Subject: [Seamoby] paging issue#1: security mechanisms

From: Marco Liebsch <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 17:29:27 +0100

Hi all,

on security support, the submitted proposals refer to IPSec and TLS
based mechanisms in order to make paging related signaling secure.
Beside others, the base-line document makes use of IPSec to have
appropriate mechanisms for authentication and possibly encryption.
draft-ohba specifies a TLS mechansims in order to provide authentication
and refers to IPSec in order to provide encryption.

As addressed already a bit earlier on the list, both mechansims have
pros and cons. We should clarify in which direction the paging protocol
should go to, considering the transport mechanisms for paging related
signaling. Signaling transport as described in the base-line draft makes
use of Destination Options for IPv6, but allows carrying messages over
UDP as well. draft-ohba relies on UDP transport. The following is my
current view on the two mechanisms:

IPSec:
*Needs to be open for mobility support
*Would be the same mechanism for IPv6/Dest-Opt as well as for UDP
transport
*Allows a gateway mode (but this is not yet part of any IP paging
protocol proposal, as far as I know)

TLS:
*Independence of lower layer specifics
*Proprietary mechanism
*Requires reliable transport

Also SSL- /PBK-like mechanisms have been addressed, but we have to
compare in order to go into one direction with the paging protocol.

Marco

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From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 09:38:32 -0800

Marco,

Let's put aside security for now. We have not yet decided if
we want to treat this in a separate draft, like I believe
MIP is doing with BU security, or in the base draft.
The advantage of a separate draft is that it makes
the base draft shorter, which helps get IESG
attention faster, and we can send a security draft
to the security directorate, where they can specifically
focus on it without having to wade through other
details of the protocol.

            jak

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From: Yoshihiro Ohba <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 12:56:09 -0500

Exactlly speaking, draft-ohba introduces a higher layer security mechanism 
over UDP, but it is not the TLS protocol specified in RFC2246.

As Jim mentioned in the SLC meeting, DMHA has a lot of big security
issues.  Some of them is similar to Mobile IPv6 BU, but some are
completely different.  Most of the issues are addressed in draft-ohba,
but I don't think everything is addressed.

IMHO, before comparing IPsec and others, we may need to analyze at
first what makes the DMHA protocol design so difficult when we are
trying to meet all the DMHA security requirements.  Depending on the
analysis, we may need to put some restriction in protocool
functionality or loosen the requirement itself, but I'm not sure...

Just my impression,
Yoshihiro Ohba

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From: Marco Liebsch <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 19:01:02 +0100

James,

ok for me, but we should bear in mind not go with other architecture and
protocol issues into a direction restricting future security support to a
specific solution.

Marco