Subject: CAP: implications of fanout

From: John Stracke <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2001 14:37:04 -0400

Section 2.4 ("Security Model") points out that CAP's wide variety of 
connectivity scenarios complicates the security model; personally, I'd 
consider that another argument against fanout.

If we remove fanout, there is a lot of text in the draft to be removed. 
A probably-incomplete list:

    * 2.6: "A qualified calendar address is required when the <csid> of
      the target calendar address differs from that of the CAP server
      receiving the command".
    * 7.2.1.7, 7.2.2.{2,3,4}: response 2.2 makes sense only in case of
      fanout.
    * 8: response 2.0.6 makes sense only in case of fanout.

-- 
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