Subject: RE: WG Review: Open Pluggable Edge Services (opes)

From: "Abbie Barbir" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 14:32:13 -0400

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Keith Moore [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2001 8:16 PM
> To: Michael W. Condry
> Cc: Mark Nottingham; Scott Brim; [email-masked]; [email-masked]
> Subject: Re: WG Review: Open Pluggable Edge Services (opes)
> 
> 
> > I think it is difficult for any working group to assume the 
> responsibility
> > for assuring that everyone will do everything correctly in terms
> > of services, regardless of their location in the 
> client-server chain. Yes,
> > things can be mis-used. 
> 
> yes, but there's a difference between technologies that are 
> accidentally
> misused and technologies whose primary purpose seems to be abusive.

I still cannot see why you keep insisting that the primary purpose of OPES
is abusive? I do see that you are concerned, but the use of words such as
"primary purpose seems to be abusive" is totally out of place. I do not
think the OPES guys are serial criminals?

abbie

---

From: Keith Moore <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 15:03:04 -0400

> I still cannot see why you keep insisting that the primary purpose
> of OPES is abusive?

partially because, as far as I can tell, the biggest demand for an interface
like OPES is not for a service acting on behalf of an endpoint, but for an 
intermediary that is acting without approval of either endpoint.

for example - if you really want to design a pluggable interface for use 
by content providers or by the audience, then there's no need to presume 
that the interface is layered on top of HTTP, and there are almost certainly 
better choices than HTTP for that interface.

another reason I am concerned is because the charter is so open-ended
and vague, when there is obviously a tremendous potential for misuse.

another reason I am concerned is because of statements to the effect that 
"we don't need to be concerned about how the protocol is used" when 
there is so much potential for misuse.

no, I don't think the OPES people are deliberately bent on harm.
I do think they are likely to do a great deal of harm if they are 
allowed to proceed on their current course.

Keith

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 15:07:23 -0400

> think the OPES guys are serial criminals?

Well.. maybe not serial criminals.  But serial abusers of end-to-end
transparency, certainly.
-- 
				Valdis Kletnieks
				Operating Systems Analyst
				Virginia Tech

---

From: grenville armitage <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 12:43:45 -0700

> Abbie Barbir wrote:
	[..]
> I do see that you are concerned, but the use of words
> such as "primary purpose seems to be abusive" is totally out of place.
> I do not think the OPES guys are serial criminals?

From "abusive" you draw the accusation that OPES guys are serial
criminals? Neat. You've just aptly demonstrated how what is said
can be twisted into something that was not said. Then again,
I guess that's the idea behind OPES.

gja

---

From: "Melinda Shore" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 16:20:38 -0400

> criminals? Neat. 

I was enormously fond of the loading-the-Jews-into-the-
train analogy, myself.  This is a fabulously productive 
discussion.

Melinda

---

From: Kevin Farley <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 13:29:10 -0700 (PDT)

I believe OPES-like services are already creeping in. Consider wireless
systems where a great deal of compression is employed to reduce data
streams. This includes proprietary mechanisms to "re-publish" graphics
and web pages to reduce bandwidth requirements.

However, in such systems where the wireless connection is (arguably) a
"single link", usually with many other standards bodies involved, such
as 3GPP2 and WCDMA. This would mean there are mechanisms in place to
standardize the "captive audience" such as for cellular data users.

But from what I have read on the OPES web site, it appears that ANY
intermediary system could inject, modify, substitute, or restrict the
flow of information from one end-point to another.

While I am no purist on the end-to-end issues raised in this forum, I
do see a VERY dangerous path ahead where an intermediate system could
restrict competitor's information, or extract information about users
in much more alarming and intrusive ways then ever before.

And if you consider the following from the Example Services for Network
Edge Proxies given on the OPES site:

"With the help of a content scanning and filtering system at the
caching proxy level, Web pages and also file transfers could be scanned
for malicious content prior to sending them to the user."

I would therefore argue, using the above logic, that we would need a
new service to "probe the route" looking for "malicious intermediaries"
and find a new routing path around them.

Any WG considering OPES needs to address not only security, but also
privacy, and author/publisher rights as well. While it could be
conceivable that there is a justfiable need for OPES, it would have to
be an EXPLICIT invocation by the user or author. A web page author may
choose to write their web pages to be open to OPES, and a user may set
security levels to allow OPES functions on their behalf.

It is IMHO that allowing intermedate devices to alter traffic content
without user knowledge, violates a basic element of the fabric of the
Internet and destroys what miniscule remaining trust users have in the
Internet in general.

Just an opinion, YMMV.

-kevin

__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Spot the hottest trends in music, movies, and more.
http://buzz.yahoo.com/

---

From: grenville armitage <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 15:12:36 -0700

If we diminish the revenue potential of invasive interception
tools with e2e encryption, what do we offer the ISP community
in return? What tools, architectures, and protocols do we offer
the ISP industry so they can generate revenue by satisfying their
customers, rather than from spying on and manipulating their
customers?

/randombabble

gja

---

From: Lloyd Wood <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 19:50:16 +0100 (BST)

The main problem with this entire tedious and polarised discussion is
that ISPs actually _want_ to be Internet Service Providers.

To have services, you must first have control of the services. That's
rather hard to do when the actual service (content to read, music to
play, books to buy) originates elsewhere on the internetwork. Internet
Service is a sum property of the Internet.

So, ISPs are not really ISPs. They're Internet Access Providers -
IAPs. And they're just going to have to live with it.

L.

<[email-masked]>PGP<http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/L.Wood/>

---

From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 14:11:25 -0700

> that ISPs actually _want_ to be Internet Service Providers.

many want to be carriers, i.e. content neutral and transparent in the
strict sense of the word.

randy

---

From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 15:43:08 -0700

> Can't see their shareholders buying that in the long term.

we can discuss that in the internet business task force

randy

---

From: Lloyd Wood <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 23:37:02 +0100 (BST)

L.

---

From: "Michael W. Condry" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2001 13:46:40 -0700

>security levels to allow OPES functions on their behalf.

The pre-working group has recognized this need from the beginning and Hilarie
has stated it well frequently. The web site also says (on the same page)

"The security model for intermediary services involves defining the 
administrator roles and privileges for the application client, application 
server, intermediary, and auxiliary server. The data integrity model 
defines what operations are permitted by the content owner(s) and 
guarantees of content correctness can be made to the owner(s) and viewers 
when content-related services are performed"

The integrity model is explicitly there to address your concerns.

>Internet and destroys what miniscule remaining trust users have in the

Michael W. Condry
Director,  Network Edge Technology