Subject: RE: [Asrg] seeking comments on new RMX article

From: "Eric D. Williams" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 6 May 2003 13:02:47 -0400

On Tuesday, May 06, 2003 12:30 PM, J C Lawrence [SMTP:[email-masked]] wrote:
> On Tue, 6 May 2003 11:42:47 -0400
> Damian Gerow <[email-masked]> wrote:
>
> > So all that really happens is that things like open relays and open
> > proxies become less and less valuable, and anonymous remailers become
> > infinitely more popular.  However, they are no more /valuable/ than
> > they are right now -- the provide the same service, they do the same
> > thing.
>
> We currently have compromised Windows systems being used as spam
> origination points.  Are we next going to see such zombie systems used
> as anonymous remailers?  Or are they more likely to use the compromised
> system to extract appropriate mailing credentials to tack onto spam
> (creds which for instance satisfy RMX etc)?

How would such an attack work?  Although you present an interesting issue re: 
security and 'zombie' eMail  how would RMX break (if that is your implication) 
in the proposed scenario.  What credentials other than domain name and IP 
address would satisfy an RMX query if stolen?  In any event the 'zombie' (or 
maybe zonebie is better :) would be a security concern first and a spam 
origination concerns second IMHO.

-e
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---

From: J C Lawrence <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 06 May 2003 11:17:21 -0700

On Tue, 6 May 2003 13:02:47 -0400 
Eric D Williams <[email-masked]> wrote:
>> On Tue, 6 May 2003 11:42:47 -0400 Damian Gerow <[email-masked]>
>> wrote:
 
>>> proxies become less and less valuable, and anonymous remailers
>>> become infinitely more popular.  However, they are no more
>>> /valuable/ than they are right now -- the provide the same service,
>>> they do the same thing.

>> origination points.  Are we next going to see such zombie systems
>> used as anonymous remailers?  Or are they more likely to use the
>> compromised system to extract appropriate mailing credentials to tack
>> onto spam (creds which for instance satisfy RMX etc)?

> How would such an attack work?  Although you present an interesting
> issue re: security and 'zombie' eMail how would RMX break (if that is
> your implication) in the proposed scenario.  What credentials other
> than domain name and IP address would satisfy an RMX query if stolen?
> In any event the 'zombie' (or maybe zonebie is better :) would be a
> security concern first and a spam origination concerns second IMHO.

The trivial approach:

  BoxA is compromised.

  The zombie code sucks in a spamming engine (SE).

  The SE determines the mail configuration of BoxA in terms of
  appropriate SMTP envelope etc from the registry.

  BoxA spams away using the stolen credentials from its registry.

Notes:

  Yeah, its illegal.  So is a significant percentage of the spam I
  receive.  Additionally, chasing law breaking spammers across
  international borders is not a fun game.

  This is a bad scenario, not just for RMX, but on almost all scores.
  Most automated authentication or credential schemes can be broken if
  subjected to localhost compromise.  In essence its a reply attack
  using the same source node.  Its not clear to me that it is possible
  to defend against this case in any reasonable fashion, with or without
  RMX.

  RMX suffers in this scenario as perfectly legitimate mail cannot be
  distinguished from spam.  This pain is not exclusive to RMX, its just
  a side effect.  

  It makes the ISP a target and gives some, very marginal and slight,
  encouragement for ISPs to __attempt__ to police their user's systems
  and pro-actively search out and shut down compromised systems.  This
  will not be welcomed by ISPs or the ISP's users.  Prediction: One big
  finger pointing whining profit margin eating tar baby morass.

-- 
J C Lawrence                
---------(*)                Satan, oscillate my metallic sonatas. 
[email-masked]               He lived as a devil, eh?		  
http://www.kanga.nu/~claw/  Evil is a name of a foeman, as I live.
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---

From: Michael Rubel <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 6 May 2003 12:10:21 -0700 (PDT)

JCL>   BoxA is compromised.
JCL> 
JCL>   The zombie code sucks in a spamming engine (SE).
JCL> 
JCL>   The SE determines the mail configuration of BoxA in terms of
JCL>   appropriate SMTP envelope etc from the registry.
JCL> 
JCL>   BoxA spams away using the stolen credentials from its registry.

J.C.,

Thank you--you've raised a reasonable, cogent objection.

