Subject: [dane] Alexey Melnikov's Yes on draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-12: (with COMMENT)

From: "Alexey Melnikov" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 03 May 2016 00:48:01 -0700

Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-12: Yes

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)

Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.

The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey/

----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

NOTE to editors: Thank you for addressing my earlier comments in -09, -10
and -12.

Despite many objections to publishing this specification I believe we
should run the experiment. I will vote "Yes" once DISCUSS-points are
addressed. I would rather see this experiment being done and fail (or
better - succeed), than to block publication of this document because it
is not perfect.

Some (edited) comments from Ned Freed that I (mostly) agree with:

1) In Section 3:

When describing unquoting and unescaping, I think it would be useful to
give an example, for example all of the following are equivalent and must
result in the same hashed value:

(1) [email-masked]
(2) first . last @example.com
(3) "first.last"@example.com
(4) "\f\i\r\s\t.last"@example.com

2)

5.1.  Obtaining an OpenPGP key for a specific email address

   If no OpenPGP public keys are known for an email address, an
   OPENPGPKEY DNS lookup MAY be performed to seek the OpenPGP public key
   that corresponds to that email address.  This public key can then be
   used to verify a received signed message or can be used to send out
   an encrypted email message.  An application whose attempt fails to
   retrieve a DNSSEC verified OPENPGPKEY RR from the DNS should remember
   that failure for some time to avoid sending out a DNS request for
   each email message the application is sending out; such DNS requests
   constitute a privacy leak

Should the document give a specific recommendation about "remember for
some time"? Is it tied to TTL for the corresponding RR?
If you can provide some additional text explaining what is reasonable (or
not) here, that would improve the specification.