Subject: [Sipping] Oh dear, I've been censored! Implications for Consent Framework?

From: Dean Willis <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2006 13:49:03 -0600

Begin forwarded message:

> From: <[email-masked]>
> Date: March 9, 2006 1:29:59 PM CST
> To: <[email-masked]>
> Subject: [MailServer Notification]Content Filtering Notification
>
> This email has violated the RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.
> and Quarantine entire message has been taken on 3/10/2006 12:59:18 AM.
> Message details:
> Server:IN-EXCHANGE
> Sender: [email-masked];
> Recipient:[email-masked];[email-masked];
> Subject:Re: [Sipping] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-sipping-certs-03.txt
>

My recent discussion of the relationship between SIP and SIPPING in  
response to Keith's query about the sipping-certs draft )which is  
really a SIP draft) has apparently offended the "racial  
discrimination political correctness filter" at ccpu.com, which has  
one subscriber on this list.

I don't know whether to laugh, cry, or file a lawsuit.

But perhaps we should learn something from this about the importance  
of end-to-end protections and the dangers of proxy-based services, as  
well as the value of our "consent framework" for uri-list services  
that act as the SIP equivalents of "mailman".

Perhaps we could extend the consent documents to provide keying  
material? Here's how it works: When I grant "consent" toa a relay, I  
might provide a key that is either used to provide:

1) Message-integrity hashing of the "exploded" message to prove that  
it came from the permitted relay

2) Encryption of the "exploded" message to disintermediate political- 
correctness filters and other MITM attackers

3) Some sort of transport, rather than application protection

4) Some combination of the above.

--
Dean

_______________________________________________
Sipping mailing list  https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping
This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP
Use [email-masked] for questions on current sip
Use [email-masked] for new developments of core SIP