Subject: Re: [Cfrg] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-03.txt

From: "Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 14:14:53 +0700

Good afternoon, dear colleagues!

The security analysis for the construction described in the draft has been
refined and updated, it is now publicly available at IACR ePrint:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1057.pdf

Best regards,
Stanislav

пн, 22 окт. 2018 г. в 2:59, N6ghost <[email-masked]>:

> On Sun, 21 Oct 2018 09:02:58 -0700
> [email-masked] wrote:
>
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > directories. This draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum RG of the
> > IRTF.
> >
> >         Title           : Randomness Improvements for Security
> > Protocols Authors         : Cas Cremers
> >                           Luke Garratt
> >                           Stanislav Smyshlyaev
> >                           Nick Sullivan
> >                           Christopher A. Wood
> >       Filename        :
> > draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-03.txt Pages           : 9
> >       Date            : 2018-10-21
> >
> > Abstract:
> >    Randomness is a crucial ingredient for TLS and related security
> >    protocols.  Weak or predictable "cryptographically-strong"
> >    pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited
> >    for malicious purposes.  The Dual EC random number backdoor and
> >    Debian bugs are relevant examples of this problem.  An initial
> >    entropy source that seeds a CSPRNG might be weak or broken as well,
> >    which can also lead to critical and systemic security problems.
> > This document describes a way for security protocol participants to
> >    augment their CSPRNGs using long-term private keys.  This improves
> >    randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs.
> >
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> >
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements/
> >
> > There are also htmlized versions available at:
> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-03
> >
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-03
> >
> > A diff from the previous version is available at:
> >
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-03
> >
> >
> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> > submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at
> > tools.ietf.org.
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cfrg mailing list
> > [email-masked]
> > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
> still reading the paper, but this seems like a good solution. its not
> unlike the way OpenBSD does it. the take the hardware generated
> randomness and use it as seed to another random generator.
>
> the general idea in OpenBSD was to have two random gens. one HW and
> one SW.
>
> -N6Ghost
>
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