Subject: RE: [Ecrit] NENA Comments on draft-ietf-ecrit-requirements-00 -Security and Reliability

From: "Michael Hammer \(mhammer\)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 15:27:51 -0400

Brian,
 
Routing information is rather broad and could be interpreted to mean an
SP can not manage its own proxy routing capabilities.  Could you make
this more specific to what you had in mind.
 
Mike

________________________________

	From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On
Behalf Of Brian Rosen
	Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2005 11:16 AM
	To: [email-masked]
	Subject: [Ecrit] NENA Comments on
draft-ietf-ecrit-requirements-00 -Security and Reliability

	More <delayed> comments from NENA: 

	Our requirement 3.6-16: Information and mechanisms used to
determine routing must be extremely reliable and available, which
implies redundancy, protocol stability, and resiliency is not adequately
addressed by I8.  Resilience against server failure: A client MUST be
able to fail over to another replica of the mapping server, so that a
failure of a server does not endanger the ability to perform the
mapping.  We also don't think this adequately addresses 3.8-1: There
shall be no single point of failure or 3.8-3: Special consideration
should be given to distributed Denial of Service of Service attacks.  We
recognize this is part of the security issues being covered in another
document.

	We do not find something that covers our requirement 3.6-17:
Routing information must be secured against unauthorized modification.
PSAPs (or perhaps a higher level civic authority such as a county,
state/province or national body) or their designated representative must
be the only entities permitted to change routing information.

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---

From: "Brian Rosen" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 15:39:07 -0400

In this context, we are talking about the mapping information.  Using
mapping information would distinguish our issue from your concern, would it
not?

Brian

  _____  

From: Michael Hammer (mhammer) [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2005 3:28 PM
To: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: [Ecrit] NENA Comments on draft-ietf-ecrit-requirements-00
-Security and Reliability

Brian,

Routing information is rather broad and could be interpreted to mean an SP
can not manage its own proxy routing capabilities.  Could you make this more
specific to what you had in mind.

Mike

  _____  

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of
Brian Rosen
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2005 11:16 AM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: [Ecrit] NENA Comments on draft-ietf-ecrit-requirements-00 -Security
and Reliability

Our requirement 3.6-16: Information and mechanisms used to determine routing
must be extremely reliable and available, which implies redundancy, protocol
stability, and resiliency is not adequately addressed by I8.  Resilience
against server failure: A client MUST be able to fail over to another
replica of the mapping server, so that a failure of a server does not
endanger the ability to perform the mapping.  We also don't think this
adequately addresses 3.8-1: There shall be no single point of failure or
3.8-3: Special consideration should be given to distributed Denial of
Service of Service attacks.  We recognize this is part of the security
issues being covered in another document.

We do not find something that covers our requirement 3.6-17: Routing
information must be secured against unauthorized modification.  PSAPs (or
perhaps a higher level civic authority such as a county, state/province or
national body) or their designated representative must be the only entities
permitted to change routing information.