As you note, RMX would not help against this kind of attack, and frankly
neither would any other proposal I'm aware of.  If I can trick your machine
into thinking I'm you, then I can do bad things in your name and thus make
you look bad.

But right now, with SMTP the way it is, I don't even have to break into your
machine to accomplish that.  I can make you look bad with impunity just by
writing your name on the "From:" addresses of emails I send, and there's
nothing you can do about it, even if you are a good, careful sysadmin.

I submit that RMX gives a significant improvement, and it's just simple/easy
enough that people might start using it!

Mike

---

From: J C Lawrence <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 06 May 2003 16:49:33 -0700

On Tue, 6 May 2003 12:10:21 -0700 (PDT) 

 

> Thank you--you've raised a reasonable, cogent objection.

Nope, there's nothing in there specific to RMX, RMX just prompted some
mental noodling which ended up with me doing some arm waving at future
attack vectors.  RMX is broken for simpler reasons, which have been well
covered without my help.

> As you note, RMX would not help against this kind of attack, and
> frankly neither would any other proposal I'm aware of.  If I can trick
> your machine into thinking I'm you, then I can do bad things in your
> name and thus make you look bad.

Quite.  As I noted at the time, this is a core problem with edge
authentication schema, and isn't necessarily resolvable.

> I submit that RMX gives a significant improvement, and it's just
> simple/easy enough that people might start using it!

Deployment expenses with RMX are a significant problem, as are the ROI
curves related to percentage deployments and fundamental email use
costs.  You can arm-wave technical solutions at them, but they merely
increase the deployment, support, and maintenance costs for a negative
ROI on the part of the deployer.  You are attempting to recreate
top-down authority structures when the natural (and proper?) tendency of
the field in normal legitimate use is for
self-authenticating/identifying nodes, not external nomination systems.

<shrug>

Now, can we move on to digging out a proposal which has a chance of
being useful instead of beating dead horses?

---

From: Mike Rubel <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 6 May 2003 22:30:11 -0700 (PDT)

JCL> You are attempting to recreate top-down authority structures when the
JCL> natural (and proper?) tendency of the field in normal legitimate use 
JCL> is for self-authenticating/identifying nodes, not external nomination
JCL> systems.

J.C.,

But RMX isn't top-down at all!  Each domain configures its own RMX
records, on its own name servers, to authenticate its own outgoing mail.  
There is no new central authority.  I'm not sure what you mean by
"external nomination system."

JCL> Now, can we move on to digging out a proposal which has a chance of
JCL> being useful instead of beating dead horses?  

With all due respect, I think it's the fastest horse of the bunch right 
now.  But my mind is open--please feel free to suggest others.  I'm 
willing to weigh merits.

Mike

---

From: J C Lawrence <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 06 May 2003 23:23:18 -0700

On Tue, 6 May 2003 22:30:11 -0700 (PDT) 
Mike Rubel <[email-masked]> wrote:

>> You are attempting to recreate top-down authority structures when
>> the natural (and proper?) tendency of the field in normal
>> legitimate use is for self-authenticating/identifying nodes, not
>> external nomination systems.

> But RMX isn't top-down at all!  

Sure it is.

> Each domain configures its own RMX records, on its own name servers,
> to authenticate its own outgoing mail.  

Right, with the implicit assumption that each domain validly controls
all mail sent in its name, or has reasonable control and expectation
that it can or even should be able to control all mail sent in its name.
I find those assumptions to be unsupportable and destructive.

> There is no new central authority.  

Sure there is, you're naming the holders of the DNS keys as the central
authority for the domain.  Not good.

> I'm not sure what you mean by "external nomination system."

DNS, as a system, is external to the edge nodes that generate mail.  It
is a nominative system in the very simple and direct sense of the word:
It assign authority by naming.

  "FOO is authorised to do XXX because I name FOO as being on the list
  of those who can do XXX."

> With all due respect, I think it's the fastest horse of the bunch
> right now.  

<shrug>  Its a question of thresholds.  

> But my mind is open--please feel free to suggest others.  I'm willing
> to weigh merits.

