Subject: [GROW] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-grow-filtering-threats-07: (with COMMENT)

From: "Kathleen Moriarty" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2015 06:05:02 -0700

Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-grow-filtering-threats-07: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Please add in the proposed text from the SecDir review to address his
questions:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05855.html

Additionally, I'd like to see the Security Considerations mention a point
brought up earlier in the draft, namely that the filtering could cause
traffic to be routed back through a path that doesn't have information
for that more specific AS.  As such, this essentially could cause a DoS
on that traffic until the BGP route allows for the new path for the more
specific AS.  The importance of mentioning this int he security
considerations section is to more explicitly call this out as a potential
DoS attack method.  The time for BGP to repropagate might be short(ish),
but that could be a critical amount of time during an event and maybe the
more specific AS is a web server farm or some other critical resource.