Subject: RE: [mobile-ip] BU Authorization method: design team recommendation

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 09:36:17 -0600

Erik Nordmark [[email-masked]] wrote:
>Vijay,
>
>> Nonce N1 and selector go in one message. Nonce N2 and the hash 
>> (N1 + N2 + selector) goes in another message. An attacker cant
>> see both these messages unless he is on the CN's link or the MN's
>> link. Please, for a moment, see this mechanism as a generic 
>> mechanism to select any BU authorization methods based on RR.
>
>Yes, but I suspect an attacker on the CN's link is a common high-level
>threat today with 802.11 and other multi-access links. (Using spoofed
>router advertisements or neighbor advertisements, if the L2 can't be
>spoofed, in order to see all packets.)
>

But solving the security problems of 802.11 or other multi-access
links is not ncecessarily Mobile IP WGs problem. 
I believe we need to avoid digressing into solving problems outside
the scope of MIPv6 (and IMO securing 802.11 or other multi-access
links is not within the scope of finding a solution for securing MIPv6
BUs) 

-Basavaraj

---

From: Erik Nordmark <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 17:24:09 +0100 (CET)

> links is not within the scope of finding a solution for securing MIPv6

Raj,

I certainly didn't mean to imply that I think MIPv6 needs to solve
problems are security issues for multi-access links.
I does not as far as I am concerned.

I was merely responding to Vijay's statement that doing things a
particular way handled threats except e.g. an attacker on the CN's link
by pointing out that in reality that link might be a prime place for
attackers to do their dirty work.

  Erik