I'm partial to the Forward Chained Received: header proposal, but it
suffers significantly from percentage deployment problems (its value
increases exponentially as deployment approaches around 80% before
flattening).  Much as I may like the idea, that single characteristic
likely dooms it.  I'm currently drafting a consent token proposal which
has gotten some running consensus off-list.  I don't expect it to get a
whole lot of traction here as offers nothing at the MTA/transport level
as it is almost purely an MUA-level affair (there's an understandable
focus by the list on server- or transport- side solutions).

---

From: "Alan DeKok" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 09:08:10 -0400

> I find those assumptions to be unsupportable and destructive.

  Nonsense.  It's not about control, it's about consent.

  When you receive a message with an envelope 'from' in a domain, has
that domain consented to the use of it's name?  Right now, we don't
know.  With something like RMX, the owners of that domain can make
their consent explicit.

  Your objections appear to be based on the idea that establishing
consent is a bad thing.  Further, you appear to be claiming that a
domain does NOT control the use of it's name (i.e. mail sent in it's
name), and that there's no reason why it should.

  Stated that way, your objections appear ..., well, surprising.

> authority for the domain.  Not good.

  So the people controlling DNS for a domain are NOT, in fact,
authorized to make any statements about the domain.  They're not
authorized to set up RMX records, and most likely also not authorized
to set up existing MX records.  If that's true, why the heck are they
controlling DNS?

  Is this really your position?  The people controlling MX records do
not have authority to add RMX records?

  I think you'll understand that I'm a little confused by what you're
saying.

> DNS, as a system, is external to the edge nodes that generate mail.

  The proponents of RMX have specifically and repeatedly addressed the
interactions of "edge nodes that generate mail" with RMX, and thus
DNS.  Please go back and read those statements before repeating
objections which have already been addressed.

  Alan DeKok.

---

From: David Walker <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 7 May 2003 09:36:58 -0500

When it comes to the authority for your domain, the holder of the DNS keys is 
great God almighty.  Everything in your domain is controlled by that.  That 
person can re-route all your incoming e-mail to timbuktu.example.com and 
point your web site to nakedteens.example.com.  An untrustworthy DNS admin 
can totally remove you from the internet.

So, yes, I think they can be trusted with this little thing too.

---

From: J C Lawrence <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 10:35:21 -0700

On Wed, 7 May 2003 09:36:58 -0500 

>> Sure there is, you're naming the holders of the DNS keys as the
>> central authority for the domain.  Not good.

> When it comes to the authority for your domain, the holder of the DNS
> keys is great God almighty.  

Not quite.  They do not control the behaviour of the nodes within the
domain, and in particular, don't control sub-domains.  They control the
phone book, not what the companies there listed do, what they say over
the telephone, or what annotations others make against the phone book.

> An untrustworthy DNS admin can totally remove you from the internet.

Malfeasance at that level is easily demonstrated and rectified.  Bad
service at the level of, "I need to send mail from &CIDR;, please add an
RMX..." is much tougher, and in general can easily be covered in large
shops due to standard minimised rate change concerns.

> So, yes, I think they can be trusted with this little thing too.

We differ.  They have primary positive feedback loops to Do The Right
Thing with the Big Things.  Those controlling loops don't exist for the
small things.

---

From: J C Lawrence <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 11:06:47 -0700

On Wed, 07 May 2003 09:08:10 -0400 

>> that it can or even should be able to control all mail sent in its
>> name.  I find those assumptions to be unsupportable and destructive.

>   Nonsense.  It's not about control, it's about consent.

Consent structures, when enforced centrally, which is what RMX is
proposing, are control structures.

> consent is a bad thing.  

No, I consider requiring explicit published consent between the DNS
masters and a sending node to be a bad thing.

Consider a corollary (which has other, different, critical flaws
compared to RMX):

  Let's say that a domain published a public key via DNS.

  Further, let's say that every node had a copy of the private key
  matching that public key.

  Next have all sent mail contain a digital signature of the Date:,
  Message-ID, and Subject: headers using that key.

  Every receiving MTA can trivially verify that there was consent on the
  part of the parent domain for each message.  You get the self-same
  identical benefits of RMX, but you remove the central point of control
  and authority.  

The problem of course is that theft of the private key now becomes easy
and relatively certain.  Howeve the massive gain is that control is no
longer centralised.

> Further, you appear to be claiming that a domain does NOT control the
> use of it's name (i.e. mail sent in it's name), and that there's no
> reason why it should.

