Subject: [Emu] [Errata Verified] RFC5216 (6357)

From: RFC Errata System <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 14:33:45 -0800 (PST)

The following errata report has been verified for RFC5216,
"The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol". 

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You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6357

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Status: Verified
Type: Editorial

Reported by: Benjamin Kaduk <[email-masked]>
Date Reported: 2020-12-16
Verified by: Roman Danyliw (IESG)

Section: 5.1

Original Text
-------------
   [3] Section 5 of BCP 86 [RFC3766] offers advice on the required RSA
   or Diffie-Hellman (DH) module and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
   subgroup size in bits, for a given level of attack resistance in
   bits.  For example, a 2048-bit RSA key is recommended to provide
   128-bit equivalent key strength.  The National Institute of Standards
   and Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes in
   [SP800-57].

Corrected Text
--------------
   [3] Section 5 of BCP 86 [RFC3766] offers advice on the required RSA
   or Diffie-Hellman (DH) modulus and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
   subgroup size in bits, for a given level of attack resistance in
   bits.  For example, a 2048-bit RSA key is recommended to provide
   128-bit equivalent key strength.  The National Institute of Standards
   and Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes in
   [SP800-57].

Notes
-----
RSA and DH computations are parameterized by their moduli, with singular "modulus" (not "module").

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RFC5216 (draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-13)
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Title               : The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol
Publication Date    : March 2008
Author(s)           : D. Simon, B. Aboba, R. Hurst
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : EAP Method Update
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG