Subject: Consensus search: #725 3.4b Appealing decisions

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 13:27:47 +0100

On reviewing #725 on appealing decisions, and the crosslinked #720 on IAD 
autonomy, I sense a disquiet in the community.

On the one hand, we recognize that a well functioning IAD and IAOC needs to 
be allowed to run the show without a thousand people trying to "put their 
hands on the tiller".

On the other hand, the community is deeply uneasy about setting up a 
situation where we have decisions being made that profoundly affect the 
working of the IETF, and if we disagree with the decision, the only 
response we can get from anyone in authority is "I made the decision. Go 
away."

The second concern was perhaps best expressed by Avri Doria:

> A letter of complaint requires no response unless there is something
> that formalizes the requirement of response.
>
> And if there is no procedure indicating that the IAOC needs to pay
> attention to a letter of complain, that decision, i.e the one to ignore
> letters of complain, cannot be appealed.
>
> So, as I see it, without a formalized process of complaint/appeal of
> IAD actions we are left with no avenue to deal with problems other then
> by the yearly nomcom process and the IETF list.

And the first viewpoint was perhaps best expressed by John Klensin:

> If people don't believe that The Right Thing is being done, they
> shouldn't be looking in detail at particular decisions. They
> should, instead, be suggesting that the IAOC review its own
> decisions contributing whatever additional information is
> available to that review. And, if the IAOC adopts a pattern of
> doing Wrong Things, it should be time to replace them (starting
> with a request for resignations), not to try to retune or
> override individual decisions.
>
> Get the right people into these positions, and then let them do
> the job.
>
> If we can't find the right people and put them there, then none
> of these procedures --other than firing the duds and trying
> again-- are good enough to protect the IETF. Perhaps worse, we
> then run the risk of getting us seriously bogged down while we
> try to use those incremental correction procedures.

In the debate, I suggested a resolution that involved keeping the in-draft 
version of the appeals procedure, with three differences:

- Not limited to procedure, and not limited to the IAOC
- Abandoning the "chain" model of "if you don't like one decision, try
again" that the current appeal structure has
- Not using the word "appeal"

While debate did not stop, this did not seem like a bad idea.

So here's another attempt at section 3.5, replacing the last 3 paragraphs 
of section 3.4:

3.5 Decision review

   In the case where someone questions a decision of the IAD or the
   IAOC, he or she may ask for a formal review of the decision.

   The request for review is addressed to the person or body that made
   the decision. It is up to that body to decide to make a response,
   and on the form of a response.

   The IAD is required to respond to requests for a review from the
   IAOC, and the IAOC is required to respond to requests for a review
   of a decision from the IAB or from the IESG.

   If members of the community feel that they are unjustly denied a
   response to a request for review, they may ask the IAB or the IESG
   to make the request on their behalf.

   Answered requests for review and their responses are made public.

I think that should be enough - the IAD and IAOC can route all frivolous 
requests to /dev/null; the decision of the IESG to not ask the IAOC for a 
review is an IESG action that can be handled in the usual way; there is no 
formal "I can overturn your decision" involved; if the IAOC shows a pattern 
of replying "go away" when a review is requested, that becomes a matter of 
public record, and can be used at nomcom time.

Does this seem like a reasonable point on the various scales of concern?

                   Harald

_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

---

From: Jari Arkko <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 15:00:41 +0200

> Does this seem like a reasonable point on the various scales of concern?

I think so.

--Jari

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 14:08:44 +0100

I think this is acceptable given that we *also* have a recall
procedure. In other words, if the IAOC isn't responsive
to a clear message from a review that "you screwed up", then
we'd better make sure that a recall is initiated.

    Brian

Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:
> On reviewing #725 on appealing decisions, and the crosslinked #720 on 
> IAD autonomy, I sense a disquiet in the community.
> 
> On the one hand, we recognize that a well functioning IAD and IAOC needs 
> to be allowed to run the show without a thousand people trying to "put 
> their hands on the tiller".
> 
> In the debate, I suggested a resolution that involved keeping the 
> in-draft version of the appeals procedure, with three differences:
> 
> So here's another attempt at section 3.5, replacing the last 3 
> paragraphs of section 3.4:
> 
> 3.5 Decision review
> 
> requests to /dev/null; the decision of the IESG to not ask the IAOC for 
> a review is an IESG action that can be handled in the usual way; there 
> is no formal "I can overturn your decision" involved; if the IAOC shows 
> a pattern of replying "go away" when a review is requested, that becomes 
> a matter of public record, and can be used at nomcom time.
>