Almost.  Currently domains don't control the use of their names, and
while there are many good reasons they may wish to, there are equally
good reasons to a) not build a top-down enforcement model of that
control, and b) not make the expression of that control require
reconfiguration of a publicly deployed system (something which no few
SysAdm are going to be willing to do rapidly or for on-offs).

> Stated that way, your objections appear ..., well, surprising.

Thank you.

> authorized to make any statements about the domain.  

Sure they are, they just currently can't explicitly control the
behaviour of edge nodes.  Under RMX they are granted a very large fat
club to dictate and control the behaviour of edge nodes.  

> They're not authorized to set up RMX records, and most likely also not
> authorized to set up existing MX records.  If that's true, why the
> heck are they controlling DNS?

Anybody can make statements.  That's easy.  The problem is that RMX
encodes those statements in a machine processable form that can and will
be used mechanically for mail filtering.  Should RMX gain any traction
it is safe to assume that in fairly short order mail from
non-RMX-bearing nodes will be bounced/dropped, and thus RMX records will
become a de facto requirement for sending mail.  That spells central
control and authority over how mail is processed within a domain.  No
thanks.  Even outside of the privacy concerns, I've no wish to build
systems which not only define, but mandate dictators on an Internet-wide
scale.

> not have authority to add RMX records?

I don't give a rats for RMX records.  People can add them now.  I cal
also create DNS entries saying bad things about your or Bill Gate's
parentage.  Big whoop.  I care about what RMX records imply and how they
will, necessarily, be used.

> DNS.  

Yes, they have repeatedly addressed it by saying that either the DNS
master will have to be a nice guy and update his records appropriately
(frequently for a domain he has no interested in for the mobile case),
or that other technologies ala VPNs  will have to be used to ensure mail
is smarthosted thru an RMX node.

I don't consider either an acceptable address.  You do.  We differ.

> Please go back and read those statements before repeating objections
> which have already been addressed.

Already done.

---

From: "Alan DeKok" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 14:58:09 -0400

> masters and a sending node to be a bad thing.

  Wow.  So any sending node doesn't need to have consent of a DNS
master to claim to send messages from that domain.  By trivial
extension, sending nodes also don't need the consent of users at a
domain, to send messages claiming to be those users.

  Great.  I'll post messages claiming to be from you, to ASRG, saying
how much you like spam, liver, punk music, or anything else.  Since I
don't need your consent, you will, of course, have no objection.

> Almost.  Currently domains don't control the use of their names,

  I'm amazed.  I thought that the administrators of DNS for a domain
could control which IP's were pointed to by names in that domain.
They can prevent other IP's from being associated with a domain,
simply by NOT listing those IP's in DNS.

  If that's not controlling the use of a name, I don't know what is.

> club to dictate and control the behaviour of edge nodes.  

  Nope.

  The edge nodes can still send email claiming to be from a domain.
They CANNOT, however, claim that they have the consent of the owner of
that domain to use his name.

> The problem is that RMX encodes those statements in a machine
> processable form that can and will be used mechanically for mail
> filtering.  Should RMX gain any traction it is safe to assume that
> in fairly short order mail from non-RMX-bearing nodes will be
> bounced/dropped, and thus RMX records will become a de facto
> requirement for sending mail.  That spells central control and
> authority over how mail is processed within a domain.  No thanks.

  So you're opposed to other people centralizing control over their
own domain.  Hmm...

  See, you don't have to add RMX records, or look them up.  That's
your choice.  But please understand that the people you send mail to
will impose conditions before they consent to accepting traffic from
you.

  The problem here is that you apparently don't want others to impose
conditions on traffic they accept from you.  In that case, your
position is *identical* to that of the spammers.

>  Even outside of the privacy concerns, I've no wish to build systems
> which not only define, but mandate dictators on an Internet-wide
> scale.

  Huh?  Since when did we jump from domain owners adminstering consent
and control for their domains, to Internet-wide dictators?

  Do you understand that artificially inflating the problem, and
engaging in fear-mongering are unhelpful?

> will, necessarily, be used.

  ... by others.  Thanks, but no thanks.   Are you familiar with the
quote:

  "If I knew someone was coming to my house with the intention of
   doing me good, I would run for my life."

> I don't consider either an acceptable address.  You do.  We differ.

