Subject: [sacm] HIP identities and public keys

From: Clifford Kahn <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2015 01:39:47 +0000

All,
I took an action item to look into HIP identities. Here is my understanding.

HIP (Host Identity Protocol, rfc 5201) identities are public keys. The endpoint holds the private keys, and can prove it.

HIP does not appear to be widely deployed.

An endpoint typically has a number of HIP identities. But a HIP identity is for only one endpoint: it is a many-to-one relationship.

HIP identities could be identity attributes.

If we defined an attribute that was an endpoint's public key, or a hash thereof, it seems like the one attribute could be used for:

-          a HIP identity

-          the public key found in the endpoint's device certificate

-          the endpoint's Kerberos public key (RFC 4556)

-          the endpoint's ssh public key (RFC 4716)

-          more?

It would cover a lot of bases.

As I mentioned last meeting, often, a public key is retained when a certificate is renewed. This makes the public key a more stable identifying attribute than a device certificate.

A public key (or a hash thereof) is also an *anonymous* identifying attribute. This might help with privacy and regulatory compliance.  Don't we have to be careful about putting Personally Identifying Information (PII) into the SACM information model?

So, should we go with a public-key attribute instead of a certificate attribute?

Best,
                                                Cliff

Action item done.
Clifford Kahn
Principal Engineeer, Technical Lead