Subject: [Ietf-not43] clear delineation of functions

From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 10:28:03 -0500

I've been thinking about the separation issues some. What about this:

CRISP is intended to function as a query-processing interface to the
various distributed databases which are commonly used for provisioning
Internet resources. Towards this end, CRISP is primarily intended to
provide read-only access to databases which contain provisioning data.
Administrators of leaf-nodes may also choose to use CRISP as a
provisioning tool (either in conjunction with other tools, or as the only
tool), although this usage is not a CRISP design objective.

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/

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From: [email-masked] (Andrew Newton)
Date: 22 Apr 2002 12:22:24 -0400

> tool), although this usage is not a CRISP design objective.

Well, this isn't what I was refering to.  I was simply drawing a
distinction between the provisioning protocol or something that might
ought to be in it versus the administrative access protocol.

Besides, in a system where delegation is so central a concept, where do
you draw the line in saying something is a leaf node?  Even just looking
at the "official" delegations, it varies from TLD to TLD.

-andy

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From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 11:42:37 -0500

Andrew Newton wrote:

> you draw the line in saying something is a leaf node?

Good point. Technically a leaf-node doesn't perform delegation (it's a
leaf-node).

"Resource administrators may also choose to use CRISP as a provisioning
tool (either in conjunction with other tools, or as the only tool),
although this usage is not a CRISP design objective."

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From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 22:25:28 -0400

Howdy,

I'm not sure I'd even go this far:

> although this usage is not a CRISP design objective."

Somebody, sometime, might like to specify some CRISP-friendly
provisioning tools, but that is such another kettle of fish that
I think it would distract from the design of the appropriate
_query_ protocol/service to think that CRISP _could_ be used for 
provisioning.

Leslie.

-- 

-------------------------------------------------------------------
"An essential element of a successful journey
    is recognizing when you have arrived."
   -- ThinkingCat

Leslie Daigle
[email-masked]
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From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 21:31:53 -0500

> _query_ protocol/service to think that CRISP _could_ be used for

Yes, I agree with you in a roundabout way. Obviously somebody that is
looking at a piece of data *could* edit that data. But what I am really
worried about is having to spec things like pushing a distribute update
around to all of the delegation servers *shudder*

As to the issue which brought all of this up, if we spec CRISP as just a
query submission/referral navigation system, then we don't have to worry
about the other usages which would further complicate it, and this
includes the actor-with-court-order issue. Let's leave them out of it.
Those folks should be going to the provisioning system where all of the
data presumably exists.

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From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 22:39:50 -0400

Howdy,

I'm not going to give that one up easily, in that today's whois
service is in fact used by law enforcement agencies to dig up
information.

I don't really think we can sweep that into the backend, or
call it a different problem.

One intention of the scenario was to illustrate that there
is a need to allow differentiated access, and I think we
have to explore that -- even if only looking at the query
end of the stick.

Leslie.

-- 

Leslie Daigle
[email-masked]

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From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 21:53:37 -0500

> service is in fact used by law enforcement agencies to dig up

The same whois that the rest of us mortals use? I could see that they
would use this as a first-round approximation, but I would hope they don't
rely on it as a credible source. Billing information from credit cards is
where the warrants and subpoenas should go, and that data won't be
available through any view of any CRISP schema under discussion.

> have to explore that -- even if only looking at the query

There is absolutely going to be a need for differentiated access within
and accross organizations. I don't know if we should formalize access and
schema for a specific collection of users however.

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From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 23:17:59 -0400

Howdy,

> The same whois that the rest of us mortals use? I could see that they

Scary, isn't  it?  :-)  No, it's not that bad -- see below.

> available through any view of any CRISP schema under discussion.

True -- but we're also talking about FINDING where to direct
more, umm, detailed investigations, when the basic contact info
is not accessible publicly.

And,

> schema for a specific collection of users however.

I (think I) agree, although we'll probably thumb-wrestle more
on the details of this later when we get down to specifics...

Leslie.

-- 

Leslie Daigle
[email-masked]

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From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 22:28:31 -0500

Leslie Daigle wrote:

> we're also talking about FINDING where to direct more, umm, detailed
> investigations, when the basic contact info is not accessible publicly.

Continue. Do you mean that they should be able to determine who the
delegating authority is, or that they should be able to view hidden
information? The former can be determined from the public view.

If the latter, do you mean that a certain group of certificates (or
whatever) should get a certain level of permissions, and that we need to
document this? Can't we just say "intended to provide read-only access to
public information" and then make the lawyers earn their hourlies if they
want more than that?

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From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 23:33:05 -0400

Howdy,

> information? The former can be determined from the public view.

I mean determining the authority based on a query that is
no longer supported in the public view (or across data that
is no longer publicly accessible).

Such as a search on name -- in VeriSign's whois server today:

> Aborting search 10 records found .....
>   Daigle (DAIGLEPE-DOM)                                             DAIGLEPE.COM
>   Daigle (DA24606-OR)             [email-masked]                   9496424798
>   Daigle & Associates (HYPERTEXAS-DOM)                            HYPERTEXAS.COM
>   Daigle Communication Graphique (DAIGLECOMMUNICATION-DOM)
>                                                          DAIGLECOMMUNICATION.COM
>   Daigle Design (ROCKREQUIEM-DOM)                                ROCKREQUIEM.COM
>   Daigle Design (KITCHENSUPPLIES2-DOM)                       KITCHENSUPPLIES.COM
>   Daigle Design (TOWNCAM3-DOM)                                       TOWNCAM.NET
>   Daigle Design (WINDOWSHOPPINGUSA-DOM)                    WINDOWSHOPPINGUSA.COM
>   Daigle Design (JETFLYER2-DOM)                                     JETFLYER.NET
>   Daigle Design (WELLSBLOOMFIELD-DOM)                        WELLSBLOOMFIELD.COM
> 

> public information" and then make the lawyers earn their hourlies if they

One possibility is to provide the ability to support class-like
certificates.  Everything else is, indeed, someone else's job.

Leslie.

-- 

Leslie Daigle
[email-masked]

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From: [email-masked] (Eric A. Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 22:56:40 -0500

> is no longer publicly accessible).

If the data is no longer available or is no longer public, then I don't
know what good a system which is designed primarily for read-only access
to public data would be. At that point they need to get access to the
backups or some other part of the provisioning system.

> certificates.

I know we're just bouncing ideas around, but refresh your memory with 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-11/10/110l-111099-idx.html
and ask Fred Baker about it. I don't think you'll get a very different
response on this one. Same hot-buttons.

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From: [email-masked] (Leslie Daigle)
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2002 11:07:21 -0400

Disagree.  The definition of "public" is perhaps at fault --
I am attempting to distinguish between that data which
is anonymously accessible to any user of the Internet, and
that which requires authenticated, or at least non-anonymous,
access.  All the data in question may be considered "public",
or at least not "private".

Leslie.

"Eric A. Hall" wrote:
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-- 

Leslie Daigle
[email-masked]