  I consider them acceptable for me, and the domains I administer.
It's your concern if you don't consider them acceptable for you, and
your domains.

  What I find astonishing about your beliefs is that you don't find
that behaviour acceptable for *me*, either.  What the heck happened to
my freedom to choose?  Or would you propose that you should be
appointed an "Internet-wide dicatator", because your attitude is
benevolent, and you're doing it "for our own good" ?

  Be careful.  Down that path lies a host of nightmares.

  Alan DeKok.

---

From: J C Lawrence <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 12:44:20 -0700

On Wed, 07 May 2003 14:58:09 -0400

> Wow.  So any sending node doesn't need to have consent of a DNS master
> to claim to send messages from that domain.

Quite.

> By trivial extension, sending nodes also don't need the consent of
> users at a domain, to send messages claiming to be those users.

That's not a server-side problem, that's an individual authentication
problem with well known and variously well deployed addresses.

> don't need your consent, you will, of course, have no objection.

There is a fundamental difference between consent and lack of objection.
I can walk on your lawn and tell people on the street corner that I am
you.  I don't need your consent to do that.  You will however object
rather strenuously I expect.

Lack of objection does not mean consent, and lack of consent does not
mean lack of objection.

Heck, I actively dislike top posting, and yet people do it every day in
mail to me over my objections.  They didn't need my consent.

> simply by NOT listing those IP's in DNS.

Absolutely.

> If that's not controlling the use of a name, I don't know what is.

They don't control the use or behaviour of the node that the name points
to, and with the singular exception of MX records, they don't control
how third parties view or interact with a node that they have a record
pointing to.  Some people want centralised systems.  That's great and
bully for them.  Others don't.  That's also great.  Dictating on an
Internet-wide scale that only centralised systems can send mail is
Wrong.

> that domain to use his name.

Assume RMX becomes popular and widely deployed.  Will you accept mail
from a node which doesn't have an RMX record or which is outside of the
RMX record stated for that domain?

That's a club.

>> filtering.  Should RMX gain any traction it is safe to assume that in
>> fairly short order mail from non-RMX-bearing nodes will be

> So you're opposed to other people centralizing control over their own
> domain.  Hmm...

I'm opposed to systems which mandate centralising control over the
behaviour of nodes in a domain, and give them (essentially) no choice
about running a decentralised model.

> See, you don't have to add RMX records, or look them up.  That's your
> choice.  But please understand that the people you send mail to will
> impose conditions before they consent to accepting traffic from you.

Absolutely.  That's true today and is not in argument.

> conditions on traffic they accept from you.

No, I don't want to impose a __centralised__mandated__model__ on mail
traffic control.  Please ensure you read the underlined words, then
compare the external behaviour of RMX to the simple public-key/crypto
model I mentioned a few messages ago.  While broken, that model achieves
the same ends of accountability that you desire with RMX without the
costs of centralised control.

> In that case, your position is *identical* to that of the spammers.

In a sense I'm taking the free speech argument, one which is also often
used by spammers.  Are all free speech arguments necessarily bad because
spammers also use them?  You can claim that I'm dirty/bad/evil due to
using a similar argument to spammers, or you can recognise that some
arguments are sufficiently general that they can easily be used on both
sides of the fence.  Your choice and no skin off my nose.

Freedom is like that: dirty and disorganised.  The problem is to clean
it up without losing the freedom.  Hate speech laws are a classic
example of an attempted balance and trade-off between the two.  We could
just all live as slaves in a planetary dictatorship -- then there would
be no spam.  However I suspect, just a little, that most of this list
would consider that an excessive sacrifice of freedoms for the gain in
cleanliness.

> and control for their domains, to Internet-wide dictators?

Yeesh.  That's not what I wrote.  Please, read with at least minimal
care.  The point is not Internet-wide dictators, but dictators on an
Internet-wide scale.  

Should the holder of the DNS keys be a dictator over all the mail sent
from his domain?  You say, "Yes!"  I say, "Hell no!"  You appear to
suggest that such control is the natural state of affairs.  I demur and
say that such levels of control must be explicitly created at some cost
and effort and shouldn't ever be the defaults.

> engaging in fear-mongering are unhelpful?

Certainly.  Happily I haven't done that, tho I can see how your
misreadings of my messages would give that impression.