---

From: [email-masked] (Scott Bradner)
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 08:13:26 -0500 (EST)

harald proposes:
  3.5 Decision review

I am still worried about the possibility of a DoS attack and the messy
situation where the looser in a bid wants the bid award overturned so
would be happier with some language that says that its real hard
or impossible to overturn signed contracts 

but that said I can live with what Harald suggests if no one else
shares my worries

Scott

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 07:20:22 -0600

Harald,

So the IAD and IAOC don't have to respond to individual requests for 
review unless IAB or IESG make the request on behalf of an individual, 
but we all get to see requests and responses and make our own NOMCOM 
inputs?

Spencer

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 14:34:27 +0100

--On torsdag, januar 13, 2005 08:13:26 -0500 Scott Bradner 
<[email-masked]> wrote:

> I am still worried about the possibility of a DoS attack

on which unit?
As I said in the note - IAOC and IAD can /dev/null the people who try DoS 
attacks. And the IESG and IAB can act as DoS attack filters, if required.

(If the IESG decides to DoS the IAOC, we have larger issues...)

> and the messy

That's why the whole section talks about "review", not "restart", "nullify" 
or "change" - I think that's adequately addressed.

> but that said I can live with what Harald suggests if no one else

I think you have to explain more why you are worried before I'm able to 
share them.

---

From: [email-masked] (Scott Bradner)
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 09:00:41 -0500 (EST)

> I think you have to explain more why you are worried before I'm able to 

I have in detail in the past

Scott

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 15:07:51 +0100

> but we all get to see requests and responses and make our own NOMCOM

Exactly.

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 10:06:03 -0500

--On Thursday, 13 January, 2005 13:27 +0100 Harald Tveit
Alvestrand <[email-masked]> wrote:

> I think that should be enough - the IAD and IAOC can route all
> frivolous requests to /dev/null; the decision of the IESG to
> not ask the IAOC for a review is an IESG action that can be
> handled in the usual way; there is no formal "I can overturn
> your decision" involved; if the IAOC shows a pattern of
> replying "go away" when a review is requested, that becomes a
> matter of public record, and can be used at nomcom time.
> 

Harald,

I think this is reasonable, but want to flag three issues, none
of which impacts this particular section of the document.
Others have identified these, or at least pieces of them, so...

Brian wrote...

> we'd better make sure that a recall is initiated.

And the traditional IETF recall procedure is probably not right
for this case, perhaps for one of the reasons it has never been
used in the IETF.  The recall procedure requires parsing the
advocates and opponents of a decision (or screw-up more
generally), figuring out who is specifically to blame, and then
trying to remove him or her in a context that also requires
balancing past and potential future good deeds and speculation
about whether a replacement would be better against the
continuation of the person involved.  The parsing process, and
maybe the rest, may be nearly impossible in a body we have
directed to work by consensus and that doesn't record votes or
internal informal discussions.

The same parsing process, of course, applies to "tell it to the
Nomcom" only without the benefits of public discussion of the
source of the dissatisfaction.

So the comments I've made have deliberately been of the nature
of "replace them", i.e., "fire the IAOC" rather than "recall an
individual".  If the IAOC is going to work as a body and make
consensus decisions, then they are collectively responsible for
those decisions.

And I think the document probably needs some sort of "fire the
IAOC" procedure that would take out everyone except the three
(?) ex-officio people.

Scott wrote:

> and the messy
> situation where the looser in a bid wants the bid award
> overturned so would be happier with some language that says
> that its real hard or impossible to overturn signed contracts 

I think the protection here is that there is no mechanism for
anyone saying "you are commanded to reverse that decision" to
the IAOC.  Put differently, structures that prevent
micromanagement, including IESG/ IAB/ IETF Plenary intervention
to change individual IAOC decisions, are much better protection
against attempts to overturn signed contracts than any
specialized language in the BCP.

Absent really strong cause, I'd expect the IAOC response to a
review request about an already-signed contract, if they agreed
with the requestor after doing the review, would be "you are
right, we shouldn't have done that, will keep it in mind for the
future".  If the IAOC starts moving in the direction of
overturning signed contracts in the absence of serious problems
and when there were any alternatives, that would, to me, be
cause for asking for a review and, if necessary, firing them
(see above) for general fiscal irresponsibility and stupidity.
If the IAOC is willing to try to overturn a signed contract
without very significant cause, then we have the wrong people on
the IAOC and should replace them.
 
     john

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 12:06:50 -0500

Hi,

Either I don't understand it or I don't agree.  I allow that I don't 
understand it.

