Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-morris-geopriv-scenarios-00.txt

From: John Morris <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 13:54:43 -0500

A brief note of background on the referenced internet-draft:

In following the discussion on the list and looking over the 
requirements and scenarios drafts that have been circulated 
(specifically, draft-rosen-geopriv-requirements-00.txt, 
draft-takahashi-spatial-privacy-scenario-00.txt, and even the very 
recent  draft-cuellar-geopriv-reqs-00.txt), we were struck that most 
of the discussion has focused on serving a location to an end client 
or application.  Although we fully agree that this stage will be 
essential to address, the need to protect privacy arises first at an 
earlier stage of the process -- during the actual determination of 
the location in the first place.

Our i-d looks specifically at that earlier stage, and attempts to 
identify the basic scenarios covering the determination or 
computation of location.  Specifically, the draft contemplates a 
number of models for the location computation, with the location 
determination possibly being done by the carrier, the target, or even 
a third party.

We look forward to a discussion of all of the relevant drafts.

John Morris
Deirdre Mulligan
Sabra-Anne Kelin
Alan Davidson

[Note: my in-bound e-mail server is down until sometime on Friday due 
to an unfortunately timed server upgrade.  So, if you reply to Alan 
or me directly, ignore any bounce messages you get.  I'll still see 
any replies to the list.  Until our server is back up, one can reach 
me directly at [email-masked].  Thanks, John M.]

>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
>directories.
>
>	Title		: Framework for Location Computation Scenarios
>	Author(s)	: J. Morris et al.
>	Filename	: draft-morris-geopriv-scenarios-00.txt
>	Pages		: 11
>	Date		: 14-Nov-01
>
>This document defines a framework for describing location
>computation scenarios.  The framework is intended to be a starting
>point for a discussion of privacy and security issues for location-
>based services.
>
>A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-morris-geopriv-scenarios-00.txt
>
<snip>

----------------------------------------
John B. Morris, Jr.
Director, Internet Standards, Technology
    & Policy Project
Center for Democracy and Technology
1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 637-9800
(202) 637-0968 fax
[email-masked]
http://www.cdt.org
----------------------------------------

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From: Nicholas Wood <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 09:16:43 +0000

Hi all,

I have been looking over the latest documents, and I was just wondering
about the scope and purpose of this group in relation to other similar
initiatives. For example, the WAP forum has published a set of generic
specifications for requesting and transporting location information (WAP
256, 257 and 258, see http://www.wapforum.org/what/review.htm), the W3C has
published the P3P specification for generic privacy policies
(http://www.w3.org/P3P/) and so on.

Thanks,
Nicholas

---

From: John Wells <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 16:56:11 -0500

Nicholas,

The charter mentions security and formatting issues, which I think are 
central to the WG and are most appropriately discussed here for location 
info trnasmitted over IP.  On the security side, we have to define what 
level of authentication/authorization would be appropriate before 
transmitting location information.  On the formatting side, we'll have to 
select a method for transporting the data, and the charter mentions SIP.  
I don't think it's outside the scope of this group to work with SIP folks 
to define how the transport might be done, and the charter even mentions 
an example API on how to do this.

I believe you are right to question this group's role in determining
privacy implications.  Taking a privacy stance should be outside this
group's scope.  Some public comments on the P3P web site explain why P3P
is policy-neutral, not the least of which is different laws on privacy in
different countries.  We too should take a policy-neutral stance, but at
the same time support existing privacy infrastructures such as P3P.

Regards,
John

ps- the WAP links you mentioned on location privacy were down.  Any clues 
as to why?

-- 
John WELLS
Tel: 1 540 231 8347
Virginia Tech Mobile Networking Lab (2015 Torgersen Hall)
PGP Public key: http://bagpipe.irean.vt.edu/~wells/pgpkey.txt

---

From: John Morris <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 17:08:59 -0500

>the same time support existing privacy infrastructures such as P3P.

John,

I am unclear on whether you are (a) characterizing what you think the 
geopriv charter says, or (b) asserting that the charter should be 
narrowed along the lines you describe.  I read the charter to say 
that the geopriv WG _should_ "take a privacy stance":

"The primary task of this working group will be to assess the ... 
authorization, integrity and privacy requirements that must be met in 
order to transfer such
information, or authorize the release or representation of such 
information through an agent." 
[[http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/geopriv-charter.html]]

I'm not sure your analogy to P3P answers the question of the 
appropriate scope.  P3P focuses on facilitating an exchange of 
information about privacy preferences, rules, and policies (as well 
as, ultimately, actions based on that info exchange).  But 
critically, this exchange is in the context of the Web, where 
barriers to entry are low and a diversity of privacy approaches can 
co-exist and compete against one another.  A user can, at least in 
theory, choose among different levels of privacy protection.

In many geopriv contexts, however, there may be little if any 
opportunity for competition among a variety of privacy approaches.  A 
wireless user may have to, in the first instance, rely on a single 
wireless carrier to protect the user's privacy.  If all geopriv does 
is create a geo-focused privacy language or info exchange, then it is 
possible that users will end up with few or no privacy-protecting 
choices.  This result (at least in my personal view) would not only 
be bad for peoples' privacy, but it would likely harm the broad 
acceptance of location services.

All of this is to say that I think that the charter does call for the 
geopriv WG to set minimum or at least default privacy levels, and 
that such a mandate is in this context appropriate.  But I certainly 
agree that this is a question that should be resolved sooner rather 
than later.

John Morris

---

From: Randall Gellens <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 17:22:18 -0800

>(http://www.w3.org/P3P/) and so on.

I don't think we're interested in reinventing wheels, but we are 
focused on security and privacy.  A generic mechanism for requesting 
and transporting location information, without regard to security or 
privacy, isn't appropriate for what we need.  Unlike some generic 
privacy mechanisms, we need to make sure that we have a way to 
request and transport location information in a way that complies 
with the user's policy in respect to security and privacy.

---

From: Nicholas Wood <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 16:42:01 +0000

Hi John,

Sorry, the documents are being moved on the WAP site. In the mean time,
please find the specs attached.

Nicholas

-----Original Message-----
From: John Wells [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: 26 November 2001 21:56
To: Nicholas Wood
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Scope of GeoPriv

Nicholas,

Regards,
John

---

From: John Wells <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 16:27:37 -0500

John,

> [[http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/geopriv-charter.html]]

I agree with you that privacy will be crucial to location services.  
Without privacy, we come one step closer to the looming specter of a Big
Brother.  But, I think the amount of privacy will depend on the
application.  No one would argue that users want the power to turn off 
location information to advertisers in order to block promotions, but E911 
folks will certainly want to know the caller's identification.  Between 
these two extremes, there are cases that argue for more or less 
identification, such as services that provide driving directions, etc. 
Each service might get more or less accurate information, which might be 
anonymous or not.

This seems to point towards some sort of privacy/security policy 
framework, be it P3P or otherwise.

John