Subject: rtgwg key chain - empty authentication

From: Jeffrey Haas <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2016 10:12:24 -0300

As a followup to mic comment on Friday afternoon of IETF 95, we should consider an explicit code point for "empty/null" authentication.  This covers the cases where authentication fields in protocols need to be used, but no mechanism providing authentication is in use.

BFD, however, has an unusual form of this case:
1. We support the *absence* of authentication.
2. We have work to add an explicit authentication code point with no authentication, simply to take advantage of some sequencing numbers in the authentication field.

-- Jeff

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From: "Acee Lindem (acee)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2016 18:01:21 +0000

Hi Jeff, 

On 4/8/16, 10:12 AM, "Jeffrey Haas" <[email-masked]> wrote:

>As a followup to mic comment on Friday afternoon of IETF 95, we should
>consider an explicit code point for "empty/null" authentication.  This
>covers the cases where authentication fields in protocols need to be
>used, but no mechanism providing authentication is in use.
>
>2. We have work to add an explicit authentication code point with no
>authentication, simply to take advantage of some sequencing numbers in
>the authentication field.

I reviewed RFC 5880 and I guess what is gained from the key-chain entry
are the send and accept lifetimes for this usage. The precise semantics
are going to be very application (Keychain user) specific.

Thanks,
Acee