In the first paragraph it seem like anyone can ask for a decision to be 
reviewed.

In subsequent paragraphs it appears that anyone is limited to IAOC, IAB 
and IESG members because no one is required to review the questions of 
anyone other then those in an I*. And while someone can ask for help 
from the IAB/IESG when their question is ignored, I don't understand 
why the level of indirection.  I think that anyone in the community 
should be able to go to the IAOC with an issue.

I also think it is a work overload issue. In a sense the IAOC is being 
created to offload the administrative issues from the IAB/IESG.  So why 
buffer them from the public's problems?

I think the IAOC should be required to respond to a request for review 
from the IETf community without requiring IAB or IESG intervention.

a.

On 13 jan 2005, at 07.27, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:

> frivolous requests to /dev/null; the decision of the IESG to not ask 
> the IAOC for a review is an IESG action that can be handled in the 
> usual way; there is no formal "I can overturn your decision" involved; 
> if the IAOC shows a pattern of replying "go away" when a review is 
> requested, that becomes a matter of public record, and can be used at 
> nomcom time.
>

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 13:19:24 -0500

--On Thursday, 13 January, 2005 12:06 -0500 [email-masked] wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> Either I don't understand it or I don't agree.  I allow that I
> don't understand it.

Since the model is partially my fault, let me try to explain.

> In the first paragraph it seem like anyone can ask for a
> decision to be reviewed.

And a sensible IAOC will initiate reviews after any
well-reasoned and sensible request, especially one that contains
information they didn't consider and should have.   If they
regularly don't, they should be fired.  

> In subsequent paragraphs it appears that anyone is limited to
> IAOC, IAB and IESG members because no one is required to
> review the questions of anyone other then those in an I*. And
> while someone can ask for help from the IAB/IESG when their
> question is ignored, I don't understand why the level of
> indirection.  I think that anyone in the community should be
> able to go to the IAOC with an issue.

I, Scott, and probably others are very concerned about denial of
service attacks on the IAOC.  We have all seen instances (even
on the IETF and IPR list in the last few weeks) in which
determined people will post small variations on the same
complaints over and over again, never noticing that they aren't
getting any traction in the community.  If the IAOC is required
to respond to every similar note with a formal review, it can
almost be guaranteed that they will get nothing else done.  

One way to deal with the problem would be to say "no one gets to
talk to the IAOC other than the IAB or IESG".  That impresses me
as fairly bad news for several reasons.  So I tried to strike a
compromise that says:

	(1)  The IAB and IESG get to initiate requests for
	review and insist that the IAOC respond.
	
	(2) Any member of the community can initiate a request
	for review.  The IAOC gets to decide whether to respond
	or to hit "delete".  It isn't explicit in the document,
	and I don't think it should be, but an IAOC that blows
	off all such requests without any good reason should be
	headed for retirement.
	
	(3) If the community member doesn't get the expected
	review, he or she gets to mount a mini-appeal to see if
	the IESG or IAB can be convinced to endorse the question
	and demand a review.  If the IESG or IAB blows off those
	requests unreasonably, _they_ ought to be headed for
	retirement, using normal mechanisms.

The text seems consistent with that.  If you can suggest better
text, I'm sure the editors would be interested.

> I also think it is a work overload issue. In a sense the IAOC
> is being created to offload the administrative issues from the
> IAB/IESG.  So why buffer them from the public's problems?

I would suggest that if "the public" has a legitimate problem
that the IAOC refuses to address after input and a request from
"the public", then the IETF has a problem and the IAB and IESG
should be aware of it.

> I think the IAOC should be required to respond to a request
> for review from the IETf community without requiring IAB or
> IESG intervention.

As I said, the concern is about denial of service attacks.  One
could, of course, eliminate or reduce that problem by setting up
some procedure requiring that the IAOC respond to a community
request endorsed by at least some minimum number of people (>>
1).  But that seemed more complicated than it was worth: I'd
rather say to the IAOC "if you blow off substantive and
constructive requests for review from community members, we will
blow you off" and just stop there.

   john

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 14:11:28 -0500

Hi,

Thanks for the response.

I don't know whether I am in a severe minority on this particular 
position, and hope that my arguments do not come across as a DOS 
attack.  At a certain point I will accept that rough consensus has 
passed this concern by.

