Subject: [dane] You're doing it wrong...

From: Warren Kumari <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 19:48:05 -0400

Cross posted:
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http://i.imgur.com/oTSPF.png

here's the site: https://www.certigna.fr/crl/

looks like private keys are exposed. 
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Probably not a big issue... 

W

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From: Warren Kumari <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 19:56:08 -0400

> Cross posted:

But many lists and twitter seem entertained...

W

> W
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From: Paul Wouters <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 21:35:22 -0400 (EDT)

> Cross posted:

Hey, at least we can write our own revocation for the entire CA :)

Paul

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From: Paul Wouters <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 21:45:22 -0400 (EDT)

> Hey, at least we can write our own revocation for the entire CA :)

Also: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=393166

Paul

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From: Peter Gutmann <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2011 14:46:43 +1200

>Also: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=393166

That was the first thing I checked, it is a trusted CA.

Peter.

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From: Peter Gutmann <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2011 14:52:04 +1200

>Probably not a big issue...

These are private keys belonging to a trusted CA, how is this not a big issue?  
Given the universal implicit cross-certification in browsers, this means any 
cert, including CA certs, can be forged by the first attacker to crack the 
encryption.  If this is what it appears to be, it'd bring the whole 
browser-PKI house of cards down.

Peter.

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From: Matt McCutchen <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 08 Jun 2011 22:54:50 -0400

> browser-PKI house of cards down.

It appears to be the private key for the www.certigna.fr server,
encrypted with a passphrase.  The most you could do is brute-force the
passphrase and MITM connections to the subscriber portal.  Hopefully
they can replace the cert before you have time to do that.

-- 
Matt

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From: Peter Gutmann <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2011 15:06:57 +1200

Matt McCutchen <[email-masked]> writes:

>It appears to be the private key for the www.certigna.fr server, encrypted 
>with a passphrase.  The most you could do is brute-force the passphrase and 
>MITM connections to the subscriber portal.  Hopefully they can replace the 
>cert before you have time to do that.

Ah, so they're just server keys and not cert-signing keys.  Still, would you
trust certs issued by a CA that publicly posts their server private keys?

Peter.

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From: Christopher Morrow <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2011 23:39:08 -0400

> trust certs issued by a CA that publicly posts their server private keys?

kind of like lifelock, eh?

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2011 08:04:24 -0400

Would I? Almost certainly, I probably don't get a choice in the matter. Even
if I control my trust environment I am likely dependent on some party who is
dependent and so there is an indirect dependency.

The real issue is whether the site is trustworthy i.e. whether I should
trust it.

Heck, the local power station runs a control system with no security in the
local loop connection whatsoever.

As far as private key storage goes, I think a lot of people did the industry
a disservice when they went round demonizing the TCG work. As a result we
still have annoying copy protection schemes and private keys are still
vulnerable.

It would be nice if we could work towards getting code signing fixed in that
respect as being low hanging fruit.

On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Peter Gutmann <[email-masked]>wrote:

> encrypted

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/