> I consider them acceptable for me, and the domains I administer.  It's
> your concern if you don't consider them acceptable for you, and your
> domains.

Quite.  There are issues of social responsibility here.  While we each
run our own little private fiefdoms in regard to our mail systems, the
exchange of mail in general across the 'net requires a basis in common
consensus.  If that consensus is defined in terms of RMX deployment,
then that is a cost and requirement that neither you or I have choice
over.  In essence it is a dictate that I, and you, and every other
domain on the 'net MUST run centralised control over the behaviour of
all nodes in our domains.

No thanks.

> What I find astonishing about your beliefs is that you don't find that
> behaviour acceptable for *me*, either.  

Hardly.  Its utterly acceptable for you.  What I'm campaigning against
is a progression that takes your individual choice, along with others,
and makes it a net-wide dictate.  Some technologies are inherently
decentralised and autonomous.  Some require, by definition, centralised
control and definition.  We get to pick.

> What the heck happened to my freedom to choose?  

Nothing.  It remains unsullied.

> Or would you propose that you should be appointed an "Internet-wide
> dicatator", because your attitude is benevolent, and you're doing it
> "for our own good" ?

Hardly.  I also don't want to be in the position of going to every other
domain out there and telling them, "You must elect your DNSmaster as
your mail dictator."

> Be careful.  Down that path lies a host of nightmares.

Aye, it sure does.

---

From: "Alan DeKok" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2003 16:42:44 -0400

> Lack of objection does not mean consent, and lack of consent does not

  Exactly.  A proposal like RMX allows consent (and objections) to be
applied before the fact, not after it.

> Dictating on an Internet-wide scale that only centralised systems
> can send mail is Wrong.

  I don't see how that applies to RMX.  See below...

> RMX record stated for that domain?

  That's my private choice, and I don't see why it's any of your
business.

> model I mentioned a few messages ago.

  RMX is even better than your toy model.  It doesn't require key
distribution.  If the domain owner establishes consent for all IP's in
a range (ANY range), then he can add wild-card DNS records, to reply
'yes' to RMX consent queries.  Heck, he can add wildcard RMX records
for the entire Internet, if he so desires.  <plink> No centralized
control, and your objection disappears.

  But RMX allows domain administrators to ALSO make less wide-ranging
statements of consent.  Those statements cannot currently be made at
all.

> spammers also use them?

  No, your arguments about free speech fall flat when they involve
limiting my speech, so that you can have less limited speech.

> from his domain?  You say, "Yes!"  I say, "Hell no!"

  I say "He should be permitted to do that, if he so chooses."

  You say "My choice is to forbid him from making that choice."

  Phrased that way, your position becomes less than friendly, and less
than open.  So I'm skeptical about your claims of "free speech."

> While we each run our own little private fiefdoms in regard to our
> mail systems, the exchange of mail in general across the 'net
> requires a basis in common consensus.

  That sounds reasonable.

> If that consensus is defined in terms of RMX deployment, then that
> is a cost and requirement that neither you or I have choice over.

  That doesn't sound reasonable.

> In essence it is a dictate that I, and you, and every other domain
> on the 'net MUST run centralised control over the behaviour of all
> nodes in our domains.

  I still have no clue where you get this "dictate" idea from.

> What I'm campaigning against is a progression that takes your
> individual choice, along with others, and makes it a net-wide
> dictate.

  Who said anything about dictating the behaviour for the net?  I
didn't.  I have said REPEATEDLY that I want everyone to choose the
behaviour that makes them happy.  What would make me happy is if
people filtered spam in certain ways, but I categorically refuse to
dictate that they do so.

  I think that's the crux of the miscommunication here.  I say "I want
choice for me", and you hear "Everyone else must follow Alan's
choice."

> I also don't want to be in the position of going to every other

  If that's a requirement you have for consenting to exchange email
with people, I don't see why you should be forbidden from making
unreasonable requests of people.  If they choose to abide by those
requests, that's a consentual relationship between two adults, and
it's not really my problem.

  So the truth comes out: You don't want two people to consent to
engage in mutual behaviour that you find reprehensible, even if that
behaviour doesn't affect other people.

  That's an attempt at massive censorship, and make me understand your
comments about "dictates".  "Methinks you doth protest too much."  

  Alan DeKok.