Subject: [RPSEC] Topic 10: Section 4.7 Overload

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 17:51:19 -0500 (EST)

This section combines overload of the control plane and the data plane
(the control and data plane of the router, I presume, i.e., the
routing protocol messages and the data traffic, not the control and
data plane of the routing protocol itself as discussed in section
2.1).  I think those are two very different topics.  For one thing,
the routing protocol design might have a chance to limit control plane
traffic.  But I don't think the routing protocol has much of a chance
to limit the data traffic.

Effect on the behavior of the entire routing system of data plane
activity is another case where there's no doubt that there's an
opportunity for attack, but not much chance that the routing protocol
could do anything about it.  (The ability of someone to break the
transport protocol connection (e.g., TCP RST) is another.  Traffic
analysis is another. Overload on the data plane is another.)  How do
we handle these?  Leave them out of the Routing *PROTOCOL* threat
list?  Or list them here as threats but eliminate from the
requirements draft?  Specially designate them here as threats but not
through the routing protocol?  I'm not sure - I think we have to
decide what the purpose of the document is to make a choice.

--Sandy
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