Subject: [rohc] SigComp assumptions about security

From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 11:40:41 -0600

Hi,

(This is triggered by the discussion of STATE_FREE.)

I'm trying to figure out how SigComp runs in an insecure
environment, and even further, do we really have such a case?
It seems we already made some assumptions.

- Integrity protection is assumed. Section 10.1: "The SigComp 
approach assumes that there is appropriate integrity protection 
below and/or above the SigComp layer."

- Do we assume application always has authentication? Many
of SigComp operations (e.g. state creation/deletion) will
be carried out by permission of the application. But what
if application has no ability to make the decision? Does
that mean SigComp is paralyzed?

Again, do we have a case where SigComp runs over insecure
environment?

BR,
Zhigang

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From: "Dr. Carsten Bormann" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 18:58:16 +0100

> below and/or above the SigComp layer."

I think this is 10.2.
Anyway, this just means that sigcomp itself is not making any contributions
to integrity protection, the text then goes on how sigcomp might compromise
integrity protection below it (and why it doesn't).

> that mean SigComp is paralyzed?

If the app has no way to make the decision, you can't use state.
Of course, it could decide to err on the liberal side -- if your application
is not stateless, you will just increase the DoS potential gradually.
The point is that sigcomp itself is not creating the DoS potential, but it
needs the consent of an application.

Gruesse, Carsten