Subject: [rddp] Security draft issue (4) - IPsec

From: [email-masked]
Date: Sat, 1 May 2004 14:31:31 -0400

On to the last, and most difficult open issue from Seoul - what
should RDDP (specifically the security draft) have to say about
a mandatory-to-implement security mechanism.  Here's an extract
from the minutes:

  Section 9 - Should we require IPsec, and therefore implement 
  this section, or make it optional? Suggestion that it be made 
  "mandatory-to-implement, optional-to-use." It was observed that 
  IPS had a similar section because it needed it. Also, now that 
  there is the IKEv2 specification to refer to, the problem is no longer 
  so difficult to document.  Look at IKEv2 and new "Cryptographic
  Algorithms for IKEv2" draft.  If these are used this section in
  the RDDP security draft may not be necessary, as an IKEv2
  reference will be adequate. 

  (4) Core question: Should we say that IPsec is mandatory for RDDP? 
  Secondary question: What parts do we actually require? (IKEv2?)

I have heard a couple of comments on this that deserve some further
elaboration.

- Q: RDDP is part of the transport, can't we defer the security
	requirements to whatever the ULP above the transport requires?
- A: Yes, but that would only cover the payloads, as the ULP won't
	know anything about RDDP headers.  To follow this approach,
	either we have to have a way to protect the RDDP headers or to
	make their protection unnecessary (e.g., as SSL/TLS makes
	protection of TCP headers unnecessary).  The latter approach
	will have to deal with RDDP enabling direct placement of network
	data into ULP/application memory, which seems to be a resource
	that deserves protection.
- Q: Isn't IKEv2 a lot to ask of implementers?
- A: Possibly - the discussion in Seoul was around the fact that IKEv2
	should clean up a lot of IKEv1's interoperability problems,
	possibly obviating the need to profile IKEv1.  OTOH, IKEv2 is
	a relatively new protocol.

This is for discussion.  I observe that the IESG will insist on a
solid answer to "What is the mandatory-to-implement security for RDDP?".

Thanks,
--David

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David L. Black, Senior Technologist
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
+1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
[email-masked]        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
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From: Caitlin Bestler <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 2 May 2004 00:04:36 +0300

> solid answer to "What is the mandatory-to-implement security for 

Actually, I have the opposite question/objection.

RDDP rides on top of standard reliable IP Transports (SCTP and TCP).

So why should a problem solved at those layers also be solved by RDDP?

The one sense that RDDP is "transport layer" is that it is below the 
application
layer. As such, it should not be making any presumption that RDDP 
applications
need more security or authentication than the transport layer itself 
would provide.

Until IPsec is mandatory-to-implement for IP hosts I see no 
justification for
making it mandatory tor RDDP endpoints. And of course if it were 
mandatory-to-
implement for IP Hosts, RDDP would not have to implement it.

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From: Caitlin Bestler <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 2 May 2004 00:04:55 +0300