Subject: [DNSOP] Fwd: code points for brainpool curves for DNSSEC

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 18:00:39 +0000

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: code points for brainpool curves for DNSSEC
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 18:00:18 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]

Hiya,

The brainpool folks have written an I-D [1] that they are pushing
through the rfc editor's independent stream. [2]

That I-D wants to register code points for using their curves for
DNSSEC.

For documents that come through the independent stream, the IESG
does an RFC 5742 [3] conflict review. The purpose of that review
is to check that the RFC doesn't conflict with ongoing work in
the IETF.

If you have thoughts on this, please let me know before Dec 17th.
I'll forward this to the dnsop, cfrg and curdle mailing lists
to check there too. Apologies if you get >1 copy of this. Please
try follow up on the saag list if you can.

Thanks,
Stephen.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schmidt-brainpool-dnssec
[2] https://www.rfc-editor.org/pubprocess/
[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5742

---

From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 16:41:59 -0500

Objections so far

* The approach is dated (not fast prime rigid) and the randomness isn't
established to be rigid.
* DNSSEC requires a single algorithm for interop
* The code points are 8 bit and thus scarce
* We should do Curdle first.

I am opposed to Brainpool for all the above and in addition, I am opposed
because the biggest problem with ECC has been too many choices. If people
are given one choice, they will do it. If they have two then they will
probably do both.

With ECC we were given 16 choices by NIST and then the same again from
Brainpool and a few other folks. So what a lot of people did was to
conclude ECC wasn't mature enough to implement right now and adopted a
wait-and-see approach.

Brainpool was a good idea at the time it was proposed but the world moved
on and the effort is counterproductive now.

Since ACME and Lets Encrypt have been proposed, we can hopefully get away
from the bogus idea that the mission of DNSSEC was 'free' certs. The
utility of DNSSEC lies in being able to sign and distribute security policy
information so that applications can achieve 'secure on first contact'
security rather than 'secure after first contact'. For that to work, DNSSEC
has to be using the same set of algorithms that the applications are using.

The other area we might potentially leverage DNSSEC is to allow encryption
of the initial exchange in a TLS/2 by putting a 'host key' in the DNS. This
would allow the SNI and certificate exchanges to be encrypted. For this to
be practical, DNSSEC and TLS have to converge on the same algorithm and
curve.

---

From: Ólafur Guðmundsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 22:33:08 -0200

Stephen,

Sorry for being so blunt below.

The document totally content free as to why this makes any sense in an
operational context.
DNSSEC algorithms should not be given out lightly as there is a significant
COST to deploy support for each additional algorithm.

While I strongly support having better ECC algorithm that the currently
specified curves, adding a new ones SHOULD take place via a performance
oriented process.
Thus I strongly advocate that this publication be held up until we can
compare this curve with other curves being proposed.

Background I'm currently fighting an multifaceted battle to have various
entities adding support for ECDSAP256, specified over 3 years ago.

Adding and deploying a new DNSKEY algorithm does not just require changes
to
-- DNS servers, libraries and resolvers.

That is just the top of the iceberg,  but also to
-  DNS provisioning systems, DNSSEC signing systems, DNS testing tools,
 - user interfaces for registrars, hosting providers, third party DNS
operators, CDN's,  etc.
 - TLD and ccTLD policy documents, EPP implementations, plus in some cases
security evaluations,
 - not to mention firewalls, network monitoring tools ....
 and number of other things I had no idea existed and majority of which is
not maintained anymore.

There are only so many times that one can get everyone's attention to
upgrade DNS stuff, thus requiring the change process to be run should not
be taken lightly.
If on the other hand if the editors are only interested in vanity algorithm
assignment without any deployment then ...........

Olafur

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 4:00 PM, Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
wrote:

> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>

---

From: "Patrik Fältström" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 10:15:51 +0100

I have nothing to add to what Ólafur wrote below. I agree with his statement.

   Patrik

On 10 Dec 2015, at 1:33, Ólafur Guðmundsson wrote:

> The document totally content free as to why this makes any sense in an operational context.
> DNSSEC algorithms should not be given out lightly as there is a significant COST to deploy support for each additional algorithm.
>
> While I strongly support having better ECC algorithm that the currently specified curves, adding a new ones SHOULD take place via a performance oriented process.
> Thus I strongly advocate that this publication be held up until we can compare this curve with other curves being proposed.
>
> Background I'm currently fighting an multifaceted battle to have various entities adding support for ECDSAP256, specified over 3 years ago.
>
> Adding and deploying a new DNSKEY algorithm does not just require changes to
> -  DNS provisioning systems, DNSSEC signing systems, DNS testing tools, - user interfaces for registrars, hosting providers, third party DNS operators, CDN's,  etc.
> - TLD and ccTLD policy documents, EPP implementations, plus in some cases security evaluations,
> and number of other things I had no idea existed and majority of which is not maintained anymore.
>
> There are only so many times that one can get everyone's attention to upgrade DNS stuff, thus requiring the change process to be run should not be taken lightly.
> If on the other hand if the editors are only interested in vanity algorithm assignment without any deployment then ...........
>
> Olafur
>
>