Subject: [Mip6] Security Considerations section of draft-ietf-mip6-nemo-v4traversal-00.txt

From: Alexandru Petrescu <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2005 19:48:48 +0200

Hello again to authors of draft-ietf-mip6-nemo-v4traversal-00.txt,

Please let me deviate the discussion to the Security Considerations
section.  It is very good that the draft has this section contributed
from the start since the security aspects are important.

It currently describes a method by which the v6 HA may use the inherent
security established with the v6 Home Address to deduce that the v4 HoA
contained in the BU is securely communicated.

While the method may make sense, maybe some flaws are still possible.

For example, it may be possible that an IPv6 attacker MN that has good
credentials with its HA (verifiable by IPsec with respect to its v6 HoA)
abuses the v4 address of another legitimate MN of same v6 HA.  The
attacker may include the legitimate's MN v4 address in its BU.  Do you
think this would not be possible?

Another example is with the NAT traversal scheme.  The current text
describes that if two IPv4 addresses in a certain packet don't match
then the HA advises the MN to use a certain Refresh Time (with the NAT
detection option).  So I think it is possible for an attacker MN to fake
the IPv4 address of another MN, such that the legitimate MN receives NAT
Detection Options although there's no NAT in place.  Do you think this
would not be possible?

Alex

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