Subject: #425: Review versus appeal?

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2005 21:50:58 +0100

Checking the debate, it seems interesting to ask about one single 
distinction on the alternatives:
Do we want to institutionalize a review or an appeal?

In the sense I'm using it here, which I think isn't too strange:

 - Review means that a body looks at a decision/handling, and
   tells us why that decision or process was made. That body
   was already responsible for making the decision - or
   supervising the person(s) that made the decision.

 - Appeal means that you take an issue that is handled by one
   person or group, and hand it off, with all supporting
   documentation needed to understand what's going on, and ask
   that other body to figure out whether the process or the
   decision was correct in context or not.

Review has no issues with confidentiality (the group is supposed to know 
the secrets already), and fewer issues with reversal of decisions - the 
decisions that are possible are already within the power of that group to 
make. and it knows whether it is committed.
But because it does not move the issue around, it may be seen as "just" a 
procedure for getting a more public documentation of what was done and why 
it ws done.

Appeal has the advantage of having new people for a "fresh look". But since 
it moves the issue around, it requires that documentation go along with it 
- creating issues with confidentiality. And if the decision is "you really 
shouldn't have done that", it creates an implicit hierarchy - the body 
appealed to is put in a position of some kind of power over the other body.

Multiple levels of appeal makes sense. Multiple levels of requesting 
reviews from the same body does not.

I'm pretty sure Avri talks about appeals, and I think Sam is too.
I'm also pretty sure John and I are talking about review (as defined above).

What are the rest of us talking about - what would we prefer, and what 
would we be able to live with?

                        Harald

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2005 18:17:55 -0500

Our processes have tended to always have review as the first step in
an appeal.  I believe that is important.

Margaret's principle (5) which I agree with is consistent with your
definition of appeal although I'm not sure I would use that word.

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From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 11:11:14 +0100

RFC2026 explicitly empowers the IAB to zap an IESG decision:

>    If circumstances warrant, the IAB may direct that an IESG decision be
>    annulled, and the situation shall then be as it was before the IESG
>    decision was taken. 

I don't think that is what we want in this case. We probably want what
has happened in practice with most appeals to the IAB, i.e. an anlysis
of what went wrong and caused unhappiness, and advice and procedural
improvements to prevent the same mistake being repeated.

So I think the flavour is indeed more review than appeal. But as
I said yesterday, I agree with principle that the review could be
escalated as far as the ISOC Board - it just seems right.

    Brian

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From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 13:23:10 +0100

Brian,

>....... We probably want what

four points of unhappiness with what you say:

- as I defined the term here, if the ISOC Board carries out the 
investigation, it is an appeal (different body), not a review (same body)

- the design of the balance of tasks between the ISOC BoT and the IAOC has 
been a long process - mostly resulting in the IAOC determining whether or 
not the IETF's needs are being met, the ISOC BoT determining whether or not 
the plans are fiscally responsible, and both cooperating to find a way 
forward where both things are true. Moving review of *all* decisions that 
the IAD and IAOC makes to a chain that ends up at the ISOC BoT changes that 
- and so does moving review of financial decisions to the IESG/IAB. See my 
notes about "implicit hierarchy" at the start of this thread.

- I think the ISOC BoT has a degree of ability to review that this BCP does 
not affect - because the ISOC BoT has fiduciary responsibility. But that is 
an ability that isn't dependent on anyone bringing complaint to them and 
being persistent enough to get past multiple levels of other review bodies.

- And last: Even if there is an appeals chain, I don't think the IESG and 
the IAB should be in it. We are supposed to be selected for the wrong sort 
of competence.

                   Harald

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From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 07:25:23 -0600

> - And last: Even if there is an appeals chain, I don't think the 
> IESG and the IAB should be in it. We are supposed to be selected for 
> the wrong sort of competence.
>
>                   Harald

I'm really not trying to muddy the waters here, but

- I agree with Harald on this point, for exactly the reason stated, 
and

- this statement seems to be pretty disconnected from the "don't have 
to respond to community appeals, have to respond to IESG/IAB appeals" 
discussion (also in this thread), so I think we're confused on 
consensus...

Spencer

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From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 10:44:11 -0500

Hi Spencer,

On 26 jan 2005, at 08.25, Spencer Dawkins wrote:

>> - And last: Even if there is an appeals chain, I don't think the IESG 
>> and the IAB should be in it. We are supposed to be selected for the 
>> wrong sort of competence.
>>
>>                   Harald
>
> - I agree with Harald on this point, for exactly the reason stated, and
>

I am afraid this confuses me.  But perhaps it is becasue I think the 
two subjects of appeal and accountability for review are, and should 
be, linked.

