Subject: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06.txt> (Threat Model for BGP Path Security) to Informational RFC

From: The IESG <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 09 Sep 2013 15:26:06 -0700

The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
(sidr) to consider the following document:
- 'Threat Model for BGP Path Security'
  <draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
[email-masked] mailing lists by 2013-09-23. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to [email-masked] instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract

   This document describes a threat model for the context in which
   (E)BGP path security mechanisms will be developed.  The threat model
   includes an analysis of the RPKI, and focuses on the ability of an AS
   to verify the authenticity of the AS path info received in a BGP
   update.  We use the term PATHSEC to refer to any BGP path security
   technology that makes use of the RPKI.  PATHSEC will secure BGP
   [RFC4271], consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the RPKI
   [RFC6480].

   The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are
   considered to be threats, and examines classes of attacks that might
   be launched against PATHSEC.  It does not revisit attacks against
   unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in
   [RFC4271].  It concludes with brief discussion of residual
   vulnerabilities.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats/ballot/

No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

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From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2013 17:22:46 -0400

I read this draft and tried to participate in shaping into something I as an operator believe useful in SIDR WG, but to no avail -- IMO because the protocol work, and then the requirements work, were largely completed already.  I believe this approach will cause more harm than good and result in more instability than security, and it leaves some considerable holes with which I am actually concerned about related to inter-domain routing security (and autonomy) on the Internet.   As such, myself and some other operators published this document, which has since been accepted and evolved as a WG document within the Global Routing Operations WG (GROW):

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02
 
I've given up on SIDR, I wish them well….

-danny

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From: "Russ White" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2013 18:28:34 -0400

> I read this draft and tried to participate in shaping into something I as
an
> operator believe useful in SIDR WG, but to no avail -- IMO because the
> protocol work, and then the requirements work, were largely completed
> already.  I believe this approach will cause more harm than good and
result in
> more instability than security, and it leaves some considerable holes with
> which I am actually concerned about related to inter-domain routing
security
> (and autonomy) on the Internet.   As such, myself and some other operators
> published this document, which has since been accepted and evolved as a
> WG document within the Global Routing Operations WG (GROW):
> 
> I've given up on SIDR, I wish them well..

+1

Russ