Subject: [Uta] Spencer Dawkins' Yes on draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-09: (with COMMENT)

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2015 16:11:34 -0800

Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-09: Yes

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COMMENT:
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This is great. Thanks for putting it together.

Just for my own edification, why would

   o  Implementations MUST support, and SHOULD prefer to negotiate,
      cipher suites offering forward secrecy, such as those in the
      Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Ephemeral Diffie-
      Hellman ("DHE" and "ECDHE") families.

not also be "MUST prefer to negotiate"?

I found it strange that there's no hint of 

5.2.  Unauthenticated TLS and Opportunistic Security

   In summary: this document does not apply to unauthenticated TLS use
   cases.

until about halfway through page 15. If it's important to say this, maybe
it's better to say it earlier in the document?