I have difficulty understanding how the IESG and IAB can be responsible 
for 'enforcing' a review request (Leslie's formulation as I understand 
it) yet, not have a role in handling appeals.

Thinking further this seems to create the following paths

- individual request for IAOC review
   - If no response
      then make request to IAB or IESG for enforced review
         (and i am not clear if this a request to
          either IAB or IESG or to some sort of joint entity.
          and if it is to either
          does one just pick the one they are more comfortable with?)

      - If IAB/IESG refuses to enforce the review request
         then make a 2026 appeal of the decision of the IAB/IESG

       -  if the appeal is successful
          then the IAB/IESG makes enforced review request

   - If the IAOC response is unsatisfactory
      then what?  appeal decision directly to ISOC BoT?
         do they accept such a responsibility?
      and who makes the appeal on an enforced review?
        does the original complainant have the right/responsibility
        or only the body that required the enforced review.

As I indicated above, separating the concept of review request from 
that of an appeal, an appeal with the possibility of revising a 
decision, seems to make things more complicated.  Unless, of course, 
the object of the separation is to replace appeals with reviews.  And 
my problem with eliminating appeals, as I have said too often now, is 
that it makes recall or non renewal the only recourse to correct a 
problem.  This bother me for several reasons:

  - It is too course a method.  90% of what an IAOC may do could be very 
satisfactory to the IETf at large with only a few decisions being 
problematic.  But if one must recall the committee to fix a bad 
decision (I assume that any IAOC can revise the decisions of a prior 
IAOC) one either sacrifices the good for the bad, or is forced to 
accept the bad as a price for the good.  A finer instrument of 
correction seems important.

- Getting reappointed to a position, or even the absence of recall,  
becomes 'approval' for all prior decisions, i.e. there is just one 
undifferentiated "moment of accountability" for all decisions.

- I strongly believe that one of the strengths of the IETF is the 
direct accountability all of the leadership has to the appeals of the 
participants.  I.e I believe that 2026 accountability is an important 
part of the IETF and should be maintained for all new organizational 
structures.

Note: If i am alone in my reasoning, I will not stand in the way of the 
draft going forward (as if i could).  So I will probably wait until 
others of a similar persuasion to mine, if there are any, comment on 
the issue before making any further comment - unless of course a 
question is directed at me specifically.

a.

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From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 16:52:31 +0100

> investigation, it is an appeal (different body), not a review (same body)

Yes, but if you read 2026 the ISOC Board role is very restricted:

    Further recourse is available only in cases in which the procedures
    themselves (i.e., the procedures described in this document) are
    claimed to be inadequate or insufficient to the protection of the
    rights of all parties in a fair and open Internet Standards Process.
    Claims on this basis may be made to the Internet Society Board of
    Trustees.

I'd assume it would be similarly restricted in this case.

> 
> - the design of the balance of tasks between the ISOC BoT and the IAOC 
> has been a long process - mostly resulting in the IAOC determining 
> whether or not the IETF's needs are being met, the ISOC BoT determining 
> whether or not the plans are fiscally responsible, and both cooperating 
> to find a way forward where both things are true. Moving review of *all* 
> decisions that the IAD and IAOC makes to a chain that ends up at the 
> ISOC BoT changes that - and so does moving review of financial decisions 
> to the IESG/IAB. See my notes about "implicit hierarchy" at the start of 
> this thread.

It's true and that bothers me too. But what alternative do we have?
If the IAOC reviews one of its own decisions and concludes that
it's perfect, where next except the existing committees?

> 
> - I think the ISOC BoT has a degree of ability to review that this BCP 
> does not affect - because the ISOC BoT has fiduciary responsibility. But 
> that is an ability that isn't dependent on anyone bringing complaint to 
> them and being persistent enough to get past multiple levels of other 
> review bodies.

Actually the BoT should review anything smelly without being told,
since as you say they have fiduciary responsibility. But that is really
a separate issue from community-requested review.

> wrong sort of competence.

Indeed. So do you want to create a review committee?

I have a proposal. We aren't progressing here. Wouldn't it be better
to punt? i.e. state in the BCP that IASA and IAOC decisions are
subject to review at the request of members of the IETF community,
and that the review process will be defined in a future document.

    Brian