To start, I must admit I have trouble equating an individual or 
community's disagreement with a decision to a DOS attack, though I do 
know how disconcerting and distracting an insistent complaint can be.  
I just don't see equating people's concerns with maliciously motivated 
attacks, no matter how persistent or obnoxious.

I also have no problem believing that the better option in any such 
disagreement would be to respond early and with due diligence with a 
public response (accountable and transparent) as opposed to just 
deleting it because it appears frivolous.  I think we need to be very 
careful in defining an objection as frivolous before having given it 
due diligence.  But once having reviewed an issue and publishing a 
response, then there would be no reason to re-review, thus avoiding an 
effect similar to that from a DOS attack.  I think this differs from 
the case of a discussion in a WG since that is an intentional and 
ongoing exchange of ideas, and traction is often difficult to gauge on 
a WG list where the majority remains silent.

I also think that history has shown us that appeals are relatively rare 
and generally not frivolous.  It is for this reason that I advocate 
extending the current model of appeal, with the caveats about not 
voiding contracts etc, to the IAD and IAOC.  I think creating the 
procedure to avoid so called 'DOS attacks' is, in effect, fighting a 
problem we do not have.

a.

---

From: Scott W Brim <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 15:33:26 -0500

On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 02:11:28PM -0500, [email-masked] allegedly wrote:
> due diligence.  

The problem in both paragraphs is that there is no "frivolous" bit to
check -- it's a subjective judgment, depending on the situation.  We
could reach an objective definition, but it would be hard to do so, the
definition would be invalidated as conditions change, and we actually
don't need to take the time.  We can leave it up to those receiving the
requests to judge frivolity, but also have ways to rein them in if
necessary.  If someone feels they are being unfairly judged frivolous,
they can bring in support.  If *they* think the person is being
frivolous, then he/she probably is.  If he/she still disagrees, we have
the appeal process to bring in even more opinions.  We don't need to
build everything into rules if the process has the right
characteristics.

> But once having reviewed an issue and publishing a response, then
> there would be no reason to re-review, thus avoiding an effect similar
> to that from a DOS attack.  

I'm not very good at being devious, but even I can think of small things
one could do that would force a re-review under any terms along those
lines.

> I also think that history has shown us that appeals are relatively
> rare and generally not frivolous.  It is for this reason that I
> advocate extending the current model of appeal, with the caveats about
> not voiding contracts etc, to the IAD and IAOC.  I think creating the

But it costs no more to make sure we don't have it, using the process
currently on the table.

I am not concerned that the IESG (or IAB) would unreasonably protect the
IAOC, but if they do, we have a process for that as well.

swb

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 22:32:59 -0600

This works for me...

Spencer

From: "Harald Tveit Alvestrand" <[email-masked]>
To: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 8:07 AM
Subject: Re: Consensus search: #725 3.4b Appealing decisions

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2005 11:33:39 +0100

Avri said

> I think creating the procedure to avoid so called 'DOS attacks' is, 
 > in effect, fighting a problem we do not have.

But we do not have a body responsible to the IETF community today
that awards commercial contracts. As I understand the concern, it's
that when we create this body, we expose it to a real risk of
people/companies misusing its public responsibility for frankly
commercial reasons. As in mailbombing with messages like
"why did you award the contract to A, when I have been told that
B's bid was ten cents cheaper?" (I'm not saying that isn't a valid
question, but it shouldn't be asked hundreds of times.)

So while there must be an open complaints procedure, it has to
be one that cannot easily be abused.

    Brian

---

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2005 13:35:00 -0500

>>>>> "Brian" == Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]> writes:

    Brian> Avri said
    >> I think creating the procedure to avoid so called 'DOS attacks'
    >> is, in effect, fighting a problem we do not have.

    Brian> But we do not have a body responsible to the IETF community
    Brian> today that awards commercial contracts. As I understand the
    Brian> concern, it's that when we create this body, we expose it
    Brian> to a real risk of people/companies misusing its public
    Brian> responsibility for frankly commercial reasons. As in
    Brian> mailbombing with messages like "why did you award the
    Brian> contract to A, when I have been told that B's bid was ten

I tend to agree with Avri that we're solving a problem we don't know
we will have.  I'd prefer to leave open the possibility of a DOS
attack and to have a mechanism for reviewing decisions.  We can go
close the DOS problem when it actually becomes a real issue instead of
a theoretical one.

That said, like Avri, it looks like I'm in a minority.  I can live
with the current text.

--Sam

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2005 14:34:59 +0100

John,

I think this one warrants a separate thread......

