Subject: [RPSEC] Charter Bashing...

From: Russ White <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 20:09:04 -0500 (EST)

We left Minneapolis with the understanding that this should be a
working group, but that we need to bash the charter some before
going to the IESG with the proposal. A copy of the latest charter
draft is below....

I know we had a good number of things to add from the comments we
got there, so bash away....

:-)

Russ
__________________________________

Routing Protocol Security Requirements (rpsec)

CHAIRS: Russ White ([email-masked])
        Danny McPherson ([email-masked])

Description
-----------

The lack of a common set of security requirements and methods for
routing protocols has resulted in a wide variety of security
mechanisms for individual routing protocols.  Ongoing work on
requirements for the next generation routing system and future
work on the actual mechanisms for it will require well documented
routing security requirements.

The products of this working group will be used by routing
protcool designers to ensure adequate coverage of security in the
future, including well known and possible threats. It is not the
goal of this working group to revisit current routing protocol
security mechanisms.

The goal of this BOF is to discuss creation and charter of a WG
in the routing area that would be charged with the following
tasks:

 - Document threat models for routing protocols
 - Document security requirements for routing protocols

Proposed WG milestones:

  1. Jul 2002: Submit initial I-D (or set of I-Ds) which details
     the threats to routing protocols.

  2. Oct 2002: Submit initial I-D (or set of I-Ds) which outlines
     security requirements for routing protocols.

  3. Dec 2002: Submit I-Ds documenting threats to routing
     protocols for publication as Informational RFC.

  4. Mar 2003: Submit the I-D documenting security requirements
     to routing protocols for publication as Informational RFC.

  5. Mar 2003: Evaluate progress, recharter with new goals (see
     possible future work below) or shutdown.

BOF Agenda
----------

 1. Agenda bashing
 2. Overview of security issues in routing protocols
 3. Overview of the current status of routing protocol security
    work
 4. Presentation on proposed WG charter and milestones
 5. Open mike (discussion, Q&As)

References
----------

 1. Flaws in packet's authentication of OSPFv2, Jerome Etienne
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-etienne-ospfv2-auth-flaws-00.txt
 2. Flaws in RIPv2 packet's authentication, Jerome Etienne
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws-00.txt
 3. BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, S. Murphy
     http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-murphy-bgp-vuln-00.txt
 4. BGP Security Protections, S. Murphy
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-murphy-bgp-protect-00.txt
 5. OSPF with digital signature against an insider, Jerome
    Etienne 
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-etienne-rfc2154-flaws-00.txt
 6. Secure BGP (S-BGP)
    http://www.net-tech.bbn.com/sbgp/draft-clynn-s-bgp-protocol-00.txt
 7. OSPF Version 2 (RFC2328)
    http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2328.txt
 8. RIP-2 MD5 Authentication (RFC2082)
    http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2082.txt
 9. IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-isis-hmac-03.txt
 10. Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option
     http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2385.txt
     http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-idr-rfc2385bis-00.txt

Possible Future Work
--------------------

 - Document the feasibility of various types of security
   mechinisms within routing protocols
 - Document requirements for new security mechanisms
 - Document security requirements for the next generation routing
   system

_______________________________________________
RPSEC mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rpsec

---

From: Tony Tauber <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 12:05:29 -0500 (EST)

> Description

What about generalizing to other network control signalling protocols
like LDP and RSVP?

I know I mentioned this idea to you prior to the BOF and someone
beat me to mentioning it on the mic, but that comment didn't make
it into the published minutes.

People may argue about which signalling protocols may be in scope or
out, but think about the desire (which I think has alot of currency)
to preserve the security and resiliency of public networks.

Thoughts?

Tony

---

From: Russ White <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 06:01:14 -0500 (EST)

> What about generalizing to other network control signalling
> protocols like LDP and RSVP?

As long as they are within the routing area, then I don't see any
problem with extending to these....

> I know I mentioned this idea to you prior to the BOF and
> someone beat me to mentioning it on the mic, but that comment
> didn't make it into the published minutes.

First, you'll have to sit closer to the mic next time. Second,
I'll have to try and write faster, or learn to bring a second
notebook to type on (since I type faster than I write, at least
legibally).

:-)

Russ

__________________________________
[email-masked] CCIE <>< Grace Alone

---

From: Alex Zinin <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 19:10:43 -0800

> problem with extending to these....

Mumble... they are not, at least not at the moment,
so I guess I'm not sure this would be a good idea so far.

> notebook to type on (since I type faster than I write, at least

...or have a dedicated scribe person :)

Alex

---

From: Tony Tauber <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 22:30:16 -0500 (EST)

> so I guess I'm not sure this would be a good idea so far.

Which seems to me to beg the question whether this work
belongs in the Routing Area necessarily.

After all, the practical point of the security is to
maintain network integrity.  Right?

Tony

---

From: Russ White <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2002 08:05:25 -0500 (EST)

> belongs in the Routing Area necessarily.

Hmmm.... I think we do need something for rp specifically.
Otherwise, we end up with something which is so general as to
border on not accomlishing anything, probably.

> After all, the practical point of the security is to maintain
> network integrity.  Right?

Yep--but there are a lot of different security spaces....
Systemic security for the network, device security, systemic
security for rp's, etc. I think we are just trying to secure the
routing system at the moment... 

:-)

Russ