Subject: RE: WG Review: Open Pluggable Edge Services (opes)

From: Vernon Schryver <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2001 15:24:57 -0600 (MDT)

>Received: by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) id RAA21280
>        for [email-masked]; Mon, 18 Jun 2001 17:10:01 -0400 (EDT)

> From: Daniel Senie <[email-masked]>

> ...
> I think OPES will further the sale of SSL accelerator boxes and web 
> certificates. If the only way to protect content from uninvited third-party 
> intermediaries, then content which is not otherwise confidential is going 
> to be encrypted.
> ...

That sounds like a good thing, or at least better than the status quo.

If only to set a good example for the world, could somebody please
arrange to have the IETF mailing lists, starting with this one, create
and publish its own certificate()s and notice and use STARTTLS?

Yes, that would probably require installing a newer version of
sendmail than 8.9.1, but that seems like a good idea for other reasons.

Vernon Schryver    [email-masked]

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From: Lloyd Wood <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2001 23:46:35 +0100 (BST)

> and publish its own certificate()s and notice and use STARTTLS?

Absolutely pointless when there's no electronic guarantee of integrity 
for RFCs, which can be edited on a whim.

Start there - with content that actually _matters_.

L.

run your own RFC mirror. get paranoid.

<[email-masked]>PGP<http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/L.Wood/>

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From: Paul Hoffman / IMC <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2001 16:10:06 -0700

>and publish its own certificate()s and notice and use STARTTLS?

If that happened and it was trumpeted, people would then start to 
assume that SMTP over TLS assures that the messages that appear on 
the list are securely the ones that were sent by the sender. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. SMTP over TLS is a hop-by-hop 
protocol, and protecting one hop in a chain does not protect the 
chain. Further, it is the job of the SMTP server on each hop to 
change the message, at least in the headers, and possibly in the body.

SMTP over TLS has many good features: it lets the two SMTP servers 
authenticate each other, it prevents snooping, and it prevents active 
attackers from changing messages. It does not prevent SMTP servers on 
any hop from changing messages.

Giving folks a false sense of security is a bad example, not a good one.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--Internet Mail Consortium