Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis

From: Sean Turner <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2016 13:24:58 -0500

Just a reminder that this WGLC will close on Friday December 9th.

spt

> On Nov 18, 2016, at 18:55, Sean Turner <[email-masked]> wrote:
> 
> All,
> 
> This is a working group last call for the “4492bis to Standards Track" draft available @ http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis/.  Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 9 December 2016.  
> 
> Note that we are particularly interesting in the issue Yoav raises in the following message:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/8Ec7jQqLr_3FrvQfuclllfozKZk
> 
> Thanks,
> J&S

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From: Martin Thomson <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 07:18:56 +0900

> Just a reminder that this WGLC will close on Friday December 9th.

A timely reminder :)

I reviewed the document and it looks pretty good.  I'd have sent a PR
with some minor changes to grammar.

The question I wanted to ask was how we wanted to manage the
relationship with TLS 1.3, particularly for EdDSA.

The draft asks for a NEW codepoint in the hash and signature
algorithms structure.  That clobbers a whole bunch of space that TLS
1.3 is going to rework.  I don't think it's a good idea to perform
concurrent surgery on this registry, particularly since new codepoints
have the effect of taking out new swathes of space.  At best we send
confusing signals to IANA.

I would prefer to take the arrangement that we have in TLS 1.3 and
backport it here so that we have a consistent story.  I also think
that taking a single 2 octet codepoint from the SignatureScheme space
is better all around.

If we don't do that, then - at a minimum - I'd like to see PRs for
both this document and TLS that recommend values for the code points
and deal with the consequences of the new codepoint allocation.

Finally, I think that there is an opportunity here to observe that TLS
1.3 doesn't include any EC signals (neither ECDH nor ECDSA) in the
cipher suite.

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From: Ilari Liusvaara <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 23:28:22 +0200

> that taking a single 2 octet codepoint from the SignatureScheme space

I actually reviewed the document and noticed the exact same thing.

Also, in my TLS implementation, doing EdDSA in TLS 1.2 by backporting
the TLS 1.3 mechanism (using ECDSA legacy type) just fell naturally
out of the implementation. It was easier to have all the machinery
needed to handle it than not to have that machinery.

-Ilari