Subject: Re: [Idr] Next revision of AS_HOPCOUNT

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2006 13:27:43 -0500 (EST)

>The mechanism
>by which your ensure that integrity is probably better discussed in
>rpsec.

RRPSEC might be the place the discuss the integrity mechanism,
but making a choice between a static PATHLIMIT and a decrementing
HOPCOUNT is better made here.  Adding a snipit of thought
to security consequences to the choice is, to me, appropriate here.

And, of course, there's the question of what integrity means
here.  If you really want the field completely mutable by other
ASes, then the definition of "integrity" is rather broad.

>The behavior of mis-setting values in this field are already
>discussed with Tony's usual wit in the security considerations of
>the draft. :-)

W-e-e-l-l.  Tony says that those routers who attach this attribute
could have used "normal policy mechanisms" to filter out the route.
But I thought the whole point was that normal policy mechanisms
did not provide the control desired.

--Sandy

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From: Tony Li <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2006 16:10:36 -0800

> did not provide the control desired.

The point is that this does not create a new security hole, as manually
configured route filters could result in the same restrictions on
propagation today, but would require TONS more coordination
and other management hair.  Thus, the new attribute does not
make the security situation appreciably worse than it is today.

Tony