Subject: Re: [kitten] Call for Adoption: draft-burgin-kerberos-aes-cbc- hmac-sha2.

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2013 09:11:05 -0500

>From past discussions and from Love's quick comment when I sent the call
for adoption, it seems clear people have reviewed this document.  There
don't seem to be any technical objections nor any objections to this
work being done on the IETF stream.  Stephen and the chairs would prefer
this go forward as a WG item if possible.

So, my reading of the silence is that no one objects to us taking this
forward as an informational document.  If I got that wrong, please shout
out before the draft submission window opens next week.  Otherwise,
we'll consider the draft adopted and move for a quick last call after
Love and Nico's concern about CTS vs CBC in resolved.

Sam hartman
Kitten co-chair

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From: Nico Williams <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2013 10:15:15 -0600

I support this work.

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From: Greg Hudson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2013 11:50:54 -0500

On 03/04/2013 09:11 AM, Sam Hartman wrote:
> forward as an informational document.

I don't object.  But I do tend to think that if the Kerberos ecosystem
is going to have two different AES-and-a-hash cipher suites, it would be
better for the new one to use SHA-3.

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From: Nico Williams <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2013 11:00:14 -0600

> better for the new one to use SHA-3.

The consensus that seems to be gathering steam is that SHA-2 is more
than secure enough for these purposes (heck, SHA-1 is too when used in
HMAC), and that it's faster in software than SHA-3, thus we should use
SHA-2.  I think we should use SHA-3 in places where we don't have HMAC
or randomized hashing -- places we don't have in Kerberos.

Nico
--

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2013 12:17:55 -0500

>>>>> "Greg" == Greg Hudson <[email-masked]> writes:

    Greg> On 03/04/2013 09:11 AM, Sam Hartman wrote:
    >> So, my reading of the silence is that no one objects to us taking
    >> this forward as an informational document.

    Greg> I don't object.  But I do tend to think that if the Kerberos
    Greg> ecosystem is going to have two different AES-and-a-hash cipher
    Greg> suites, it would be better for the new one to use SHA-3.

I'd urge WG participants considering this issue to review the
presentations and discussion surrounding the last few SAAG discussions
of sha-3.
Nico's comments are consistent with those discussions.

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From: Kelley Burgin <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2013 14:05:24 -0500

I think it will take NIST a while (years?) to publish a standard for  
SHA-3 where it selects the algorithm parameters, provides test  
vectors, etc. It makes sense to me to have SHA-2 available in the  
meanwhile and revisit adding SHA-3 when a standard is published. Also,  
the draft is proposed to support draft-burgin-kerberos-suiteb, and  
Suite B requires SHA-2.

Kelley

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From: Greg Hudson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 04 Mar 2013 14:14:43 -0500

On 03/04/2013 02:05 PM, Kelley Burgin wrote:
> SHA-3 where it selects the algorithm parameters, provides test vectors,
> etc. It makes sense to me to have SHA-2 available in the meanwhile and
> revisit adding SHA-3 when a standard is published. Also, the draft is
> proposed to support draft-burgin-kerberos-suiteb, and Suite B requires
> SHA-2.

Okay, I withdraw my preference.