Subject: RE: A PKI Question: PKCS11-> PKCS12

From: Hal Lockhart <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 13:59:44 -0500

Generating a secret on a smartcard and having it never leave the card is a
major security feature to many people. For example, I believe it is mandated
by Identrus for financial transactions. It is certainly a major motive for
using smartcards, since it insures that all copies of the key are protected,
not just one of them. It also insures that an attacker can not read out the
key and use it in some environment where the card is not present.

On the other hand, many people believe in the benefits of key backup,
particularly in a corporate environment, where the assets being protected
belong to the organization not the individual. Also some folks believe that
a central facility can do a better job of generating unguessable keys than a
smartcard with limited processing power.

There is never any reason to protect certificates, since they are signed and
intended to be public knowledge. They tend to take a lot of precious space
on a smartcard. But, given the lack of a universally deployed directory
infrastructure, it is convenient to have them "with you".
 
However, trusted root keys (which may be held in a self signed certificate
for processing convenience) must be protected from modification.

Hal

> -----Original Message-----
> From: RAGHAVENDRAN H. (SSG) - CTD, Chennai.
> [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 11:17 AM
> To: [email-masked]
> Subject: A PKI Question: PKCS11-> PKCS12
> 
> 
> 
> Hi List:
> 
> Sorry this may be off the list, but I thought this is the 
> best "PKI" place
> to ask this question :-)
> 
> Myself and my friend had an discussion in which he says that 
> when I put a
> private key/certificate pair into a smart card device (such 
> as GPK 4000), it
> is impossible to read the information and create a PKCS12 
> file (disk based)
> out of it. 
> 
> I find it mighty strange. For example, I might want to swap my
> certificate/key pair from one smart card to another and I 
> might want to do
> it via the PKCS12 format. 
> 
> Can anybody say whether this is possible or not?
> 
> Some of my friends say that it "may be" possible to export only the
> Certificate and not the private key associated with it. I 
> don't see sense
> any of this argument.
> 
> In fact, what is the point in jailing the private key for 
> life in a single
> smart card? This argument is totally contrary to logical thinking.
> 
> Pls. guys, I'd be grateful if you could answer this question.
> 
> Regards,
> Raghav
>

---

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 14:37:58 -0500

If your smart card supports PKCS 12 (export), you have the ability to move
your keys to another device, usually for disaster recovery. This is
appropriate for CA keys. A typical user should not need this capability for
normal business.

-Jim

Baber Amin <[email-masked]> on 11/27/2001 02:06:05 PM

To:   [email-masked]
      Jim Essig/US/ABAS/PwC@Americas-US
cc:   [email-masked]
Subject:  Re: A PKI Question: PKCS11-> PKCS12

So how would one move their keys and certs from one smart card to
another.

Thanks
Baber
:)

>>> <[email-masked]> 11/27/01 11:24AM >>>

The purpose of storing a private key in a smart card, is exactly that
"to
jail it". By being able to move the private key to another device you
run
the risk of a malicious user having a copy of your private key and
using
that private key to impersonate you. The reason to have a smart card is
to
provide a secure means to transport, store and use your private key
for
authentication and/or encryption. A Smart card user may have a
legitimate
"want" to move their key to another smart card, but this would
circumuvent
the point of the smart card. The purpose is not to just be able to
transport the key, otherwise everyone would use 3.5" floppies.

Hope this answered your question.

-Jim

"RAGHAVENDRAN H. (SSG) - CTD, Chennai." <[email-masked]>
@mail.imc.org on 11/27/2001 11:17:19 AM

Sent by:  [email-masked]

To:   [email-masked]
cc:

Hi List:

Sorry this may be off the list, but I thought this is the best "PKI"
place
to ask this question :-)

Myself and my friend had an discussion in which he says that when I put
a
private key/certificate pair into a smart card device (such as GPK
4000),
it
is impossible to read the information and create a PKCS12 file (disk
based)
out of it.

I find it mighty strange. For example, I might want to swap my
certificate/key pair from one smart card to another and I might want to
do
it via the PKCS12 format.

Some of my friends say that it "may be" possible to export only the
Certificate and not the private key associated with it. I don't see
sense
any of this argument.

In fact, what is the point in jailing the private key for life in a
single
smart card? This argument is totally contrary to logical thinking.

Regards,
Raghav

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---

From: Ryan Hurst <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 11:35:55 -0800

There are different type's smart cards, some of which are storage only
devices, others actually do the cryptography. In the first case it is
possible to export/import a P12 onto the device. In the latter case it is
not normally possible. Most crypto cards also support being used as storage
only devices but not all, this is usually determined by how the device has
been initialized.

Hope this helps

Ryan

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 10:24 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: A PKI Question: PKCS11-> PKCS12

The purpose of storing a private key in a smart card, is exactly that "to
jail it". By being able to move the private key to another device you run
the risk of a malicious user having a copy of your private key and using
that private key to impersonate you. The reason to have a smart card is to
provide a secure means to transport, store and use your private key for
authentication and/or encryption. A Smart card user may have a legitimate
"want" to move their key to another smart card, but this would circumuvent
the point of the smart card. The purpose is not to just be able to
transport the key, otherwise everyone would use 3.5" floppies.

-Jim

To:   [email-masked]
cc:

Hi List:

Sorry this may be off the list, but I thought this is the best "PKI" place
to ask this question :-)

Myself and my friend had an discussion in which he says that when I put a
private key/certificate pair into a smart card device (such as GPK 4000),
it
is impossible to read the information and create a PKCS12 file (disk based)
out of it.