> IAOC" procedure that would take out everyone except the three

The recall procedure of RFC 3777 are in fact rather short....

7.  Member Recall

   The following rules apply to the recall process.  If necessary, a
   paragraph discussing the interpretation of each rule is included.

   1.  At any time, at least 20 members of the IETF community, who are
       qualified to be voting members of a nominating committee, may
       request by signed petition (email is acceptable) to the Internet
       Society President the recall of any sitting IAB or IESG member.

       All individual and collective qualifications of nominating
       committee eligibility are applicable, including that no more than
       two signatories may have the same primary affiliation.
       Each signature must include a full name, email address, and
       primary company or organization affiliation.

       The IETF Secretariat is responsible for confirming that each
       signatory is qualified to be a voting member of a nominating
       committee.  A valid petition must be signed by at least 20
       qualified signatories.

       The petition must include a statement of justification for the
       recall and all relevant and appropriate supporting documentation.

       The petition and its signatories must be announced to the IETF
       community.

   2.  Internet Society President shall appoint a Recall Committee
       Chair.

       The Internet Society President must not evaluate the recall
       request.  It is explicitly the responsibility of the IETF
       community to evaluate the behavior of its leaders.

   3.  The recall committee is created according to the same rules as is
       the nominating committee with the qualifications that both the
       person being investigated and the parties requesting the recall
       must not be a member of the recall committee in any capacity.

   4.  The recall committee operates according to the same rules as the
       nominating committee with the qualification that there is no
       confirmation process.

   5.  The recall committee investigates the circumstances of the
       justification for the recall and votes on its findings.

       The investigation must include at least both an opportunity for
       the member being recalled to present a written statement and
       consultation with third parties.

   6.  A 3/4 majority of the members who vote on the question is
       required for a recall.

   7.  If a sitting member is recalled the open position is to be filled
       according to the mid-term vacancy rules.

There's actually not much there about the criteria for removing someone - 
it seems that if 20 people can get their act together and demand a 
resignation, and 10 randomly-picked-from-a-pool-of-volunteer people can get 
together, listen to the person under recall and agree (with 3/4 majority) 
that the IETF is better off with getting rid of that person, that's it.

The one thing that I agree sticks out is that the language of 3777 talks 
about firing *one* person - in the case where the group is dysfunctional, 
it may be better to take the group out, as you say.

(there are more issues, such as the ISOC president no longer being a 
disinterested party .... but those are less major issues than whether we 
open up the topic of firing procedures...)

                         Harald

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2005 11:02:52 -0500

--On Monday, January 17, 2005 2:34 PM +0100 Harald Tveit 
Alvestrand <[email-masked]> wrote:

>...
> The one thing that I agree sticks out is that the language of
> 3777 talks about firing *one* person - in the case where the
> group is dysfunctional, it may be better to take the group
> out, as you say.
>...

I think this is the only significant issue.  The IAOC is either 
going to meet the needs of the community _as a group_ or it 
isn't.  And, if it isn't, we should have a procedure for 
removing the whole crew.  Otherwise, we will find ourselves back 
in the position that the community has, sad to say, sometimes 
found itself in with the IESG: the disfunction is obvious, but 
it is extremely difficult to get sufficient information to blame 
and remove one person as the key to the issues.   That becomes 
even more important when the group --either in the IESG example 
or IAOC -- starts behaving like a team, i.e., pulling together 
to hide problems with its members, putting being able to work 
well with others in the group ahead of particular decisions, and 
so on.

Basically, I think we have running code that this is an issue, 
and we need to develop a mechanism --other than recall and 
non-reappointment of individuals-- for dealing with it should it 
occur.  Indeed, having such a mechanism may be an important tool 
for preventing it from occurring, which makes the mechanism even 
more important.

     john

---

From: Carl Malamud <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2005 08:03:25 -0800 (PST)

> it may be better to take the group out, as you say.

I think if there is enough momentum to engage in these procedures, it won't
be hard to take them out one by one.  I think that's better than firing an
entire group.  Individual accountability is a good thing.

If we do the "take out the whole group" procedure, might as well have a similar 
procedure for the IESG and the IAB.   

Regards,

Carl

---

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2005 12:23:30 -0500

>>>>> "John" == John C Klensin <[email-masked]> writes:

    John> --On Monday, January 17, 2005 2:34 PM +0100 Harald Tveit
    John> Alvestrand
    John> <[email-masked]> wrote:

    >> ...  The one thing that I agree sticks out is that the language
    >> of 3777 talks about firing *one* person - in the case where the
    >> group is dysfunctional, it may be better to take the group out,
    >> as you say.  ...

