Subject: [dns-privacy] More detailed documentation required for an end user understanding

From: Tariq Saraj <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 15:39:54 +0500

Dear group fellows,
RFC7626 and RFC7258 discussing Privacy concerns on more technical grounds.
In conjunction the NIST explains PII as any information that can be used to
distinguish and trace an individual among the group of users.
For distinguishing or tracing individual requires to identify him/her
first.
.
May I know if there is a document that can explain that the two main issues
discussed in RFC7626 "Identification of IP and in some cases application"
can reveal Identity of an end user and how ?
Because only after that, one can argue that there is a harm to identity
theft, embarrassment, or blackmail, A loss of public trust, legal
liability, or remediation costs with an end user.
.
In simple the Impact of PM should be very clear regarding an end user
understanding.

-- 
Regards
Tariq Saraj

---

From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 14:38:31 +0200

On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 03:39:54PM +0500,
 Tariq Saraj <[email-masked]> wrote 

> Dear group fellows,

Frankly, I'm not sure I fully understand your message.

> For distinguishing or tracing individual requires to identify
> him/her first.

This is not true. It's the opposite: you trace an individual, without
knowing him and, if you want and can, you try to identify her. But, in
some use cases, tracing is enough (research in marketing, for
instance).

> May I know if there is a document that can explain that the two main
> issues discussed in RFC7626 "Identification of IP and in some cases
> application"

I disagree with this summary of RFC 7626. 

> can reveal Identity of an end user and how ?

I don't think we have the same approach of security. You seem to say
that, while the attacker did not get everything he wanted, there is no
security problem. For me, if the attacker can get access to some
information HE HAS NO BUSINESS TO KNOW, if is already a security
issue.

"My" approach is, by the way, the most common in security: do not wait
until the ennemy is in the dungeon: even if he is still at the gates,
you have a problem.

> In simple the Impact of PM should be very clear regarding an end user

Text welcome.

---

From: Tariq Saraj <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 14 May 2016 22:34:27 +0500

Dear Stephane,
It is my responsibility to convey my message in more clear manners.
The important thing for me is your response for which I must say thank you.
Truly saying the statement you disagreed regarding "distinguishing and
tracing an individual, requires to identify him/her first" is not mine. I
referred it from "NIST Special Publication 800-122".
Also, the summary of complete RFC7626 was not the my intention but among
all the discussed issues, from a portion of the said RFC, I just pointed
out these two.
The working group is focused to develop standards to protect the Privacy of
an end user due to the plain text messaging of DNS. In that case there
should be some details about the issues that can reveal PII of end user
instead of application or IP.
When I capture DNS traffic in some sniffing tools such as Wireshark,
Instead of other potential attacks regarding DNS protocol, I don't see how
to map the problem with the PII of end user.

-- 
Regards
Tariq Saraj

---

From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 14 May 2016 11:16:31 -0800

Hi, Tariq - where I think you're parting company with the working
group is in the belief that there must be some way of deriving
identity information from the surveilled data.  That's actually
not the case - for example, an observer should not be able to
determine what sort of material a user is reading, which websites
they're visiting, and so on.  In many cases an observer already
has identifying information or can get it, or can infer it from
metadata (see, for example, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/with-a-few-bits-of-data-researchers-identify-anonymous-people/?_r=0).
So, you may want to reconsider your assumptions about the parameters
of the problem.

Melinda

---

From: Muhammad Yousaf <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 09:15:00 +0000 (UTC)

Hi dear,I read the article in the given link. Although it discussed the issues in general, however, it does not discuss any privacy concerning issue particular to the DNS/DNSSEC. I request the community to kindly share the document discussing privacy issues particular to the DNS/DNSSEC query/response. 
It would be interesting to explicitly discuss the issue in the following scenarios:1) DNS/DNSSEC Query/Response over IPv4 without NAT2) DNS/DNSSEC Query/Response over IPv4 with NAT (May also be in nested NAT) 3) DNS/DNSSEC Query/Response over the IPv6 
If an attacker monitors the number of queries from a user then he certainly can profile the user behavior. And, this behavior analysis can lead to tracing the user even in the crowd, I mean if a user is behind the NAT. This profiling becomes easier if the user is using IPv6 without NAT. 
Still, I think that these scenarios should be explicitly discussed in the documents. That will lead to identify the actual vulnerabilities in the protocol and will help to devise the efficient security solution for it. In my opinion, proactively shutting down the doors probably is not a very good idea.   
Thanks.
Regards,Muhammad Yousaf,Riphah International University, Islamabad
https://sites.google.com/site/muhyousaf/

    On Sunday, May 15, 2016 12:17 AM, Melinda Shore <[email-masked]> wrote:

Melinda

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