work in policy.

The best way to understand the above is  to setup a four hop network and attempt to secure it.  Assuming you are working on an IP network, if you have never setup IPsec, I suggest starting there.  Secure the IP and wireless and then do the DTN.  It will be difficult, but easier to learn the IP network and the concepts with translate to DTN.  I suggest keeping the network fully connected to start.  Once you get everything working, you can add disconnection.  At which point you may decide to turn off IPsec as much of that may break.

This is a lot of work, but when you are done, you will have a fairly decent understanding of security and why it is difficult to deploy in multi-organizational networks.  Note, the vast amount of DTN research to date in the open community has been performed without security.

- Will
On Feb 2, 2011, at 3:00 PM, Shoaib Malik wrote:

> hi, 
> I am working on a secure DTN network. 
> 
> In the DTN network, Suppose a node, say N1, opportunistically becomes available to any other already existing node S, then at that time can we assume that there exist a confidential channel between N1 and S. 
> In general, "Can we assume that there exist a confidential channel between each hop nodes, in a multi hop network". 
> 
> Is taking this assumption good or bad while working on security for DTN. 
> 
> regards,
> Shoaib
> _______________________________________________
> dtn-security mailing list
> [email-masked]
> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security

******************************
William D. Ivancic
Phone 216-433-3494
Fax 216-433-8705
Networking Lab 216-433-2620
DTN Lab 216-433-2981
Mobile 440-503-4892
http://roland.grc.nasa.gov/~ivancic

From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2011 17:04:48 -0500
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Security for DTN

On Wed, Feb 2, 2011, Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]> wrote:

>hi, 
>I am working on a secure DTN network. 
>
>In the DTN network, Suppose a node, say N1, opportunistically becomes
>available to any other already existing node S, then at that time can we
>assume that there exist a confidential channel between N1 and S. 
>In general, "Can we assume that there exist a confidential channel
>between each hop nodes, in a multi hop network". 
>
>Is taking this assumption good or bad while working on security for DTN. 
>
>regards,
>Shoaib

HI Shoaib,

you can't assume that any particular node implements the security
protocol, or any particular ciphersuite. There is no "automatic"
confidential or secure channel - it depends entirely upon the deployment.

Regards.....Peter

From: Rohit <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2011 15:19:56 -0500
To: Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] [dtn-interest] Security for DTN

--0016368e1aa18c86fa049b526073
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

We can consider it as initial secure-context establishment problem. I have
recently come across a paper related to this topic. check the link below...

http://www.ics.uci.edu/~jsolis/publications/dtn_compsac09.pdf

<http://www.ics.uci.edu/~jsolis/publications/dtn_compsac09.pdf>I think the
question you raised by itself is a problem to address. So taking it as an
assumption really depends on the problem you are trying to address.

I am completely new to security in DTN. There are lot of experts in this
mailing list, who can give you better suggestion.

Regards,
Rohit Mullangi,
Graduate Student,
The University of Georgia,
Athens GA.

On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 3:00 PM, Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]>wrote:

> hi,
> I am working on a secure DTN network.
>
> In the DTN network, Suppose a node, say N1, opportunistically becomes
> available to any other already existing node S, then at that time can we
> assume that there exist a confidential channel between N1 and S.
> In general, "Can we assume that there exist a confidential channel between
> each hop nodes, in a multi hop network".
>
> Is taking this assumption good or bad while working on security for DTN.
>
> regards,
> Shoaib
>
> _______________________________________________
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We can consider it as initial secure-context establishment problem. I have =
recently come across a paper related to this topic. check the link below...=
=A0<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://www.ics.uci.edu/~jsolis/publicatio=
ns/dtn_compsac09.pdf">http://www.ics.uci.edu/~jsolis/publications/dtn_comps=
ac09.pdf</a></div>

<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"http://www.ics.uci.edu/~jsolis/publications/=
dtn_compsac09.pdf"></a>I think the question you raised by itself is a probl=
em to address. So taking it as an assumption really depends on the problem =
you are trying to address.</div>

<div><br></div><div>I am=A0completely=A0new to security in DTN. There are l=
ot of experts in this mailing list, who can give you better suggestion.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>Rohit Mullangi,</div><div>Graduate=
 Student,</div>

<div>The University of Georgia,</div><div>Athens GA.</div><div><br><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 3:00 PM, Shoaib Malik <span d=
ir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:[email-masked]">shoaibmalik1981=
@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div>hi,=A0</div><div>I am working on a sec=
ure DTN network.=A0</div><div><br></div>In the DTN network, Suppose a node,=
 say N1, opportunistically becomes available to any other already existing =
node S, then at that time can we assume that there exist a confidential cha=
nnel between N1 and S.=A0<div>

In general, &quot;Can we assume that there exist a confidential channel bet=
ween each hop nodes, in a multi hop network&quot;.=A0</div><div><br></div><=
div>Is taking this assumption good or bad while working on security for DTN=
.=A0</div>

<div><br></div><div>regards,</div><div>Shoaib</div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
dtn-interest mailing list<br>
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aillists.intel-research.net</a><br>
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t" target=3D"_blank">http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/d=
tn-interest</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2011 20:00:32 +0000
From: Shoaib Malik <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] Security for DTN

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hi,
I am working on a secure DTN network.

In the DTN network, Suppose a node, say N1, opportunistically becomes
available to any other already existing node S, then at that time can we
assume that there exist a confidential channel between N1 and S.
In general, "Can we assume that there exist a confidential channel between
each hop nodes, in a multi hop network".

Is taking this assumption good or bad while working on security for DTN.

regards,
Shoaib

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<div>hi,=A0</div><div>I am working on a secure DTN network.=A0</div><div><b=
r></div>In the DTN network, Suppose a node, say N1, opportunistically becom=
es available to any other already existing node S, then at that time can we=
 assume that there exist a confidential channel between N1 and S.=A0<div>
In general, &quot;Can we assume that there exist a confidential channel bet=
ween each hop nodes, in a multi hop network&quot;.=A0</div><div><br></div><=
div>Is taking this assumption good or bad while working on security for DTN=
.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>regards,</div><div>Shoaib</div>

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