Subject: Re: [weirds] Security Requirements: Non-repudiation

From: Edward Lewis <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 09:12:07 -0400

At 7:59 -0700 10/29/12, SM wrote:

>>This is all very interesting, but I think John's point still stands: this
>>is scope creep. Are we also gonna specify cert hierarchies for validating
>>signed objects? Develop a PKIX profile? Define cert path validation?

In as much as the protocol the WEIRDS WG is developing is a data 
access protocol, trying to attach any feature that relates to the 
accuracy and hence the ability to prevent denouncing a historical 
value of the data would be out of scope.  At least when it comes to 
accessing the data.

Alluded to earlier in this thread, if an organization wanted to 
provide non-repudiation of accesses (both writes and reads) to data, 
logs of ephemeral actions would need to be maintained, these logs 
would need to have data integrity protection.  This is all well and 
good, if needed, but not something that is part of the data access 
protocol.

There's a difference between end-to-end security and hop-by-hop 
security just as there's a difference between "securing" static data 
and dynamic events.  For end-to-end, we have things like digital 
signature, for hop-by-hop we have things like TLS/SSL.  For static 
data, there's data integrity for events there's non-repudiation.

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Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

2012...time to reuse those 1984 calendars!