Subject: [Tsvwg] new ID on TCP antispoofing

From: Joe Touch <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2004 13:37:48 -0700

Hi, all,

The following ID will appear shortly (available at 
www.isi.edu/touch/pubs/draft-touch-tcp-antispoof-00.txt in the 
meantime), and is an attempt to summarize the April TCP spoofing attacks 
on BGP and the set of possible solutions. The topic was raised in the 
TCPM WG this past April in response to a proposed solution based on a 
TCP modification.

Because this draft covers the set of solutions, some involving TCP mods, 
and others not, but focuses on the vulnerability of TCP to spoofing more 
generally, IMO it would be more useful to discuss it further at the 
TSVWG meeting in San Diego.

Joe

PS - the bulk of this doc appeared previously as 
draft-touch-anonsec-00.txt; that draft is being updated and 
draft-touch-anonsec-01 now (or by next Monday ;-) focuses specifically 
on the need for anonymous security, and is scheduled to be presented at 
SAAG (security open area meeting) in San Diego.

-------------------------

Network Working Group                                           J. Touch
Internet-Draft                                                   USC/ISI
Expires: January 8, 2005                                   July 10, 2004

                  Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks
                        draft-touch-tcp-antispoof

Abstract

    Recent attacks on core Internet infrastructure indicate an increased
    vulnerability of TCP connections to spurious resets (RSTs).  TCP has
    always been susceptible to such RST spoof attacks, which were
    indirectly protected by checking that the RST sequence number was
    inside the current receive window, as well as via the obfuscation of
    TCP endpoint and port numbers.  For pairs of well-known endpoints
    often over predictable port pairs, such as BGP, increases in the path
    bandwidth-delay product of a connection have sufficiently increased
    the receive window space that off-path third parties can guess a
    viable RST sequence number.  This document addresses this
    vulnerability, discussing proposed solutions at the transport level
    and their inherent challenges, as well as existing network level
    solutions and the feasibility of their deployment.
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