I find it mighty strange. For example, I might want to swap my
certificate/key pair from one smart card to another and I might want to do
it via the PKCS12 format.

Some of my friends say that it "may be" possible to export only the
Certificate and not the private key associated with it. I don't see sense
any of this argument.

In fact, what is the point in jailing the private key for life in a single
smart card? This argument is totally contrary to logical thinking.

Regards,
Raghav

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 17:45:19 -0700

PKI key operations can be put into two categories .... authentication
(digital signatures) and secrecy/privacy (encryption).

It is reasonable to have a hardware token with a private key that was
generated in the chip and never leaves the chip for use in authentication
applications .... i.e. digital signatures for reliably authenticating an
entity.

Most key escrow and business continuity issues involve privacy, secrecy,
encryption and recovery of information; aka essential corporate assets
protected with encryption could be lost if the access to the encryption key
only existed in a single chip and that chip malfunctioned (a continuous
availability issue with regard to no-single-point-of-failure and redundancy
... for high value assets, frequently not even simple duplicates, but even
higher levels of redundancy and availability).

While it is possible that the same kind of chips and similar public key
technology may be used in the two cases, the actual business processes
(authentication and secrecy/privacy) have different requirements and design
points.

It is possible to define chips/crypto for use in authentication-only
business processes to have requirements that the private key be unique to a
hardware token and never divulged. At the same time, it is also possible
for essentially identical chips/crypto for use in secrecy/privacy business
processes to have requirements that there be no single point of failure
(even down to the hardware token containing a private key) which involving
critical business assets. To meet business continuity and availability
requirments it is possible that private keys involve in encryption for
secrecy/privacy issues be replicated via means like key escrow.

The business requirments are different for the two different scenarios,
even if the technology is otherwise identical.

<[email-masked]> on 11/27/2001 11:59 AM wrote:

Generating a secret on a smartcard and having it never leave the card is a
major security feature to many people. For example, I believe it is
mandated by Identrus for financial transactions. It is certainly a major
motive for using smartcards, since it insures that all copies of the key
are protected, not just one of them. It also insures that an attacker can
not read out the key and use it in some environment where the card is not
present.

On the other hand, many people believe in the benefits of key backup,
particularly in a corporate environment, where the assets being protected
belong to the organization not the individual. Also some folks believe that
a central facility can do a better job of generating unguessable keys than
a smartcard with limited processing power.

There is never any reason to protect certificates, since they are signed
and intended to be public knowledge. They tend to take a lot of precious
space on a smartcard. But, given the lack of a universally deployed
directory infrastructure, it is convenient to have them "with you".

Hal

---

From: Santosh Chokhani <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 21:49:29 -0500

FIPS 140-1 as a standard permits you to output private keys in plaintext for
levels 1 and 2.

For levels 3 and 4, you can still output the private key, but it must
encrypted or split.

-----Original Message-----
From: Mitchell Arnone [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 5:48 PM
To: RAGHAVENDRAN H. (SSG) - CTD, Chennai.; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: A PKI Question: PKCS11-> PKCS12

It depends on the Smart Card in use.  Most Smart Cards that meet standards 
like FIPS 140-1 Level 2 will not let you export the private key ever.  This 
is necessary to support non-repudiation.  It makes total sense.

Mitch

it
>Pls. guys, I'd be grateful if you could answer this question.

***********************************************************
Mitchell Arnone
Senior Consultant
Technical Consulting Practice, Northeast Region
Schlumberger Network Solutions

[email-masked]
www.slb.com/nws

35 Waterview Blvd.
Suite 210
Parsippany, NJ 07054-1200
USA

Phone  +1 410-579-8691
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---

From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 19:57:45 +1300 (NZDT)

"RAGHAVENDRAN H. (SSG) - CTD, Chennai." <[email-masked]> writes:

>private key/certificate pair into a smart card device (such as GPK 4000), it
>I find it mighty strange. For example, I might want to swap my certificate/key
>pair from one smart card to another and I might want to do it via the PKCS12
>format.

Just out of interest (for a paper I'm working on), why do you want to move the
private key around?  There seems to be an amazing demand for this, with reasons
ranging from logical ("We're experimenting with the technology and want to move
keys around different systems for testing") through to the questionable ("We
want to share the same key across all our servers") through to the bizarre ("We
don't know, we just need to do it").  I'd be interested in hearing any other
reasons people have heard for moving keys around (apart from obvious ones like
key backup).

Peter.

---

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 21:10:44 -0700

note that bank vaults and armored trucks have things put into and taken out
of them all the time ... and they are still considered secure.

in the scenario of digital signature & public key for authentication, it is
possible that there is a  business requirement for non-divulging/exporting
the private key.

however, in the scenario of hardware tokens protecting private key(s)
involved in secrecy/privacy encryption there can be significant reasons for
having private key replication ... especially if very valuable corporate
assets are involved.

hardware tokens can be secure .... whether they implement private key
exporting or not. In the business process of authentication there can be
higher confidence that with a non-export private key policy there is
improved non-repudiation. However, that shouldn't negate the fact that
similar secure hardware tokens can't be used to protect private keys that
have been replicated for various business purposes (that don't involve
things like non-repudiation).

There can be some confusion when identical technology is being used for
totally different and distinct business purposes .... where the associated
business requirements for the different business processes can place
different requirements on the technology.

<[email-masked]> on 11/27/2001 4:27 PM wrote:

HI there,

I have tested numerous different smart cards/USB tokens and software
combinations and have not seen one that offers a p12 export facility. The
Purpose of having a smart card is to be able to securely store the Private
key, if it can be exported from the smart card/token then it isn't really
secure.

Richard Culshaw