Subject: draft-ietf-v6ops-scanning-implications WGLC

From: Fred Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2007 21:21:35 +1200

This is to initiate a two week working group last call of draft-ietf- 
v6ops-scanning-implications. Please read it now. If you find nits  
(spelling errors, minor suggested wording changes, etc), comment to  
the authors; if you find greater issues, such as disagreeing with a  
statement or finding additional issues that need to be addressed,  
please post your comments to the list.

We are looking specifically for comments on the importance of the  
document as well as its content. If you have read the document and  
believe it to be of operational utility, that is also an important  
comment to make.

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From: james woodyatt <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2007 11:10:40 -0700

> believe it to be of operational utility, that is also an important  

In section 5.1, I think it might be worth noting that the limited  
duration of privacy addresses may result in network operators having  
a means of impeding the spread of worms that harvest node addresses  
from off-link sources by blocking the method they use to refresh  
their knowledge of recently available attack surfaces.

On the question of the importance of this document, I'd say that its  
intended audience is currently besieged by a conflicting message from  
the IETF and elsewhere that inbound flow initiations should be  
blocked by default at unmanaged stateful packet filters in  
residential gateways.  This conflicting message, as near as I can  
tell, is derived from an undiscussed technical consensus that this is  
necessary to prevent the propagation of IPv6 worms by using a  
sledgehammer at the gateway, despite the alternative mechanisms well- 
enumerated in section 5 of this draft for the abatement of IPv6 worm  
traffic.  I'd like to see a consistent message come from the IETF  
about this issue.

--
j h woodyatt <[email-masked]>