Subject: RE: [Asrg] Assume perfect knowledge by domain registry provisioners, so what?

From: "Eric D. Williams" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 11:06:41 -0400

On Monday, May 12, 2003 3:51 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine 
[SMTP:[email-masked]] wrote:
> The point of the first question, capability of signalling, is that if
> impossible, then the question of whether there is a role for registrars
> is answered in the negative, for spam. For spammers (trace), signalling
> is not an issue.

Yes, I agree.

> The point of asking if data types matter, is that one set of registries are
> provisioned (allow write access with some authentication and validity check
> by multile actors to some authoritative store) with character data typed data
> (domain names), another set with decimal data typed data (addresses). Each is
> input to distinct publication systems. Differences in the pro formas for each
> are not essential, except where they present latency of response, and may be
> the root cause for an incapability of signalling.

I did not know the systems were disjoint.  If the pro formas are not essential
to your proposal, then I think it is a matter of determining the cause and
remedy to the latency issue.  Is latency affected by input serialization or
blocking?  Is it arbitration? If that is the case then it may be unworkable.
Could you possibly expand on where latency is introduced into the system?  I
can see (I surmise) where the signaling is an issue with respect to arbitration
where I am not clear is whether that presents a significant hurdle unless tied 
to
other disjoint systems or processes.  Is there a treatment of this where I can 
get
more information?

> Clearly each disjoint instance of authority for a publication of a resource
> of either type is capable of responding meaningfully to notice of initial
> discovery of a source of spam.

That seems reasonable, given adequate (or workable) notification to that 
system.
It may not be workable however due to (what you may be referring to above
ref. latency) the required cache convergence at other points in the system.

> Is there any benefit to making it possible for these disjoint instances of
> authority to be aware of their responces to notice of initial discovery of
> a source of spam?

It may be, by my thinking.  However, I must admit this will take a little more
research on my part for a fuller understanding of the system.  In any event if
a channel that is sufficiently timely can be implemented, its properties should
include some notification periodicity such that issues of latency can be 
reduced.

> This is a possible application of something I've been working on.

I would like to hear more.

-e
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From: Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 May 2003 13:00:05 -0400

Each registry is disjoint, any exchange of data between two are either via
a policy body, e.g., registries constituency (cc or g) within ICANN, via a
community of interests, e.g., registries within the CDNC, or "accidentally"
via overlapping registrars (some registrars are registries, and vica versa).

It is an exercise left to the reader to determin the upper bounds for delay
for data nominally concerning "spam" to go from the .kr registry operator to
the joker.com .com registrar, or reverse, to take to examples simply for the
purpose of using well-known practitioners of domain name registry.

In the above para, "registry" refers to domain name registries.

To get even more disjoint, estimate the upper bound on a human-assisted
forward and/or reverse mapping, involving a domain name in a VGRS registry
with joker.com registrar, and an APNIC RIR address assignement.

To restate: in just the com/net/org/biz/info/name (cnobin) playpen, 21 of
the 100+ registrars have 92% of all registrations -- that's 24 players to
my count. Another 25 ccTLDs, with fewer than 25 distinct operators, defines
the major non-cnobin space down to the 125K threashold -- that's an additional
20 operators and their registrars, many of which are in the first cohort.
So, mild handwave, 100 actors, 100 endpoints, defines 90% or more of authors
of entries into the public DNS.

Presently these are organized into ~30 (6+25) stars, with a significant amount
of "multihoming" by registrars that act upon two or more of the ~30 registries.
There is arbitrary latency for any communication between stars, and even for
communication from a registry to a registrar (polling artifact). If this is
changed, presumably for the better, does it matter?

All data from SOTD, Q302.

Eric