Subject: RE: Issue4: (new) Device identifier (types)

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2003 17:06:05 +0300

> From: ext Mohan Parthasarathy [mailto:[email-masked]]
<klip>
> > So, this really is in the scope of PANA.
> > 
> Please see above. Are you saying that PANA should come up with some
> mechanism to prevent address spoofing ?

That is out of the scope, but PANA can act as a carrier for that information. Or should we say that the addresses that PaC is using can be bound to the PANA session within the PANA protocol - securely.

I'm not saying that PANA should do something that is in the scope of SEND. PAA could for example query other parties:
 - PANA and DHCP interworking, 
 - PANA and MIPv6/v4 interworking, 
 - PANA and SEND interworking, 
 - PANA and "local administration" interworking (network policies, 
   access control, packet filtering and firewalling)
if the listed DIs are ok for the PaC.

What do you think about this?

- Dan

---

From: Yoshihiro Ohba <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2003 14:27:43 -0700

>  - PANA and SEND interworking, 

I think this is already covered by allowing link-local address to be
bound to PANA SA.

> if the listed DIs are ok for the PaC.

I'd like to know exactly what is not covered by just allowing
link-local address to be bound to PANA SA in order to achieve this
level of interworking.  Note that we already identified that if we use
SEND to assign an interface address and use IPsec tunneling for data
packet protection between PaC and EP, then inner packet filtering is
possible based on the SEND-generated interface-address that is also
used for inner packets.

Yoshihiro Ohba