Subject: RE: BGP security in practice

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 10:22:53 -0500 (EST)

>In order for BGP Security to become a reality, we need:
>
>1) a PKI based system
>2) IPSEC based encryption of all data
>3) Required use of an IRR for all routing
>
>Until then, we are running around with Bandaids trying to stop hundreds of
>leaks...

I agree, but how to convince people to do this?

--Sandy

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From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 11:32:30 -0500 (EST)

>that is not clear.  e.g. why do the data need privacy?

Some people say "encryption" when they mean "use cryptography".  Some
people say "encryption" when they mean "use cryptography to provide
privacy".  So I don't know if Christian's use meant privacy or not.
Be that as it may, in the rpsec meetings, people have spoken up to say
that they think routing data does need to be private between peers.
I don't know why, myself, but if they want it, who am I to quibble?
(Now, in the wireless world where routing protocols sometimes use the
broadcast channel, providing privacy between peers might be problematic.)

>..
>why do
>all relationships need to be represented in routing registries?

A minimal level of protection would be to have people checking the
routing registries to see if the routing data (origin and ASPath) was OK,
without a cryptographic protection of the messages.  This doesn't buy
much, but it is a bit better than nothing.

--Sandy

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From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 12:58:34 -0500 (EST)

>Pray tell, how would MD5 secret solve configuration problems?

I didn't say that MD5 would solve the configuration problems, but
that the fact that just mis-configuration errors can cause lots of
damage should clue people into the fact that the protocol has
vulnerabilities to deliberate attack.

--Sandy

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From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 15:07:01 -0500 (EST)

> 
> but you will find it in draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions-00.txt

Whenever one is building a system that uses PKI ("o the 'pki' is pgp-like or
even real pgp") one must deal with key management on the principal. If one
does not deal with the key management on the principal, the entire
authentication/authorization functionality that relies on PKI cannot be
trusted. Saying that PKI key management is beyond the scope of the protocol
is passing a bucket, which does not work. Hence, the protocol added another
layer of complexity and gained nothing. That, in turn, violates KISS
principal.

Alex