Subject: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases

From: Karen Seo <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 01:38:59 -0400

Randyet al.,

In hopes of restarting work on this draft, here is proposed text for 
section 4. This is an attempt to integrate the original text with the 
comments to the list submitted back in Feb 2014. My apologies if I've 
mis-understood the original draft text or the comments.  Does this 
correctly and clearly describe the use cases?

4.  Use Cases

Case 1:

    Organization C finds that its CA certificate has been revoked (or
    modified to remove resources) by the RIR (or ISP) that issued it.
    Or, if C has outsourced its CA operations, C finds that one of its
    children's certificates has been revoked (or modified to remove
    resources).C disagrees with this action and would like relying
    parties to be able to ignore, at their discretion, the certificate
    revocation (or modification). The revocation or modification could be:

          * unintentional, i.e., due to an error by RIR (or ISP) staff
          * malicious, i.e., done with the intent to cause problems,
            which could be aimed at C or some other entity.
          * mandated by a law enforcement agency in the jurisdiction
            where the RIR (or ISP) operates

    For example, Carol, a RIPE resource holder (LIR, PI holder, ...), is
    a victim of the "Dutch Court Attack." Someone has convinced a Dutch
    court to forcethe RIPE/NCC to remove or modify some or all of
    Carol's certificates, ROAs, etc. or the resources they represent.
    However, the operational community wants to retain the ability to
    route to Carol's network(s).

Case 2:

    Organization B makes use of private address space (RFC 1918) or
    address space allocated to another party but not globally announced
    by that party or by B. B wants its routers to be able to use RPKI
    data for both internal routing to these addresses and for global
    routing.

Case 3:

    Organization A is authorized to control the routing of traffic from
    a set of organizations (within A's administrative control) to the
    rest of the Internet. A wants traffic from these organizations that
    is destined for a set of prefixes outside of A's administrative
    control to be routed to other addresses, or to be dropped. A
    accomplishes this by controlling the UPDATEs sent to those
    organizations. Because these organizations use the RPKI, A needs a
    way to coordinate their use of the RPKI in support of A’s traffic
    management goals.

    For example, Alice runs the network operations for a large
    consortium X. Her management requests that traffic (from X's
    members) that is destined for a competitor's site, be re-directed to
    a site approved by X. To do this,Alice has to ensure that the RPKI
    has the appropriate certificates, ROAs, etc. for those approved
    addresses as well as for the rest of the Internet.

Thank you,
Karen