Subject: [Emu] Tunnel requirements: a few comments

From: Yaron Sheffer <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2009 12:50:35 +0300

Hi,

Referring to Sec. 3.5 of
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-03, there should be
an indication to the application that is using EAP that such "strange"
authentication took place. For example, the VoIP server may than make sure
that only calls to 911 or 112 are allowed. Otherwise there is no way to
authorize the user without some backchannel into the AAA.

So I propose to add:

"The tunnel method, if it supports emergency services, MUST provide an
indication at the EAP or EAP-method level that such authentication took
place; the indication MUST be unencrypted but integrity protected".

Sec. 4.1.1 has requirements on algorithm agility. They are important, but
insufficient. I propose to mention that when the tunnel method uses
certificates, it MUST be possible to migrate to new algorithms for such
certificates as well. (This possibly belongs in 4.2.1).

4.5.1: I suggest to mention that even in cases where passwords are *not*
sent in the clear (e.g. challenge-response methods), server authentication
is still a MUST.

Sec. 4.5.4 mentioned "housekeeping functions". It would be useful to add
some detail here.

Thanks,

            Yaron