Subject: [Seamoby] question to Pekka S. on CTP

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2003 13:44:54 +0300

Pekka,

Before I dig into your comments, I have a quick question to you.
You have the following substantial comments:

==========

substantial
-----------

 - first thought: "state is evil, distributed state is even more evil."  I 
think it must be *very* clear exactly what state should be transferred and 
what are the real benefits of that related to the time it would take to 
re-establish the state -- and whether the state transfers can be made to 
work ok.  Otherwise you can just wait pushback from IESG/IAB.. :-)

 - spell out deployment restrictions of nAR + pAR for sharing security 
associations; e.g. same ISP's network?  does MN/nAR/pAR somehow have to 
discover whether CT makes sense (e.g. when MN moves to some really foreign 
network, no use even trying to do CT's)?

===========

I agree that the text needs to be improved, but how high of a barrier
do you see that is needed to be achieved.  One thing that was missed
in the last update is to classify this as experimental.  I think part
of the point of going experimental was to allow some deployment
& experiments to get a better handle on your concerns above.  Do you
think this is reasonable?

thanks,
John
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From: Pekka Savola <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2003 14:17:45 +0300 (EEST)

Hi,

> You have the following substantial comments:

I think experimental (compared to standards track) may be a very good 
choice here, and very reasonable.

But regardless of that, I think it's important (and I think you'll
probably agree) to at least try to paint some picture about deployment
restrictions very early (in abstract, special section or introduction), so
people don't have too many fantastic notions about the applicability (and 
when starting to read the document, think like "what are these guys 
doing?  you can't solve the generic problem with this".

So, personally I think it might be a good idea to focus first *with
sufficiently verbose text early on* on the "context transfer inside one
ISP" -problem, and see whether it gives you sufficient sufficient benefits
and the protocol can be deployed.

The next phase, to be done later (prior to going to PS, at the latest),
could be figuring how how to establish security associations in context
transfers between ISP's, and how to enhance the context transfer triggers.

An alternative method, of course, might be to try to work on -- at least
in some fashion -- the inter-ISP cases right now too, to get better
experimental data (when CTP gets implemented and piloted) on that for
later, to see how well the current protocol works in this scenario (might
save redesigning later on if inter-ISP context transfers or other stuff
required for real deployments are deemed necessary).

I see two paths, but I can't really say which is the best.  Both have 
their tradeoffs.

Hope this helps..

-- 
Pekka Savola                 "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy                    kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings