Subject: Re: [mobile-ip] Why not IKE? (was: Re: Drafty draft about key establishment for Binding Update)

From: James Kempf <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2001 10:36:21 -0800 (PST)

Pekka,

>To add a tidbit.  In order to cover all cases _really_ securely,
>IKE would require a global PKI that contains information about
>who "owns" which address, i.e., what is the home address of a
>given MN.  In technical terms, the PKI would have to include
>information to securely bind a home address and a public key together.
>
>The same applies to AAA.  When you scale up AAA, at some point you
>must stop assuming that all parties in the AAA are honest.  Once you
>do this, you must start including authorization information for the
>AAA parties, basically saying "this ISP owns this block of IP addresses"
>for each ISP.  AFAIK, such the current AAA architecture does not fully
>cover that, not discussing about the associated deployment problems.
>
>Thus, in both cases, establishing the required infrastructure would be 
>quite hard and expensive.  
>
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nikander-ipng-address-ownership-00.tx
t
>tries to clarify this and other related problems.

Like I said, I haven't looked at this problem in detail. I was merely
arguing from an "installed base" perspective. Acceptance of AAA by the
3Gs is further along than IKE, so deployment seems certain. Ultimately,
as you point out, there may be similar problems in global deployment.

		jak

---

From: James Kempf <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2001 11:39:47 -0800 (PST)

Mike,

>   I'm not a huge IKE fan, but I do know that the
>   cable MSO's are using Kerberos to key SA's for
>   MGCP/SIP, and that there's a real working group
>   to really standardize Kerberized IPsec in IETF.
>   Using (or not) AAA for a similar general
>   purpose keying mechanism really should not be
>   done piece meal, and *especially* from MIP WG. 
>   If people think that AAA is a good way to key
>   SA's, we ought to have a BOF and a real WG to
>   set the charter and requirements. As it is
>   right, now using AAA to key SA's is an
>   amorphous requirementless free for all. Since
>   it's a security protocol, that should frighten
>   everybody.

Sounds like you have identified a topic for a BOF at the London meeting.
I'll post the idea to aaa-wg and see what they think.

		jak