Subject: [NSIS] Security Threats for NSIS : Attacks against the Transport Mechani sm

From: Tschofenig Hannes <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2004 15:45:27 +0200

hi all, 

a comment regarding section 4.11:

> 4.11 Attacks against the Transport Mechanism 
>     
> I think we can now refer to the split layer architecture as a 
> decision within the group (after all, it's in the charter) and is
> as defined in the framework.

> A reference to RFC2385 might be helpful background.

regarding the reference RFC2385 ( Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option). i guess we should not introduce new pointers to certain
solutions. rfc2385 is one particular solution approach.

regarding the overall comment i have changed the text from:

"
4.11 Attacks against the Transport Mechanism 
    
   In [BL01] a two-level architecture is proposed, which suggests 
   splitting an NSIS protocol into layers: a signaling message 
   transport-specific layer and an application-specific layer. This 
   architectural assumption is also considered within the NSIS 
   framework [HF+03]. Most of the threats described in this document 
   are applicable to the application-specific part (i.e., signaling QoS 
   or middlebox-specific information). There are, however, some threats 
   that are applicable to the transport of signaling messages.  
    
   Network or transport layer protocols lacking protection mechanisms 
   are vulnerable to certain attacks such as header manipulation, DoS, 
   spoofing of identities, session hijacking, unexpected aborts, etc.  
    
   Malicious nodes can attack the congestion control mechanism to force 
   NSIS nodes into a congestion avoidance state. 
    
   In the case in which existing protocols are used for exchanging NSIS 
   signaling messages, known threats scenarios applicable to these 
   protocols are relevant. 
" 

to 

"

4.11 Attacks against the NTLP

In [BL01] a two-level architecture is proposed, which suggests splitting an
NSIS protocol into layers: a signaling message transport-specific layer and
an application-specific layer. More details can be found in the NSIS
framework [HF+03]. Most of the threats described in this document are
applicable to the NSLP application-specific part (e.g., QoS NSLP). There
are, however, some threats that are applicable to the NTLP. 

Network and transport layer protocols lacking protection mechanisms are
vulnerable to certain attacks such as header manipulation, DoS, spoofing of
identities, session hijacking, unexpected aborts, etc. Malicious nodes can
attack the congestion control mechanism to force NSIS nodes into a
congestion avoidance state.

Threats which address parts of the NTLP which are not related to attacks
against the usage transport layer protocols are covered in various sections
throughout this document, such as in Section 4.2. 

In the case in which existing transport layer protocols are used for
exchanging NSIS signaling messages, security vulnerabilities know to these
protocols need to be considered. A detailed threat description of these
protocols is outside the scope of this document. 
" 

do you think that this is more appropriate?

ciao
hannes

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