    John> I think this is the only significant issue.  The IAOC is
    John> either going to meet the needs of the community _as a group_
    John> or it isn't.  And, if it isn't, we should have a procedure
    John> for removing the whole crew.  Otherwise, we will find
    John> ourselves back in the position that the community has, sad
    John> to say, sometimes found itself in with the IESG: the
    John> disfunction is obvious, but it is extremely difficult to get
    John> sufficient information to blame and remove one person as the
    John> key to the issues.  
[. . . ]

    John> Basically, I think we have running code that this is an
    John> issue, and we need to develop a mechanism --other than
    John> recall and non-reappointment of individuals-- for dealing
    John> with it should it occur.  

In my experience this has not been an issue and I don't believe we
have evidence of that fact.  I do believe that group dynamics are
important and believe that throwing out the entire group is going to
be dangerous.  Without a strong demonstrated need, I believe that the
potential harm of such a procedure outweighs any potential good.

--Sam

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2005 08:58:39 +0100

> procedure for the IESG and the IAB.   

There aren't so many IAOC members. The group of 20 petitioners can easily
send in simultaneous recall petitions for all of them. For that matter,
the same is true of IAB and IESG recalls - a little cut and paste goes
a long way. Actually, I think Carl is correct - a very slight tweak
to the wording of 3777 would allow it to apply to one or more people.

I don't presume that firing the whole committee is more likely than
firing one individual who is causing problems.

     Brian

---

From: Carl Malamud <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2005 07:53:24 -0800 (PST)

Hi -

Just so we're clear, I think a mass execution procedure is a bad idea.
Serial executions are much better: these people got seated one by one,
and if you don't like them, each one should get their own trial and
sentence.

Changing 3777 to allow group trials seems like a task well beyond the
current exercise, which should be focused on how to get the IAOC on
board and functioning.  I fully expect that our founding fodders on
the IAOC will do a great job and that we should focus on building this
particular bridge instead of establishing procedures for burning it down.

Regards,

Carl

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2005 11:21:55 -0500

i strongly agree with Carl on this, people serve as individuals.

a.

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2005 12:18:33 -0500

> i strongly agree with Carl on this, people serve as

I had promised myself I would drop this, but one more try.  

I agree with Carl that individual responsibility and individual
service is a much better model.  But the IAOC is set up exactly
the way the IESG is -- no votes except as a last resort, no
requirement to record votes, tremendous incentives for the group
to work together as a group (which includes covering for people
who are performing below-par), strong mechanisms to be sure that
everyone goes along with the group in order to get anything
done, and perhaps most important, no real way for people on the
"outside" to determine that someone isn't working effectively as
part of the team.  We've also replicated the role of a Chair
with no real authority over the other members of the IAOC.   All
of those things are probably good decisions, at least IMO.
However, there are even fewer constraints on the IAOC than on
the IESG.  In particular, many types of underperformance by an
AD are visible to that AD's WGs.   

A fairly large number of comments during the Problem Statement
WG period seemed to point to the fact that neither the appeals
nor the nomcom processes were effective in singling out the
individuals who were responsible for aggregate IESG bad behavior
and retiring them, precisely because the offenders could not be
properly identified.  So, drop the idea of "mass execution", but
think about how any problematic individuals are going to be
identified sufficiently well that "individual responsibility"
tools work.  Otherwise, if the IAOC turns out to be
insufficiently functional, the only way to fix it is, in
practice, almost certain to involve singling out some individual
as the problem, piling all of the problem on him or her, and the
having an execution of that individual.  If the way in which the
recall procedures have functioned so far are indicative, we have
either never had anyone who deserved recalling or that "make
public accusations and hold an individual responsible for
something that might actually be the consequences of
circumstances or someone else's fault" is just not a model that
we are willing to use.

      john

>> Just so we're clear, I think a mass execution procedure is a
>> bad idea. Serial executions are much better: these people got
>> seated one by one, and if you don't like them, each one
>> should get their own trial and sentence.
>> 
>> Changing 3777 to allow group trials seems like a task well
>> beyond the current exercise, which should be focused on how
>> to get the IAOC on board and functioning.  I fully expect
>> that our founding fodders on the IAOC will do a great job and
>> that we should focus on building this particular bridge
>> instead of establishing procedures for burning it  down.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Carl
> 
>