Subject: [Sigtran] M2PA Security section (was: m2pa comment: author list)

From: Tom George <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2003 15:58:07 -0600

On Jan 26, 2003 "Ong, Lyndon" wrote:
  [...]
> The security section probably needs to be updated based on the
> security framework document (which should come out this week).
  [...]

Here is my first stab at revising section 6 of the M2PA draft. Comments
are welcome, especially since I am not familiar with the security
protocols.

tomG.

=============================
6. Security

M2PA is designed to carry signaling messages for telephony
services. As such, M2PA MUST involve the security needs of several
parties: 

   - the end users of the services

   - the network providers

   - the applications involved

Additional requirements MAY come from local regulation.  

While these parties may have some overlapping security needs, their
needs may not be identical. Any security solution SHOULD fulfill all
of the different parties' needs.

6.1 Security Requirements

As a transport protocol, M2PA has the following security objectives:

   - Availability of reliable and timely user data transport.

   - Integrity of user data transport.

   - Confidentiality of user data.

M2PA runs on top of SCTP [RFC2960].  SCTP provides certain transport
related security features, as discussed in [Security]. However, these
security features MAY NOT be adequate for all of the involved parties'
requirements.

When M2PA is running in professionally managed corporate or service
provider network, it is reasonable to expect that this network
includes an appropriate security policy framework. The "Site Security
Handbook" [RFC2196] SHOULD be consulted for guidance.

When the network in which M2PA runs involves more than one party
(e.g., a non-private network), it MAY NOT be reasonable to expect that
all parties have implemented security in a sufficient manner.  In such
a case, it is recommended that IPSec or TLS be used to ensure
confidentiality of the user payload. Consult [Security] for more
guidance on the use of security protocols. 

6.2 Protecting Confidentiality

Particularly for mobile users, the requirement for confidentiality MAY
include the masking of IP addresses and ports. In this case
application-level encryption is not sufficient. IPSec ESP SHOULD be
used instead [RFC2401].  Regardless of which level performs the
encryption, the IPSec ISAKMP service SHOULD be used for key
management.

=============================

{Add an informative reference:}

  [Security]
       J. Loughney, M. Tuexen, and J. Pastor-Balbas, "Security
       Considerations for SIGTRAN Protocols,"
       draft-ietf-sigtran-security-01.txt (January 2003).

=============================

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---

From: Tom George <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 09:35:35 -0600

It was brought to my attention that in section 6.2, "wireless" would be
more accurate than "mobile". 

tomG.