NOTE: This charter is a snapshot of that in effect at the time of the 38th IETF Meeting in Memphis, Tennessee. It may now be out-of-date.
Ran Atkinson <rja@inet.org>
Paul Lambert <palamber@us.oracle.com>
Jeffrey Schiller <jis@mit.edu>
General Discussion:ipsec@tis.com
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Archive: ftp://ftp.tis.com/pub/lists/ipsec
Rapid advances in communication technology have accentuated the need for security in the Internet. The IP Security Protocol Working Group (IPSEC) will develop mechanisms to protect client protocols of IP. A security protocol in the network layer will be developed to provide cryptographic security services that will flexibly support combinations of authentication, integrity, access control, and confidentiality.
The protocol formats for the IP Authentication Header (AH) and IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) will be independent of the cryptographic algorithm. The preliminary goals will specifically pursue host-to-host security followed by subnet-to-subnet and host-to-subnet topologies.
Protocol and cryptographic techniques will also be developed to support the key management requirements of the network layer security. The Internet Key Management Protocol (IKMP) will be specified as an application layer protocol that is independent of the lower layer security protocol. The protocol will be based on the ISAKMP/Oakley work begun in:
draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-05.txt, draft-ietf-ipsec-oakley-01.txt, and draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-00.txt
A follow on work item may incorporate mechanisms based on SKIP as defined in:
and related documents. Flexibility in the protocol will allow eventual support of Key Distribution Centers (KDC), such as are used by Kerberos.
Goals and Milestones:
· Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
· Simple Key-Management For Internet Protocols (SKIP)
· X.509 Encoding of Diffie-Hellman Public Values
· SKIP Algorithm Discovery Protocol
· SKIP Extensions for IP Multicast
· SKIP extension for Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)
· Combined DES-CBC, HMAC and Replay Prevention Security Transform
· HMAC-SHA IP Authentication with Replay Prevention
· Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
· The resolution of ISAKMP with Oakley
· Combined 3DES-CBC, HMAC and Replay Prevention Security Transform
· The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP
· Inline Keying within the ISAKMP Framework.
· Implementation of Virtual Private Network (VPNs) with IP Security
· HMAC-SHA-1-96 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention
· HMAC-MD5-96 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention
· IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
· IP Authentication Header
Request For Comments: