Subject: Re: [provreg] Proposal: A standard EPP OT&E test suite for each object type and extension type

From: [email-masked]
Date: Sun, 03 Jul 2011 08:25:44 -0400

patrik,

If you, or anyone else with an interest in the implementation consequences
of the post-2004 scaling properties of new icann contracts for registries,
had been engaged in the vertical integreation policy area, from the point
in time when icann staff, sui sponte, included the continuation of the '01
and '04 structural separation with the more general question of economic
utility analysis [1], you would have witnessed two salient meta-requiements
expressed by the majority involved in the policy area:

	o registrars generally had no interest in restrictions upon their
	  behavior as registries, though a few significant exceptions did
	  exist, e.g., core and godaddy,

	o non-registrars had no interest in restrictions upon their 
          behavior as registries.

if you go back to the final vi report and see how many participants (note
also their business, or their academic/ideological affiliation) rejected
continuity of the basic '01 and '04 separation requirement.

the ec and doj letters of last month deal with the existing competition policy
problem of allowing an entity with an 83% market share, or entities with a
100% market share, compete with external registrar functional units, though
it is expressed as a market power analysis, allowing integration where market
power is absent.

what the ec and doj letters do not deal with is nacent competition policy
problem of 500 registries, each able to express a distinct business model,
through its registration policy, and each able to operate as a registrar
for its own registry.

your milage, and others, will vary, but after i reflected on the problem i
came to the conclusion that the 15% cap on registry ownership in registrars
was the better structural policy choice which allowed any cross-ownership,
as it, as an implementation detail, requires at least 7 registries which do
not share ownership or control (e.g., no "seven puppets") to agree to form
a cross-ownership restriction compliant registrar.

this reduces the diversity problem by almost an order of magnitude, see  
"scale", above, as the co-owners of, and co-channel dependent registries
have a criticial material interest in -- interoperation.

a lower cross-ownership threshold is even better, 5% means 20 registries
have a criticial material interest in their common registrar's ability to
operate over 20 inventories, 20 policy models, on a tractible implementation
platform, possibly implemented as a single code base with 20, but no fewer,
ugly little #ifdefs.

since i don't recall anyone involved in epp, past or present, other than myself
being involved with the icann vi wg, the straight-registrar interest in the
issue of requirements diversity is a ship that sailed, steered mostly by the
stars of independent fortunes for independent registries.

a ship that has not yet sailed is that of 2012 applicants who apply for a
form of assistance arising from the icann boards' policy resolution 20 at
nairobi, and implemented by the joint applicant support (jas) working group.

for qualified (for support under the guidelines recommended by the jas)
applicants, is cooperation on one or more areas of qualified applicant common
interest recommended, required, or included?

if support is available to 20% of the 2012 applicants, and if cooperation
takes the form of a criticial material interest in -- interoperation, then
this reduces the diversity problem by two orders of magnitude, see  
"scale", above.

i'm writing this now (well, today i'm working on a law school project with
a "now" deadline). if you want to find a way to pursuade enom to play nice
with netsol, where both (and many others) are platform owners and hold one
or (many) more registry contracts and are registrars for their proper new
gtld registries, feel free. i suspect you'll need to make your arguement
to the board (ok, you can try the fatally disfunctional gnso first) that
diversity without restriction leads to cartels of registrar controlled
registries, harming non-affiliated registrars (and registrants), and when
that doesn't work, making the same competition policy claim to the ec and
doj as competition authorities.

the straight registrar has a criticial material interest in interoperability,
this interest is not shared by registries, or any other policy advocacy entity
with standing, under the current regulatory policy model and practice. 

one reasonable answer is monopoly, follow com/net, with a few forks for org
and the next big thing. we took that path in 2000, dropping xrp and all its
bells and whistles.

another is changing the problem constraints, see above. implementers need
only inform investors that interoperability with existing competitors, and
surrendering plan of record competitive advantage in the new gtld market
is a wicked good idea to find redirection or other employment opportunities.

which leaves a lot of non-interoperability, and some interoperability, based
on a criticial material interest.

-e

[1] 2008, the "economic analysis" having been claimed as a necessity prior
by parties advocating no, or few, new registries, generally due to the cost
to marks portfolio managers to execute dilution defense via systematic
defensive buys -- the covert "first million in revenu" in the price-cap
with no material policy based registration restriction registry business plans.

---

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 04 Jul 2011 09:00:23 -0400

paf,

it is now useful for one or more epp specification and implemention
interested parties to opine, or make a recommendation on the utility
of common syntax and semantics to a class of registry applicants.

i, and possibly one or more other contributors to the joint applicant
support working group (jointness from the generic name supporting
organization and the at large advisory committee, as participating
bylaws entities of the internet corporation for assigned names and
numbers), will be making recommendations that are intended to reduce
new gtld applicant cost and risk, for qualified applicants.

cost includes more than the application fee, and risk includes risk of
entering "continuity", which includes a failure of the registry as a
cost-recovery economic unit, which includes interoperability, as a
cost barrier to its acquisition of sales channels (external registrars),
and therefore the provisioning protocol.

a contribution on the subject, from parties knowledgable about the
current practice of provisioning protocol implementors and users, and
the choices available to specification authors for a given set of
user requirements, something offering more salient guidance than
"tired of all non-interoperable registry inventions in epp", could
be useful.

non-contribution means i co-author the text, which i suspect is sufficient,
but asking is prudent.

more formal requests from the jas-wg to the board and it's ietf liaison,
and on through the magic of delegation, eventually to this very mailing
list, are possible.

-e