Subject: [Capwap] lwapp-dtls: section 2.1

From: Scott G Kelly <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 07:01:20 -0800

>   A direct consequence of this is that with DTLS encapsulation, we
>    cannot distinguish between control traffic and data without first
>    decrypting the packet - this means we must establish separate
>    channels if we do not wish to encrypt data channel traffic.  Two
>    methods for accomplishing this are discussed below.
> [NCW] For clarity, it would be useful to precede this section with a
 > description of the DTLS encapsulation as LWAPP over DTLS as I believe
 > the above description has instantiated (up until this section, it was
 > unclear as to how the transport layering was being invoked).  With
 >this encapsulation, there must be some mechanism by which during the
 > DTLS authentication the roles of each must be asserted to ensure
 > that the keys resulting from a successful DTLS authentication are
 > used to only protect LWAPP.

Okay, we can add little more text explicitly describing the dtls record 
layer encapulation. As for roles, this is the same problem lwapp 
currently contends with (section 10.4), so again, we can leave that 
where it is or cut/paste it here.

Scott

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